Uncategorized

Summary

This report analyses UK public attitudes towards the principles and policies of the asylum system in the UK. The findings provide a strong case to – and policy advice for – this Conservative Government for reforming the asylum system. 

The key findings are: 

• Just under half of the UK public say that one of the main reasons why irregular asylum seekers arrive in the UK is because they are ‘driven by the welfare benefits available here’ (48%).
• The UK public (50%) and 2019 Conservative voters (50%) are most likely to believe there is ‘hostile’ reception towards irregular asylum seekers who arrived in the UK, rather than a ‘hospitable’ reception, in terms of where asylum seekers stay when they are in the UK, the benefits they can receive and the rights available to them.
• The main policy priorities for the UK Government on asylum, according to the UK public, are a mixture of compassion and control: ‘providing asylum to all genuine refugees in need of protection’ (17%), ‘stopping the operation of people smugglers’ (17%) and ‘reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (16%).
• A majority of the UK public favours deporting irregular migrants, but favours due process when determining deportations, preferring that government remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been rejected (41%) rather than automatically (34%), as is the current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. 
• The UK public marginally favours due process when determining deportations to Rwanda under the new Rwanda asylum plan, preferring that irregular asylum seekers be sent only if they are not genuine refugees (26%) rather than automatically (24%) as is current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023.
• The most common reason among the UK public for supporting the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is to ‘deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (36% of those who supported the scheme).
• The most common reason among the UK public for opposing the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is ‘human rights concerns’ (50% of those who opposed the scheme).
• A majority of the UK public favours detaining irregular migrants, but would rather failed asylum seekers are detained (31%) than those waiting for a decision on their claim (23%).
• A clear majority of the public think that asylum seekers should be able to apply for humanitarian visas that can be offered overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum (57%).
• A plurality of the UK public support some form of expansion of resettlement schemes (48%), with the most popular option being that schemes be expanded from specific fragile countries but the number of places capped (19%).
• A plurality of the UK public believe that the Government’s policy priority on family reunification should be ‘reducing exploitation of it by people who are not in genuine need of protection’ (33%).
• The UK public favours due process on maritime push-back policies, preferring that UK authorities block irregular migrants arriving by small boats from going ashore, but only if the return of the boats is safe and in line with international law (44%), rather than even if it violates international law (26%).

In general, our research reveals that the UK public wants a mixture of control and compassion in the management of the asylum system. The public particularly prioritises due process, preferring asylum seekers to have their claims heard first before they are detained or deported.

Younger people, those on higher household incomes, those from London and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters tend to favour principles and policies that are more sympathetic towards and supportive of asylum seekers who arrive irregularly.

In contrast, older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to prefer principles and policies that are more sceptical towards and stricter on asylum seekers who arrive irregularly.

Based on our findings, Bright Blue proposes four policies that the Government should introduce: 

1. The UK Government should commit to an annual quota for the number of refugees under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, subject to official review each year, and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.
2. The UK Government should introduce a new humanitarian visa that would allow a capped number of asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum, subject to official review each year and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.
3. The Rwanda asylum agreement should be amended rather than abolished, and the UK Government should arrange for the removals of migrants to Rwanda only when they have had their asylum claims heard and refused and are failing to leave the UK voluntarily. 
4. The UK Government should reinstate for a long trial period the two-tier system that existed between April 2022 and June 2023, enabling and promoting differential treatment of refugees who arrived via legal routes and those who arrived irregularly. Only if the evidence after the trial shows that it impacts the decision-making of asylum seekers should it be made permanent.

Introduction

Until the Illegal Migration Act 2023 was passed, one could apply for asylum in the UK upon arrival in the country, after arriving irregularly or coming legally under a valid visa, such as a student or regular visitor visa and then applying for asylum. Alternatively, one could come to the country via a resettlement or family reunification scheme. There is a global United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettlement scheme, but most refugees come through a nationally-specific resettlement scheme; the UK Government recently set up such schemes for asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Ukraine, for example. 

Migration can, therefore, be divided into two groups: regular and irregular. Regular migration (sometimes referred to as ‘legal’) is when people arrive in the UK via visas and resettlement schemes. Irregular migration (sometimes referred to as ‘illegal’) is when people arrive in the UK without having obtained permission to enter, or violate the conditions of their visas. Irregular migration includes, but is not limited to, unauthorised border crossings, English Channel boat crossings and visa overstays. 

Over the past decade, the UK system for irregular asylum seekers has come under severe criticism. There are concerns that successive governments have struggled to control inflows coming irregularly, raising security concerns and putting unsustainable pressure on public services.[1]

Criticism of irregular migration has intensified in recent years, in particular around small boat crossings across the English Channel. In 2018 there were just 299 detections of small boat arrivals at the UK border. They climbed to 8,466 in 2020, before escalating to 33,029 in 2022.[2] The Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, has made one of his five key pledges this year to ‘stop the boats’. 

The Illegal Migration Act 2023 was designed to deter asylum seekers from coming to the UK irregularly, especially by crossing the English Channel. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 effectively bans asylum applications for nearly all irregular arrivals. It enhances the Home Office’s powers to detain and deport such asylum seekers. Under its provisions, deported migrants will not have a right to re-entry, settlement or citizenship in the UK. 

A major obstacle to remove nearly all migrants who arrive in the UK is that a high proportion of these asylum seekers come from countries that are not recognised as ‘safe’ by the UK, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Therefore, the Home Office needs to find an alternative safe country, besides the UK, that would agree to accommodate the irregular migrants. 

As of late Summer 2023, Rwanda remains the only country that has agreed to receive migrants who arrived into the UK irregularly and have been removed. This Rwanda asylum agreement was agreed in 2022. It allows migration authorities to send people to Rwanda who would otherwise claim asylum in the UK. Such departures, however, have been blocked by legal challenges, which at the time of writing, remain unsettled. To date, then, no irregular asylum seekers have been deported to Rwanda.

The UK is, however, not the only country that struggles to control irregular migration. While the Rwanda asylum agreement and the Illegal Migration Act 2023 mirror more restrictive asylum policies in countries like Australia and the US, international experience provides alternative approaches to better control and manage irregular asylum seeking.

Current polling of public opinion on asylum policy in the UK is highly informative, but tends to be limited on two fronts. First, there is little testing of attitudes towards alternative asylum policies. Second, there is a lack of understanding of how public opinion towards asylum policy varies by different socio-demographic and political characteristics. We were particularly interested in the views of 2019 Conservative voters because we currently have a majority Conservative Government, and the attitudes of their voters are prioritised. Our analysis is a response to both these limitations and thus complementary to existing research on UK public attitudes towards the asylum system.

Methodology

The polling was conducted by Opinium between the 19th and 21st of July 2023. It consisted of a nationally representative sample of 2,080 UK adults. The sample was weighted to be nationally and politically representative. The weighted base size for the sub-sample of 2019 Conservative voters was 703 UK adults. 

For technical reasons, polling question 3 was conducted separately between the 2nd and the 4th of August 2023.  It consisted of a nationally representative sample of 2,063 UK adults and was weighted to be nationally and politically representative. The weighted base size for the sub-sample of 2019 Conservative voters was 697 UK adults.

In our analysis, we only highlight significant and regular differences in attitudes between different socio-demographic and political groups. 

Nature of the asylum system

We first asked the UK public what they thought were the main reasons irregular asylum seekers come to the UK. This was to establish public attitudes towards the intentions of people claiming asylum – whether they are deemed to be in genuine need of protection or are ‘gaming’ the system. 

Chart 1, below, summarises the main findings. The UK public could select up to two options from a selection of eight. The most common view is that irregular asylum seekers are driven by ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’, which nearly half of the UK public (48%) believe. This is followed by 40% of those who view ‘To escape war and military conflicts’ as one of the main reasons for coming to the UK by irregular migrants. Notably, ‘To escape persecution’ is the third most popular perception, with about a quarter of the UK public believing this.

So it is clear the public are conflicted: they think there is a mix of intentions among irregular asylum seekers, some genuinely seeking sanctuary, others coming for the welfare benefits this country has to offer. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

As Chart 1 above illustrates, there is a pronounced difference between younger and older respondents, with younger respondents more likely to choose ‘To escape war and military conflict’ as one of the main reasons, whilst other respondents are more likely to choose ‘They are driven by welfare benefits available in the UK’. Pluralities of people aged 18-34 (50%) and 35-49 (43%) choose ‘To escape war and military conflict’ as one of the main reasons, but the majority of people aged 50-64 (60%) and over 65 (64%) say that one of the main reasons for irregular entries by asylum seekers is ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’. 

Those on the highest household incomes with income above £100,001 a year (56%) are most likely to say that irregular asylum seekers enter the UK mainly ‘To escape war and military conflict’. Contrastingly, the least well-off respondents are most likely to choose ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’ as one of the main reasons for irregular arrivals, with 52% of respondents with household income below £25,000 believing this. In fact, this is also believed by a plurality of respondents among those on household income of £25,001 to £50,000 a year (48%). 

London stands out among the English regions for its perception of irregular asylum seekers’ reasons for coming to the UK. A plurality of those from the UK capital (47%) regard ‘To escape war and military conflict’ as one of the main reasons for irregular arrivals. In contrast, a majority of those from the North (52%), the South (52%) and the Midlands (53%) believe ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’ as one of the main reasons.

A focus on variation by voting history reveals that while ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’ is seen as one of the main reasons for irregular entries by the majority of 2019 Conservative voters (72%), it is not as widely believed among 2019 Labour (32%) and Liberal Democrat (38%) voters. Chart 2 below illustrates variation across political groups. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

For both 2019 Labour (53%) and Liberal Democrat (48%) voters ‘To escape war and military conflicts’ is the most common view.

Among 2019 Conservative voters, differences in responses by age were evident. While the vast majority of older 2019 Conservatives – especially in the 50-64 age group (78%) – think ‘They are driven by welfare benefits available in the UK’ is one of the main reasons for irregular asylum seekers coming to the UK, just 50% of those in the 18-34 age cohort do, albeit still the most common view among the youngest 2019 Conservative voters.

It is clear that the perception of the reasons for irregular asylum seekers arriving in the UK corresponds with political views and socio-demographic characteristics. Older respondents, those on lower household incomes, 2019 Conservative voters and those from outside London are more likely to view ‘welfare benefits’ as one of the main reasons for entry into the UK by irregular asylum seekers. Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters, and respondents from London tend to be more likely to believe that ‘To escape war and military conflicts’ is one of the main reasons. 

We then asked how different types of asylum seekers and refugees are received in the UK This question aimed to capture how welcoming the UK public think the asylum system is.

Chart 3 below illustrates the findings. A majority of the UK public believe that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (50%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (52%) in the UK is hostile – measured by those who said that reception was either somewhat hostile or very hostile. In contrast, there is no majority opinion on ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’. The UK public is equally likely to say that the reception was hospitable – measured by those who said that reception was either somewhat hospitable or very hospitable – (34%) and somewhat hostile or very hostile (33%). More decisively, 44% say that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived via official routes’ is hospitable, compared to 25% who believe it is hostile. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is substantial variation across socio-demographic groups on the reception of different asylum seekers and refugees – ‘Irregular asylum seekers’, ‘Vulnerable asylum seekers’, ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’. 

All age groups are more likely to believe that the reception towards ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ is hostile. In all age groups this is the majority belief, except among the 18-34 group in which only 46% believe it is hostile, albeit still the most common belief. Across all regions, the UK public are more likely to say that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ is hostile, but only a majority of those in London (57%) and the Midlands (53%) say so. Across all income groups, except those with a household income of between £50,001 to £100,000, a plurality believe that there is a hostile reception towards ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (49% in each). Meanwhile, a majority of those with a household income of between £50,001 to £100,000 believe so (55%).

Meanwhile for ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’, younger members of the UK public tend to see the reception towards them as more hostile than hospitable, with 36% of those aged 18-34 saying the reception is hostile. By contrast, those aged 50-64 are slightly more likely to see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hospitable (38%). A plurality of those on the lowest household income, up to £25,000, see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hospitable (37%). However, a plurality of those with the highest household income, over £100,001, see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hostile (48%).

For ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’, there is little socio-demographic variation on whether the reception is hostile or hospitable. In all age groups, with the exception of those aged 18-34 in which it is the plurality (46%), the majority of the UK public regard that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ is hostile. Likewise, in all household income groups, but for those with household income between £25,001 to £50,000 where a plurality (49%) think it, more than 50% say that the reception of these refugees is hostile. 

For ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’, although there are more people saying that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is more hospitable than hostile across all age groups, younger people are more likely to say that it is hostile than older respondents: 31% of those in the 18-34 age cohort, compared to 18% of those aged over 65 saying so. However, across all age groups, the plurality belief is that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is hospitable, likewise with all regions. In terms of household income, a plurality of those with a household income of over £100,001 see a hostile reception towards ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ (42%). Yet, across all other household income groups, the plurality is that the reception is hospitable.

As Chart 4 below shows, there are also substantial differences in UK public attitudes towards the reception of different types of asylum seekers and refugees by voting history. In general, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to see the reception of different asylum seekers and refugees as hostile, rather than hospitable, than 2019 Conservative voters. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

More 2019 Labour voters believe that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (56%), ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ (42%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (55%) is hostile than hospitable. 2019 Liberal Democrat voters tend to think that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (58%), ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ (42%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (61%) is hostile. However, more 2019 Liberal Democrat voters judge that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is hospitable (37%) rather than hostile (32%). 

For 2019 Conservative voters meanwhile, a plurality of 43% and and a majority of 56% believe that the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is hospitable, respectively. More 2019 Conservatives find the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (50%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (54%) hostile. 

Among 2019 Conservative voters, there is some notable variation by age. A plurality of young 2019 Conservatives aged 18-34 are likely to believe that the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ (42%) is hostile. Meanwhile the plurality view among those 65+ (43%) is that the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ is hospitable.

For all groups of asylum seekers and refugees, except for ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’, 2019 Conservatives who intended to vote Labour if elections were held the next day are slightly more likely to see the reception of asylum seekers as hostile than the ‘loyal’ Conservatives – those who intended to vote Conservative if elections were held the next day. A plurality of ‘loyal’ Conservatives’ think the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ as hostile (49%), albeit still the most common view. Meanwhile, a majority of 2019 Conservatives who intend to vote Labour see the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’, as hostile (57%). 

Interestingly, a plurality of ‘loyal’ Conservatives (48%) see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hospitable. However, 35% of 2019 Conservatives who intend to vote Labour see this reception as hostile, the most common response. 

Only a plurality (49%) of ‘loyal’ Conservatives view the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ as hostile, while a majority (57%) of those 2019 Conservatives who intend to vote Labour do.

We, therefore, observe a clear pattern in the responses. With certain exceptions, younger respondents and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to perceive the reception of different asylum seekers and refugees in the UK as hostile than older respondents and 2019 Conservative voters. It is evident that the public perception of the treatment of different asylum seekers and refugees when in the UK varies with irregular migrants being perceived as facing greater hostility. 

We then asked the UK public to select the most important policy priority for asylum in the UK. This was to establish the overriding public policy priority for the design of the country’s asylum system. 

Chart 5 below illustrates the policy priorities for the asylum as selected by the UK public. The top policy priorities that are selected by the largest proportion of the UK public as the most important for asylum policy were ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ and ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ (17% each). This is followed closely by ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (16%). 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is a notable variation in responses across certain socio-demographic groups: age and household income. 

Young adults are more likely to want to prioritise the provision of asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection over the stopping of people smuggling. A policy of ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is the most important for those aged 18-34, with almost a quarter (23%) of them prioritising this. In contrast, older respondents – in particular those aged 65+ (24%) – are most likely to choose ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ as the most important policy priority. This is closely followed by 23% of those aged 65+ who select ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’. 

Those with higher household incomes are also more likely to prioritise the provision of asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection over the stopping of people smuggling. ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is the most popular policy priority among respondents with household incomes of over £100,001 a year (25%). Contrastingly, the most popular policy priority for those with household income below £25,000 is ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’, with one fifth of those on the lowest household incomes prioritising this. This is followed closely by 19% of those with household incomes below £25,000 choosing ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’. 

As Chart 6 below demonstrates, for 2019 Conservative voters, more than a quarter (26%) believe that the primary aim should be ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’, followed by 25% who prioritise ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’. This is not the case for either 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters, for whom ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is most likely to be seen as the most important policy priority (24% and 21% respectively). 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

Our findings also indicate substantial variation among 2019 Conservative voters, interestingly, maintaining the correlation between age and views on asylum policy priorities across the UK population. 

When it comes to age, the policy of ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is viewed as the most important policy priority on asylum by 2019 Conservative voters aged 18-34 (22%), followed closely by 19% selecting ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’. By contrast, the most popular selections for 2019 Conservatives voters aged 65+ are ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ (28%) and ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (26%).

Moreover, when it comes to household income levels, ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is most likely to be the most important asylum policy priority for 2019 Conservative voters with annual household income below £25,000 (30%). For those 2019 Conservative voters with household income over £100,001, the priority is most likely to be ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ (25%).

Finally, when it comes to region, 2019 Conservative voters from London are more likely to see ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ as their most important asylum policy priority (32%). By contrast, ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is, with slight lead, the most common belief by 2019 Conservative voters in other regions, with 24% of 2019 Conservative voters from the South, 26% from the North and 36% from the Midlands. 

Interestingly, we observe a significant difference between 2019 Conservative voters who intended to vote for the Conservative Party and those who intended to vote for Labour if elections were held the next day. While ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is most likely to be seen as the most important asylum policy priority by those 2019 Conservatives who intended to stay loyal to the Conservative party (27%), followed closely by 26% of ‘loyal’ 2019 Conservative voters selecting ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’. Only 12% of 2019 Conservatives intending to now vote Labour choose the former, with the most popular selection for these ex-Conservatives being the policy of ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ (27%).

Overall, the results demonstrate that the UK public wants to see a mixture of compassion and control in government policy on asylum. 

Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to prioritise a more compassionate approach, with ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ being the most common choice. In contrast, older and less wealthy respondents and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to prioritise policies that would increase control over asylum. For these respondents, ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ and ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ were the most common policy priorities. 

Current Government policies on asylum

The Illegal Migration Act 2023 means the UK Government wants to remove all irregular migrants immediately. We wanted to test whether the UK public supported this approach. So we asked the UK public whether irregular migrants should be removed from the UK and under what circumstances: immediately, after their asylum claim has been rejected, or not at all.

A plurality of the UK public believe that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’ (41%). The next most popular view is that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’ – what is now official policy under the new Illegal Migration Act. This is chosen by 34% of the UK public. As such, the UK public seems to differentiate between asylum seekers based on the validity of their claim; more people want to give asylum seekers a fair hearing, rather than a firm refusal. The results are illustrated in Chart 7 below. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is a clear difference between younger and older respondents, with the support for the view that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’ changing from just 17% for those aged 18-34 to 50% for those aged over 65. Instead, a plurality (43%) of those aged 18-34 regard that the Government should first hear the asylum claim before removal, compared to a minority (38%) of those aged over 65. In fact, over a quarter (27%) of those aged 18-34 believe that ‘The Government should not attempt to remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’. 

There are also differences by income. A majority (54%) of those with the highest household income above £100,001 believe that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’. However, for those with a household income of less than £25,000 a year, there is more division, with 38% saying that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’ and 40% believing that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’.

‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’ is the most common belief in all UK regions. Still, in London, there are more people (28%) than in the rest of the UK saying that the view closest to theirs is that ‘The Government should not attempt to remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’.  This compared to 10% of people from the North, 12% from Midlands and 13% from the South. 

Chart 8, below, sheds light on the variation across political groups on the question of the removals of irregular migrants from the UK. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

2019 Conservative voters are the most supportive of ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’, with a majority believing this (56%). The support for this approach is, however, much smaller among 2019 Labour (17%) and Liberal Democrat (19%) voters. The most popular belief for 2019 Labour (43%) and Liberal Democrat (58%) voters is that the Government should only remove irregular migrants if their asylum claim was heard and rejected.

The demographic variation among those who voted Conservative in 2019 largely follows that of the general public. 

The most common response for 2019 Conservatives aged 18-34 is that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’ (48%). In contrast, older 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to say ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’, with 61% of those 65+ agreeing.

We observe a familiar pattern in responses by socio-demographic characteristics and past voting. Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters favour the view that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’. Conversely, older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters tend to support the current Government’s approach via the new Illegal Migration Act 2023 of the blanket removals for all irregular asylum seekers.

Ultimately, a majority of the UK public do want to remove irregular migrants from the UK, but the plurality of the UK public is more likely to want asylum seekers to have their claim heard before being removed, rather than being removed automatically, thus showing that the UK public favour due process before deportation.

Having tested UK public attitudes towards the first major part of the current Government’s new asylum plan, the refusal of nearly all irregular asylum applicants, we then wanted to understand what the UK public thought about the second major part of their plan – the immediate deportation of irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda, which, as described earlier, is still pending following legal challenges to it. 

We therefore asked the UK public for their views on the deportation of irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda, specifically which type of asylum seeker they would support being deported. By doing this, we can again ascertain whether the UK public think differently about asylum seekers, this time in how they should be treated depending on the validity of their claim.  

Chart 9 below presents the findings. The two most common choices among the UK public are ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’ (26%) and ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (26%). Slightly fewer respondents believe that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ is the view closest to their own (24%). Again, the UK public seems to prefer giving irregular asylum seekers a fair hearing before taking action such as deportations to Rwanda. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

Younger respondents tend to oppose removals to Rwanda, as ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ is the most popular selection by those aged 18-34 (28%). By contrast, older respondents are more likely to say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (31% for 50- to 64-year-olds) or that they should be deported but ‘only if they are not genuine refugees’ (34% for over 65s). 

Respondents on lower household incomes, specifically those with incomes of under £25,000 a year (29%), are most likely to say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’. This is closely followed by 27% of those with household incomes under £25,000 who say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda.’ Higher-income respondents, meanwhile, are also significantly more likely to say that ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’, with a plurality (47%) of those with household incomes of over £100,001 a year most likely to believe this. 

Respondents from London most commonly say that ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (37%). This was also the most common view in the South, albeit very narrowly, with 27% saying likewise. In the North and the Midlands, the most common belief is that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’, with 29% and 30% believing so, respectively.

There were notable differences in attitudes towards what type of asylum seekers should be deported to Rwanda by past voting behaviour, as Chart 10 below demonstrates. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

A plurality of 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are critical of removals to Rwanda, with 45% and 46% respectively saying that ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’. Contrastingly, 2019 Conservatives are most likely to say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (40%).

A plurality of 2019 Conservative voters who intended to support Labour if elections were held the next day say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’ (36%), followed closely by 32% of those who say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda.’ In contrast, for ‘loyal’ Conservatives the most common response is that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (43%). 

Overall, while half the UK public are not opposed to the idea of removing asylum seekers to Rwanda, it seems to be their preference that genuine refugees are not sent. The plurality of the UK public would prefer for a deportation only to occur once an an asylum claim has been heard and it is shown that they are not genuine refugees, rather than automatic deportation to Rwanda.

Socio-demographic and political groups that are more sceptical of removals to Rwanda include younger respondents, respondents from London, respondents on higher household incomes and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters. 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower household incomes and older respondents are more supportive of the idea of removals to Rwanda for all irregular asylum seekers. 

We then went on and asked respondents to select the main reason why they opposed or supported the deportations of at least some irregular migrants arriving in the UK to Rwanda. This was so we could explore the underlying reasoning behind support and opposition to deportations of asylum seekers to Rwanda. 

Chart 11 summarises the main reasons for why relevant respondents support the deportation of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda. A plurality of those who support deportations to Rwanda say that the main reason for their support is ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (36%). This is followed by the ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’ option (22%). 

Base: 1,206 UK adults

Responses from young adults tend to be equally spread between the options. ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is chosen by 22%, ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’ by 19% and ‘Reduce strain on the UK asylum system’ by 17% of people aged 18-34. Older respondents, on the other hand, are clearly most likely to say that they support the deportations mainly ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’, as 45% of respondents aged over 65 say this. 

‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is the most common response of respondents in all regions. Notably, however, respondents from London are less likely (16%) to say that they support the deportations ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’ than respondents from other UK regions: 22% of respondents from the South, 22% of respondents from the North and 22% of respondents from the Midlands say this.  

2019 Liberal Democrats and Conservative voters are most likely to say they support deportations to Rwanda mainly ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’, with 43% and 44% respectively selecting this. The answers for 2019 Labour voters are dispersed, with 24% of 2019 Labour voters saying that they support deportations mainly ‘[to] Reduce strain on the UK asylum system’, 23% mainly ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ and 22% mainly ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’.  

We also polled respondents who opposed any removals to Rwanda to find out the main reason for doing so. This is shown in Chart 12 below. 

Base: 539 UK adults

‘Human rights concerns’ is palpably the most commonly cited for opposing the deportations to Rwanda (50%). Next, almost a quarter (24%) of the respondents who say that the Government should not attempt to send irregular migrants to Rwanda also believe that ‘​​The UK should take responsibility for determining whether someone who arrives here should be granted refugee status’. 

Although ‘Human rights concerns’ is the most popular selection for all age groups, a majority of those aged 18-34 (58%) and 50-64 (51%) cite ‘Human rights concerns’ as the primary reason for opposing deportations to Rwanda. Meanwhile, this is only the plurality response for those aged 65+ (41%). Those aged 65+ are notably more likely to cite ‘​​The UK should take responsibility for determining whether someone who arrives here should be granted refugee status’ as the reason for their opposition (31%) than those aged 18-34 (17%).

Those on higher household incomes are much more likely to prioritise ‘Human rights concerns’. Fifty-six percent of respondents with household incomes of between £50,001 and £100,000 a year put this as the main reason behind their opposition. By contrast, 44% of respondents with household incomes below £25,000 a year say this. 

Similarly, ‘Human rights concern’ is significant for the majority of female respondent (56%) but for only a plurality of male respondents (43%). 

The current UK Government has an aim – via the recently enacted Illegal Migration Act 2023 – to detain nearly all irregular migrants upon arrival for the purpose of removing them from the UK. 

To establish the views of the UK public on the use of detention for asylum seekers, we asked them to state their views on who should be detained. This was a multiple-choice question. We were clear that Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) – special facilities used to detain migrants for the purposes of immigration control – differ from other asylum accommodation, such as hotels, emergency accommodation and private housing, as they restrict the individual freedom of asylum seekers. 

The results are summarised in Chart 13 below. ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ is the most common selection (31%). The view that ‘Asylum seekers should not be kept in detention’ is the least popular (13%) of the seven choices. The public again seem to want to treat asylum seekers differently, this time based on the progress of their claim. 

Base: 2,063 UK adults

Support for the use of detention is positively associated with age. The view that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ is held by just 19% of 18–34-year-olds, but a plurality of those in the over 65 age group (45%). Young people are most likely to say that ‘Asylum seekers should only be kept in detention for a limited period of time’, with 25% of adults aged 18-34 saying this, compared to only 16% of those over 65. This is closely followed by 22% of those aged 18-34 who say that ‘Asylum seekers should not be kept in detention’.

Those with household incomes above £100,001 are most likely to say that ‘There should be exemptions from detention for vulnerable groups, such as victims of modern slavery, LGBTQ+ individuals, disabled individuals and unaccompanied children’ (37%). Contrastingly, that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ is the most popular answer in all other household income groups, with 33% of those in the under £25,000 income group saying so.

A variation in responses can also be seen across voting history, summarised in Chart 14 below. 2019 Conservative (44%) and Liberal Democrat (38%) voters are most likely to say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’. Conversely, the most popular views among 2019 Labour voters are that ‘There should be exemptions from detention for vulnerable groups, such as victims of modern slavery, LGBTQ+ individuals, disabled individuals and unaccompanied children’ (27%) and ‘Asylum seekers should only be kept in detention for a limited period of time’ (26%). 

Base: 2,063 UK adults

2019 Conservative voters from London are most likely to say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ (65%). This is the most common response in all other regions with the exception of the North, where 41% say this. Meanwhile, 42% say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained indefinitely until their asylum claim is processed’ and 43% say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained indefinitely for the purpose of removing them from the UK’. 

Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes and 2019 Labour voters are more likely to prefer an approach to detentions that include limits on the duration of detention and exemptions for vulnerable asylum seekers. On the other hand, older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters prioritise greater use of detention.

Ultimately, the majority of the UK public do support detention for migrants for the purpose of immigration control. However, the most popular individual belief is that this should only be done for those who have failed an asylum claim and have to leave the UK rather than automatic detention until their claim is processed. Again, the UK public emphasise due process – this time in determining whether someone should be detained.

Overall, however, there is a clear preference among the UK public to treat asylum seekers differently based on the process of their claim: the UK public would rather failed asylum seekers are detained than those waiting for a decision on their claim.

Alternative asylum policies

Having established UK public attitudes to the current Government’s main asylum policies, we wanted to test UK public attitudes towards alternative policies for managing our asylum system, rooted in international experience. 

International experience suggests a diverse range of policies to control and manage irregular asylum seeking that might be implemented in the UK. In this section, we therefore investigate the UK public’s views on potential alternative policies on asylum to manage asylum, rooted in some international approaches including: new humanitarian visas, modified resettlement schemes, modified family reunification and ‘push-back’ policies.  

One policy adopted internationally to tackle the problem of irregular asylum seekers, for example in Australia and Italy, is the so-called ‘humanitarian visa’. Humanitarian visas enable countries to provide relatively controlled and quick pathways for asylum seekers abroad to gain protection without the need for irregular arrival.

Humanitarian visas vary between countries. One of the most prominent examples is the Australian Global Special Humanitarian visa. Under the Australian Global Special Humanitarian visa, asylum applications are processed prior to asylum seekers arrival; successful visa holders are granted permission to settle in Australia.[3] Additionally, in response to the crises in Libya in 2011 and Palestine in 2009, Italy issued visas as part of ‘informal’ resettlement operations, and, upon arrival in Italy, their asylum claims were processed via the ordinary asylum procedure.[4]

Currently, humanitarian visa schemes also operate in Argentina, Brazil, France and Switzerland. Such humanitarian visas do not exist for asylum seekers wanting to come to the UK.[5]

We therefore asked the UK public what they thought about a new visa that allows asylum seekers to arrive legally for the purposes of claiming asylum in the UK. In the question, we informed the respondents that, currently, asylum seekers cannot apply for asylum in the UK unless they are physically present in the UK and that some countries have introduced such visas in the past.  

The results are illustrated in Chart 15 below. A clear majority of respondents are in favour of the introduction of a humanitarian visa, with 57% saying that ‘The UK should allow some asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally into the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum’. In comparison, only 29% of people say that ‘The UK should not allow any asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally into the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum’. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

The level of support for this humanitarian visa differs slightly according to socio-demographic and political differences.

All age groups have a clear majority in support of the introduction of this humanitarian visa. However, a larger majority of younger voters are in favour of the humanitarian visa than older voters. Sixty-one percent of 18–34-year-olds are in favour of the policy, compared to just 53% of those over 65.  

The majority from all income groups are in favour of introducing a humanitarian visa. However, those in the highest household income bracket (over £100,001 a year) have a significantly higher majority in favour of the policy (79%). Conversely, 54% of those with household incomes below £25,000 a year support an introduction of the visa. 

While the majority of 2019 voters for all three of the major parties say that ‘The UK should allow some asylum seekers to arrive legally into the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum’, there is a slight difference in the level of support shown by voters across each party. Those who voted Conservative in 2019 are the least likely to support the introduction of a humanitarian visa (51%), while 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters show higher levels of support, at 64% and 66% respectively. Chart 16 illustrates these differences. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

Among 2019 Conservative voters, young Conservatives are more likely to support the introduction of the humanitarian visa, as 58% of 18–34-year-old Conservative voters favour it. The support decreases slightly with age, with 51% of 2019 Conservative voters above 65 being in favour of the idea. 

Those 2019 Conservative voters that intended to vote Labour if elections were held the next day are much more likely to support the humanitarian visa. Sixty-three percent of 2019 Conservative voters that intended to vote Labour support the idea of the new visa. This contrasts with a plurality (49%) of ‘loyal’ 2019 Conservative voters saying the same.

The results demonstrate a majority support for the introduction of a new visa that would allow asylum seekers to legally come into the UK to claim asylum here. This outcome is consistent across socio-demographic and political groups, with only a few specific exceptions. 

As with previous results, younger respondents, those on higher household incomes and 2019 Liberal Democrat and Labour voters are generally more likely to support the idea. Older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters are less favourable of the introduction of the visa, however, with minor exceptions, a majority of them still support it. 

Next, we tested UK public attitudes towards family reunification of refugees, which has been used in different countries to both widen and restrict access for those seeking sanctuary. Under family reunification schemes in the UK, those granted refugee status can be joined by their immediate family members, such as their legal partner, children under the age of 18 and children over the age of 18 in exceptional circumstances.

On the one hand, family reunification can be used to expand legal and safe routes. On the other hand, restrictions on family reunification can be used to target one of the supposed ‘pull factors’ for irregular asylum seeker migration. For example, Switzerland differentiates between refugee groups, limiting the rights to family reunification for individuals with ‘F-permit’ protection status – individuals and refugees with temporary admission.[8] In Austria, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection – granted to individuals who do not meet the criteria of the Refugee Convention but can show that they would face a real risk of serious harm if returned to their home country – have to wait three years from the recognition of their status before they can begin family reunification proceedings.[9]

We thus asked the UK public what should be the UK Government’s main policy priority on family reunification. Respondents were informed that, in the UK, those who have been granted refugee status even if they arrived irregularly can also be joined by their immediate family members. Immediate family members include partners, children under the age of 18 and children over the age of 18 in exceptional circumstances.

The main policy objective of ‘Reducing exploitation of [the family reunification scheme] by people who are not in genuine need of protection’ received a plurality of support (33%). Chart 19 illustrates this. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is a 13 percentage point difference between the support for the preferred option and the second most popular main policy option: ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ (20%). This is followed by ‘Restricting access to family reunification to reduce total migration’ (18%). The answer that receives the least support from the public is ‘Making family reunification more accessible to refugees’ wider family members, such as parents and siblings’ (13%). The public, seemingly, is quite divided on family reunification, albeit expansion of eligibility is not popular. 

A plurality of older respondents believe that the main policy priority should be ‘Reducing exploitation of [the family reunification scheme] by people who are not in genuine need of protection’, with 42% of those aged over 65 believing this. This was in sharp contrast to younger respondents. For those aged 18-34, ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ is most commonly selected as the main priority (29%). 

Both 2019 Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters are most likely to say that the Government’s main priority when it comes to family reunification should be ‘Reducing exploitation of [the family reunification scheme] by people who are not in genuine need of protection’, at 40% and 39% respectively. In contrast, those who voted Labour in 2019 are most likely to choose ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ (30%). This variation is depicted in Chart 20. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

The UK public are seemingly divided on family reunification, although preventing exploitation is the most preferred priority. 

The data shows that younger respondents and 2019 Labour voters tend to support making it easier for refugees to reunite with their families. 2019 Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters and older respondents are most likely to prioritise reducing exploitation of the scheme.

Conclusion

This analysis has revealed 12 main findings on UK public attitudes towards the principles and policies of the UK’s asylum system.

• Just under half of the UK public say that one of the main reasons why irregular asylum seekers arrive in the UK is because they are ‘driven by the welfare benefits available here’. Notably, however, this is not the most common response for young people aged 18-34, those with household income above £100,001 a year, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters and the respondents from London. The plurality of respondents in these groups tend to say that irregular asylum seekers come to the UK ‘To escape war and military conflicts’.

• The UK public and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to believe there is ‘hostile’ reception towards irregular asylum seekers, rather than a ‘hospitable’ reception, in terms of where asylum seekers stay when they are in the UK, the benefits they can receive and the rights available to them. Notably, younger respondents and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are usually more likely to perceive the reception of different groups of asylum seekers and refugees as hostile than older respondents and 2019 Conservative voters. 

• The main policy priorities for the UK Government on asylum, according to the UK public, are a mixture of compassion and control: ‘providing asylum to all genuine refugees in need of protection’, ‘stopping the operation of people smugglers’ and ‘reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’. Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters tend to prioritise a more compassionate approach, with ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ being their most common choice. In contrast, older and less affluent respondents and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to prioritise policies that would increase control over asylum. For these respondents, ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ and ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ are more likely to be the main policy priorities.

• A majority of the UK public favours deporting irregular migrants, but favours due process when determining deportations, preferring that government remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has rejected rather than automatically, as is the current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. Support for this due process deportations varies greatly by socio-demographic characteristics and voting history. Younger people, those on higher income and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to believe in due process deportations. But interestingly, a plurality of older respondents and a majority of 2019 Conservative voters say that government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK automatically.

• The UK public marginally favours due process when determining deportations to Rwanda under the new Rwanda asylum plan, preferring that irregular asylum seekers be sent only if they are not genuine refugees rather than automatically, as is current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. In fact, the public are more likely to say that irregular migrants should not be sent to Rwanda at all than sent automatically. 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower incomes and older members of the public are more likely to support the idea of removals to Rwanda for irregular asylum seekers. Younger respondents, those from London and those on higher household incomes are less likely to support deportation to Rwanda.

• The most common reason among the UK public for supporting the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is to ‘deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’. This is consistent across age, region, household income and voting history.

• The most common reason among the UK public for opposing the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is ‘human rights concerns’. There is little variation across socio-demographic characteristic and voting history.

• A majority of the UK public favours detaining irregular migrants, but would rather failed asylum seekers are detained than those waiting for a decision on their claim. Whilst older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters prioritise greater use of detention it remains the case that across almost all socio-demographic characteristics, the plurality response is that nearly all asylum seekers are detained if they have a failed asylum claim. The only socio-demographic groups in which this is not the plurality response are those aged 18-34 who believe that asylum seekers should only be detained for a limited period of time, and those with a household income of over £100,001, who regard that there should be exemptions from detention for vulnerable groups.

• A clear majority of the public think that asylum seekers should be able to apply for humanitarian visas that can be offered overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum. While this result is consistent across socio-demographic groups and voting history, the majority support is slightly weaker among 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower household incomes and older respondents.  

• A plurality of the UK public support some form of expansion of resettlement schemes, with the most popular option being that schemes be expanded from specific fragile countries but the number of places capped. This is consistent across socio-demographic and political groups. Support for reduction of resettlement schemes is notably higher among 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower household incomes and older respondents. 

• A plurality of the UK public believe that the Government’s policy priority on family reunification should be ‘reducing exploitation of it by people who are not in genuine need of protection’. The second most popular answer – ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ – is more popular among younger respondents. There is very little support for expanding eligibility of family reunification to a wider set of family members.

• The UK public favours due process on maritime push-back policies, preferring that UK authorities block irregular migrants arriving by small boats from going ashore, but only if the return of the boats is safe and in line with international law, rather than even if it violates international law’. Compared to other socio-demographic or political groups, older respondents and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to support the measure even if it violates international law. 

Our polling shows that socio-demographic characteristics and voting history are often associated with differing views on the asylum principles and policy. 

For almost all questions, we observe high variation by age, household income and voting history. Gender and region are sometimes associated with certain differing views on asylum policy. Remarkably, for some questions, we observe significant variation among 2019 Conservative voters by current voting intentions. In particular, ‘loyal’ Conservative voters have significantly different views to those who intend to vote for Labour in the next general election.

Many variables in our sample are likely to be statistically correlated. We, therefore, cannot draw any conclusions on the causal relationship between being a member of a specific socio-demographic group or having a particular voting history and holding a certain attitude. 

Based on our findings, Bright Blue recommends four asylum policies that the UK Government should introduce to better reflect the UK public attitudes and better enable a reduction in the flow of asylum seekers arriving irregularly in the UK. 

Recommendation one: The UK Government should commit to an annual quota for the number of refugees under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, subject to official review each year, and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.

Our research showed that the UK public is favourable towards expanding resettlement schemes, if they are capped and preferably from specific countries. 

The UK Government currently operates four schemes that accept referrals from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): the United Kingdom Resettlement Scheme (UKRS), the Community Sponsorship Scheme, the Mandate Scheme and the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS).[13] With the exception of ACRS, these programmes are not restricted to specific countries and accept people from any countries, but usually from war-torn regions. 

In 2022, the UK resettled 1,200 people under the UNHCR resettlement schemes.[14] This puts the UK in ninth place globally in terms of number of resettlements under the UNHCR that year.[15] However, in the years prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, the UK used to resettle more than 5,000 refugees through the UNHCR resettlement schemes a year.[16]

Except for ACRS, the UK did not commit to a formal quota for the number of refugees under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, which makes the country an outlier internationally.[17] Quotas for resettlement schemes under UNHCR are used in the United States, EU member states, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and other countries. Most commonly, quotas are set as annual targets and are subject to annual reviews by parliament or a designated authority. 

Historically, resettlement quotas have been effectively deployed by the UK Government. In 2015, the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS) was expanded to resettle 20,000 of the most vulnerable Syrians fleeing the civil war by 2020.[18] The Vulnerable Children’s Resettlement Scheme (VCRS) launched in 2016 aimed to resettle 3,000 at-risk children and their families who had fled Syria and now were in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey by 2020.[19]

We, therefore, encourage the UK Government to commit to an annual quota for the number of refugees taken under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, subject to official reviews each year. The numbers taken should reflect the fragility of certain countries and the most common-sense countries for irregular asylum claims as evidenced in the policy recommendation below.

This expansion in this legal and safe resettlement route, clearly capped, would create more resettlement opportunities for asylum seekers from fragile countries without a UK specific resettlement scheme catering for them, thus particularly reducing the flows of migrants travelling irregularly, albeit marginally. A clear annual quota will also enhance public scrutiny of the Government’s conduct on resettlement.

Recommendation two: The UK Government should introduce a new humanitarian visa that would allow a capped number of asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum, subject to official review each year and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.

Currently, foreign nationals can only apply for asylum in the UK if they are physically present in the country. This is one possible reason why asylum seekers use irregular routes to come to the UK even when such routes are often dangerous and expensive. 

A new humanitarian visa would allow the UK Government to provide a legal and safe alternative for some asylum seekers while retaining control over who arrives in the UK. The Home Office could conduct the appropriate checks prior to the arrival and then use the existing process for asylum once the visa is granted and the recipient arrives. 

The UK already processes some existing visa applications online. A new humanitarian visa that can be applied for online would therefore technologically be open to almost everyone from wherever they are applying around the world. 

An annual cap on the number of places available under the new humanitarian visa would allow the government to control the inflow of asylum seekers in the UK, plan ahead the processing of asylum applications and ensure that asylum seekers receive appropriate welfare support and housing. 

A humanitarian visa could be designed to ensure a proportionate spread of successful applicants who come from specific countries, especially those countries which currently have a very high approval rate for asylum claims. For instance, in 2021, Iranian nationals constituted 29% of irregular channel boat crossings and were granted asylum in 89% of cases. The same year, 10% of channel boat crossings were nationals from Eritrea, and the initial decision grant rate for Eritrean nationals was 97%.[20] A new humanitarian visa could therefore potentially redirect some asylum applicants to legal and safe routes from irregular routes. 

This is why we recommend that the UK Government introduces a new humanitarian visa that would allow a capped number of asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum, subject to official review each year and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.   

Recommendation three: The Rwanda asylum agreement should be amended rather than abolished, and the UK Government should arrange for the removals of migrants to Rwanda only when they have had their asylum claims heard and refused and are failing to leave the UK voluntarily. 

The Home Office has so far not provided conclusive evidence that nearly all of those who arrive in the UK irregularly for the purpose of claiming asylum here are not in genuine need of protection. This is why Bright Blue cannot support the automatic removal of nearly all irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda before hearing their asylum claims. The UK public, as shown in our research, also tends to only support the deportations of asylum seekers to Rwanda once their claim has been heard and rejected. In other words, the UK public are looking for due process before such strict measures are applied. 

We believe that the Rwanda asylum agreement could be amended to ensure the removal to Rwanda of those asylum seekers in the UK who had their asylum claim heard and were refused asylum in the UK. 

Over the last decade, the number of people the Home Office removes from the UK has been in decline.[21] When asylum seekers’ claim is rejected, some of these migrants find a way to stay in the UK and fail to comply with the deportation notice by the Home Office.[22]

The ability to effect removals was substantially affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Still, even in the years prior to the pandemic, the total number of returns of asylum seekers was significantly below the number of refusals on asylum applications. For instance, in 2018, there were 1,665 returns, compared to 8,162 refusals, according to the available statistics by the Home Office.

One of the main reasons behind such low removal rates is the lack of agreements with third safe countries that would be willing to accept refused asylum seekers from the UK.[23] The majority of asylum seekers, especially irregular asylum seekers, come from countries that are not recognised as safe by the UK.[24] Hence, the Home Office cannot return these refused asylum seekers directly to their countries of origin – of the 3,632 people who claimed asylum in the UK and were refused in 2020, only 314 were returned to their country of origin.[25]

At the moment, the Rwandan Government has confirmed that it is ready to accept 1,000 asylum seekers during the trial period of the new Rwanda asylum agreement, but has the capacity in the long-term for more.[26] The Home Office currently plans to remove nearly all irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda, which is likely to be tens of thousands of people. This is unrealistic. Based on the available data, under our policy proposal, it would be more realistic for Rwanda to accept any asylum seekers who have had their asylum claims rejected.[27]

This is why we encourage the UK Government to use the Rwanda asylum agreement to remove all migrants to Rwanda only when they have had their asylum claims heard and refused and are failing to leave the UK voluntarily. 

Recommendation four: The UK Government should reinstate for a long trial period the two-tier system that existed between April 2022 and June 2023, enabling and promoting differential treatment of refugees who arrived via legal routes and those who arrived irregularly. Only if the evidence after the trial shows that it impacts the decision-making of asylum seekers should it be made permanent.

In June 2023, the Government announced that it would be pausing the two-tier system for refugee protection. Under the two-tier system, refugees that first arrived in the UK via irregular routes were granted Group 2 (temporary refugee permission) status.[28]

This meant they received permission to stay in the UK for shorter periods of time and had to wait longer to apply for settled status than asylum seekers who arrived via legal routes -such as family reunion visas or by already being here legally but on a time-limited basis – and received Group 1 refugee status.[29] While Group 1 refugees were granted permission to stay in the UK for a minimum five years and apply for settled status after this period, Group 2 refugees were only allowed to stay for a minimum of two and a half years and were entitled to a settled status after 10 years of living in the UK.[30]

This system, introduced under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, by the Conservative Government, was partially designed to deter asylum seekers from arriving in the UK irregularly and instead encourage them to use legal and safe routes.[31]

However, the measure was never properly implemented. In 2022, just 56 people received Group 2 refugee status, compared to 16,649 of those who received Group 1 status. This was likely affected by the slow processing of asylum claims.[32]

While we cannot support blanket inadmissibility rules that the Irregular Migration Act 2023 imposes, as they are very likely to exclude asylum seekers in genuine need of protection, we believe that it is right to try and reduce the ‘pull factors’ associated with irregular migration and reward those who choose legal and safe routes. 

If implemented appropriately, the two-tier system could potentially decrease the incentives to arrive in the UK irregularly. It should be noted, however, that for the two-tier system to be most effective, the UK Government should implement additional measures to raise awareness about the differential treatment of refugees who arrive irregularly and those arriving via legal routes among potential asylum seekers before they arrive in the UK. Currently, the evidence suggests the details of UK asylum policy do not impact on asylum decision-making.[33] The UK Government should also increase the accessibility of legal and safe schemes, as we recommend in this report, to ensure that asylum seekers have a real choice between irregular and legal routes. 

This is why we recommend that the UK Government reinstates for a long trial period the two-tier system, promoting differential treatment of refugees who come to the UK irregularly and refugees who arrive via legal routes, and ascertaining whether this affects the decision-making of asylum seekers.

Authors

Mikhail Korneev, Eve Redmond, Cosima Zaveta and Thomas Nurcombe

Acknowledgments

This report has been made possible by the generous support of Unbound Philanthropy. We are especially grateful to Will Somerville for his support and feedback. The ideas expressed in this report are those of Bright Blue and do not necessarily reflect the views of our sponsor.

We would like to thank Ryan Shorthouse and Bartek Staniszewski for reviewing and editing this report. We would also like to thank James Crouch, Calum Weir and the rest of the Opinium team for their hard work and attention to detail. 

Notes

The relevant data tables for the polling can be found here.

Endnotes

[1] Home Office, “New plan for immigration: policy statement (accessible), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/new-plan-for-immigration/new-plan-for-immigration-policy-statement-accessible (2023).

[2] Home Office, “Irregular migration to the UK statistics”, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-statistics (2023).

[3] Australian Department of Home Affairs, “Subclass 202: Global Special Humanitarian Visa”, https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/global-special-humanitarian-202#When.

[4] European Parliament, “Humanitarian visas: option or obligation?”, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509986/IPOL_STU(2014)509986_EN.pdf (2014), 44.

[5] UNHCR, “Humanitarian pathways”, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-we-do/build-better-futures/long-term-solutions/complementary-pathways-admission-third-0#:~:text=Humanitarian%20visas%20can,of%20each%20country.

[6] The Migration Observatory, “Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-to-the-uk-asylum/#:~:text=28%20June%202022.-,Refugee%20resettlement,in%20operation%3A%20the%20UKRS%2C%20Mandate%20Scheme%2C%20Community%20Sponsorship%20Scheme%2C%20and%20ACRS.,-Afghan%20Citizens%20Resettlement (2022).

[7] Home Office, “How many people do we grant protection to?”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-statistics-year-ending-march-2023/how-many-people-do-we-grant-protection-to#resettlement (2023).

[8] Stephanie Motz, “Family reunification for refugees in Switzerland: legal framework and strategic considerations”, https://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/11/201710-CSDM-UNHCR-FamReun-for-Refugees-in-Switzerland.pdf (2017).

[9] Asylum Information Database, “Not there yet: family reunification for beneficiaries of international protection”, https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Family-Reunification.pdf (2023).

[10] Migration Policy Institute, “Maritime migration to the United States is a reminder of chapters past”, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/maritime-migration-united-states-rise (2022).

[11] Helena Smith, “Greek government under fire after video shows ‘pushback’ of asylum seekers”, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/19/greek-government-under-fire-after-video-shows-pushback-of-asylum-seekers (2023).

[12] “British navy rejects plan to push back Channel migrant boats”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/british-navy-rejects-plan-push-back-channel-migrant-boats-2022-02-02/ (2022).

[13] UNHCR, “Resettlement country chapter: United Kingdom”, https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-handbook/wp-content/uploads/sites/153/2023/04/Country-Chapter-United-Kingdom-2023.pdf (2023).

[14] Home Office, “How many people do we grant protection to?”; Note that this figure includes only UNHCR resettlement schemes and excludes cases relocated under Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP), ACRS ‘Pathway 1’ and Ukraine schemes.

[15] UNHCR, “Resettlement data finder”, https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#eP4Z.

[16] Ibid.

[17] In 2022 the Home Office committed to resettling 5,000 people under ACRS in the first year and 20,000 in the following years. As of summer 2023, this target has, however, not been met.

[18] UNHCR, “UNHCR resettlement handbook: country chapter – United Kingdom”, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/40ee6fc04.pdf (2018).

[19] Ibid.

[20] Migration Observatory, “People crossing the English Channel in small boats”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/people-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats/#:~:text=Since%202018%2C%20the,2022%20(Figure%205) (2023); Migration Observatory, “Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK”.

[21] Migration Observatory, “Deportation and voluntary departure from the UK”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/deportation-and-voluntary-departure-from-the-uk/#:~:text=Return%20to%20top-,In%202021%2C%208%25%20of%20returnees%20were%20asylum%20seekers,were%20around%2010%2C600%20asylum%20returns%2C%20making%20up%2023%25%20of%20all%20returns.,-Figure%205 (2022).

[22] Home Office, “Asylum and resettlement datasets”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/asylum-and-resettlement-datasets#:~:text=Outcome%20analysis%20of%20asylum%20applications%20(MS%20Excel%20Spreadsheet%2C%20410%20KB)%0AAsy_D04%3A%20The%20initial%20decision%20and%20final%20outcome%20of%20all%20asylum%20applications%20raised%20in%20a%20period%2C%20by%20nationality (2023).

[23] Migration Observatory, “Policies to deter people from claiming asylum”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/uk-policies-to-deter-people-from-claiming-asylum/#:~:text=The%20lack%20of%20safe%20third%20countries%20willing%20to%20accept%20asylum%20seekers%20from%20the%20UK%20is%20one%20reason%20few%20people%20have%20been%20returned%20under%20existing%20policies (2023).

[24] Migration Observatory, “People crossing the English Channel in small boats”.

[25] Rajeev Syal, “Nine in 10 people refused asylum in 2020 free to remain in UK”, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/22/nine-in-10-people-refused-asylum-in-2020-free-to-remain-in-uk-home-office (2022).

[26] “What is the UK’s plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-61782866 (2023).

[27] Home Office, “Asylum and resettlement datasets”.

[28] Migration Observatory, “Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK”.

29] Group 1 status does not apply to resettled refugees that have different scheme-specific provisions.

[30] Sarah Tudor, “Refugees and asylum-seekers: UK policy”, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-uk-policy/#:~:text=The%20applicant%20is%20recognised%20as%20a%20group%201%20refugee%20and%20granted%20asylum%20with%20five%20years%E2%80%99%20leave%20(permission%20to%20stay%20in%20the%20UK)%2C%20after%20which%20they%20may%20apply%20for%20permanent%20residence (2022).

[31] Home Office, “Nationality and Borders Bill: a differentiated approach factsheet”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nationality-and-borders-bill-differentiation-factsheet/nationality-and-borders-bill-differentiation-factsheet#:~:text=discourage%20them%20from%20travelling%20to%20the%20UK%20by%20means%20of%20dangerous%20journeys (2022).

[32] Home Office, “How many people do we grant protection to?”.

[33] Migration Observatory, “People crossing the English Channel in small boats”.

Summary

This report analyses UK public attitudes towards the principles and policies of the asylum system in the UK. The findings provide a strong case to – and policy advice for – this Conservative Government for reforming the asylum system. 

The key findings are: 

• Just under half of the UK public say that one of the main reasons why irregular asylum seekers arrive in the UK is because they are ‘driven by the welfare benefits available here’ (48%).
• The UK public (50%) and 2019 Conservative voters (50%) are most likely to believe there is ‘hostile’ reception towards irregular asylum seekers who arrived in the UK, rather than a ‘hospitable’ reception, in terms of where asylum seekers stay when they are in the UK, the benefits they can receive and the rights available to them.
• The main policy priorities for the UK Government on asylum, according to the UK public, are a mixture of compassion and control: ‘providing asylum to all genuine refugees in need of protection’ (17%), ‘stopping the operation of people smugglers’ (17%) and ‘reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (16%).
• A majority of the UK public favours deporting irregular migrants, but favours due process when determining deportations, preferring that government remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been rejected (41%) rather than automatically (34%), as is the current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. 
• The UK public marginally favours due process when determining deportations to Rwanda under the new Rwanda asylum plan, preferring that irregular asylum seekers be sent only if they are not genuine refugees (26%) rather than automatically (24%) as is current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023.
• The most common reason among the UK public for supporting the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is to ‘deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (36% of those who supported the scheme).
• The most common reason among the UK public for opposing the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is ‘human rights concerns’ (50% of those who opposed the scheme).
• A majority of the UK public favours detaining irregular migrants, but would rather failed asylum seekers are detained (31%) than those waiting for a decision on their claim (23%).
• A clear majority of the public think that asylum seekers should be able to apply for humanitarian visas that can be offered overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum (57%).
• A plurality of the UK public support some form of expansion of resettlement schemes (48%), with the most popular option being that schemes be expanded from specific fragile countries but the number of places capped (19%).
• A plurality of the UK public believe that the Government’s policy priority on family reunification should be ‘reducing exploitation of it by people who are not in genuine need of protection’ (33%).
• The UK public favours due process on maritime push-back policies, preferring that UK authorities block irregular migrants arriving by small boats from going ashore, but only if the return of the boats is safe and in line with international law (44%), rather than even if it violates international law (26%).

In general, our research reveals that the UK public wants a mixture of control and compassion in the management of the asylum system. The public particularly prioritises due process, preferring asylum seekers to have their claims heard first before they are detained or deported.

Younger people, those on higher household incomes, those from London and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters tend to favour principles and policies that are more sympathetic towards and supportive of asylum seekers who arrive irregularly.

In contrast, older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to prefer principles and policies that are more sceptical towards and stricter on asylum seekers who arrive irregularly.

Based on our findings, Bright Blue proposes four policies that the Government should introduce: 

1. The UK Government should commit to an annual quota for the number of refugees under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, subject to official review each year, and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.
2. The UK Government should introduce a new humanitarian visa that would allow a capped number of asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum, subject to official review each year and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.
3. The Rwanda asylum agreement should be amended rather than abolished, and the UK Government should arrange for the removals of migrants to Rwanda only when they have had their asylum claims heard and refused and are failing to leave the UK voluntarily. 
4. The UK Government should reinstate for a long trial period the two-tier system that existed between April 2022 and June 2023, enabling and promoting differential treatment of refugees who arrived via legal routes and those who arrived irregularly. Only if the evidence after the trial shows that it impacts the decision-making of asylum seekers should it be made permanent.

Introduction

Until the Illegal Migration Act 2023 was passed, one could apply for asylum in the UK upon arrival in the country, after arriving irregularly or coming legally under a valid visa, such as a student or regular visitor visa and then applying for asylum. Alternatively, one could come to the country via a resettlement or family reunification scheme. There is a global United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettlement scheme, but most refugees come through a nationally-specific resettlement scheme; the UK Government recently set up such schemes for asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Ukraine, for example. 

Migration can, therefore, be divided into two groups: regular and irregular. Regular migration (sometimes referred to as ‘legal’) is when people arrive in the UK via visas and resettlement schemes. Irregular migration (sometimes referred to as ‘illegal’) is when people arrive in the UK without having obtained permission to enter, or violate the conditions of their visas. Irregular migration includes, but is not limited to, unauthorised border crossings, English Channel boat crossings and visa overstays. 

Over the past decade, the UK system for irregular asylum seekers has come under severe criticism. There are concerns that successive governments have struggled to control inflows coming irregularly, raising security concerns and putting unsustainable pressure on public services.[1]

Criticism of irregular migration has intensified in recent years, in particular around small boat crossings across the English Channel. In 2018 there were just 299 detections of small boat arrivals at the UK border. They climbed to 8,466 in 2020, before escalating to 33,029 in 2022.[2] The Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, has made one of his five key pledges this year to ‘stop the boats’. 

The Illegal Migration Act 2023 was designed to deter asylum seekers from coming to the UK irregularly, especially by crossing the English Channel. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 effectively bans asylum applications for nearly all irregular arrivals. It enhances the Home Office’s powers to detain and deport such asylum seekers. Under its provisions, deported migrants will not have a right to re-entry, settlement or citizenship in the UK. 

A major obstacle to remove nearly all migrants who arrive in the UK is that a high proportion of these asylum seekers come from countries that are not recognised as ‘safe’ by the UK, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Therefore, the Home Office needs to find an alternative safe country, besides the UK, that would agree to accommodate the irregular migrants. 

As of late Summer 2023, Rwanda remains the only country that has agreed to receive migrants who arrived into the UK irregularly and have been removed. This Rwanda asylum agreement was agreed in 2022. It allows migration authorities to send people to Rwanda who would otherwise claim asylum in the UK. Such departures, however, have been blocked by legal challenges, which at the time of writing, remain unsettled. To date, then, no irregular asylum seekers have been deported to Rwanda.

The UK is, however, not the only country that struggles to control irregular migration. While the Rwanda asylum agreement and the Illegal Migration Act 2023 mirror more restrictive asylum policies in countries like Australia and the US, international experience provides alternative approaches to better control and manage irregular asylum seeking.

Current polling of public opinion on asylum policy in the UK is highly informative, but tends to be limited on two fronts. First, there is little testing of attitudes towards alternative asylum policies. Second, there is a lack of understanding of how public opinion towards asylum policy varies by different socio-demographic and political characteristics. We were particularly interested in the views of 2019 Conservative voters because we currently have a majority Conservative Government, and the attitudes of their voters are prioritised. Our analysis is a response to both these limitations and thus complementary to existing research on UK public attitudes towards the asylum system.

Methodology

The polling was conducted by Opinium between the 19th and 21st of July 2023. It consisted of a nationally representative sample of 2,080 UK adults. The sample was weighted to be nationally and politically representative. The weighted base size for the sub-sample of 2019 Conservative voters was 703 UK adults. 

For technical reasons, polling question 3 was conducted separately between the 2nd and the 4th of August 2023.  It consisted of a nationally representative sample of 2,063 UK adults and was weighted to be nationally and politically representative. The weighted base size for the sub-sample of 2019 Conservative voters was 697 UK adults.

In our analysis, we only highlight significant and regular differences in attitudes between different socio-demographic and political groups. 

Nature of the asylum system

We first asked the UK public what they thought were the main reasons irregular asylum seekers come to the UK. This was to establish public attitudes towards the intentions of people claiming asylum – whether they are deemed to be in genuine need of protection or are ‘gaming’ the system. 

Chart 1, below, summarises the main findings. The UK public could select up to two options from a selection of eight. The most common view is that irregular asylum seekers are driven by ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’, which nearly half of the UK public (48%) believe. This is followed by 40% of those who view ‘To escape war and military conflicts’ as one of the main reasons for coming to the UK by irregular migrants. Notably, ‘To escape persecution’ is the third most popular perception, with about a quarter of the UK public believing this.

So it is clear the public are conflicted: they think there is a mix of intentions among irregular asylum seekers, some genuinely seeking sanctuary, others coming for the welfare benefits this country has to offer. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

As Chart 1 above illustrates, there is a pronounced difference between younger and older respondents, with younger respondents more likely to choose ‘To escape war and military conflict’ as one of the main reasons, whilst other respondents are more likely to choose ‘They are driven by welfare benefits available in the UK’. Pluralities of people aged 18-34 (50%) and 35-49 (43%) choose ‘To escape war and military conflict’ as one of the main reasons, but the majority of people aged 50-64 (60%) and over 65 (64%) say that one of the main reasons for irregular entries by asylum seekers is ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’. 

Those on the highest household incomes with income above £100,001 a year (56%) are most likely to say that irregular asylum seekers enter the UK mainly ‘To escape war and military conflict’. Contrastingly, the least well-off respondents are most likely to choose ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’ as one of the main reasons for irregular arrivals, with 52% of respondents with household income below £25,000 believing this. In fact, this is also believed by a plurality of respondents among those on household income of £25,001 to £50,000 a year (48%). 

London stands out among the English regions for its perception of irregular asylum seekers’ reasons for coming to the UK. A plurality of those from the UK capital (47%) regard ‘To escape war and military conflict’ as one of the main reasons for irregular arrivals. In contrast, a majority of those from the North (52%), the South (52%) and the Midlands (53%) believe ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’ as one of the main reasons.

A focus on variation by voting history reveals that while ‘welfare benefits available in the UK’ is seen as one of the main reasons for irregular entries by the majority of 2019 Conservative voters (72%), it is not as widely believed among 2019 Labour (32%) and Liberal Democrat (38%) voters. Chart 2 below illustrates variation across political groups. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

For both 2019 Labour (53%) and Liberal Democrat (48%) voters ‘To escape war and military conflicts’ is the most common view.

Among 2019 Conservative voters, differences in responses by age were evident. While the vast majority of older 2019 Conservatives – especially in the 50-64 age group (78%) – think ‘They are driven by welfare benefits available in the UK’ is one of the main reasons for irregular asylum seekers coming to the UK, just 50% of those in the 18-34 age cohort do, albeit still the most common view among the youngest 2019 Conservative voters.

It is clear that the perception of the reasons for irregular asylum seekers arriving in the UK corresponds with political views and socio-demographic characteristics. Older respondents, those on lower household incomes, 2019 Conservative voters and those from outside London are more likely to view ‘welfare benefits’ as one of the main reasons for entry into the UK by irregular asylum seekers. Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters, and respondents from London tend to be more likely to believe that ‘To escape war and military conflicts’ is one of the main reasons. 

We then asked how different types of asylum seekers and refugees are received in the UK This question aimed to capture how welcoming the UK public think the asylum system is.

Chart 3 below illustrates the findings. A majority of the UK public believe that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (50%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (52%) in the UK is hostile – measured by those who said that reception was either somewhat hostile or very hostile. In contrast, there is no majority opinion on ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’. The UK public is equally likely to say that the reception was hospitable – measured by those who said that reception was either somewhat hospitable or very hospitable – (34%) and somewhat hostile or very hostile (33%). More decisively, 44% say that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived via official routes’ is hospitable, compared to 25% who believe it is hostile. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is substantial variation across socio-demographic groups on the reception of different asylum seekers and refugees – ‘Irregular asylum seekers’, ‘Vulnerable asylum seekers’, ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’. 

All age groups are more likely to believe that the reception towards ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ is hostile. In all age groups this is the majority belief, except among the 18-34 group in which only 46% believe it is hostile, albeit still the most common belief. Across all regions, the UK public are more likely to say that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ is hostile, but only a majority of those in London (57%) and the Midlands (53%) say so. Across all income groups, except those with a household income of between £50,001 to £100,000, a plurality believe that there is a hostile reception towards ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (49% in each). Meanwhile, a majority of those with a household income of between £50,001 to £100,000 believe so (55%).

Meanwhile for ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’, younger members of the UK public tend to see the reception towards them as more hostile than hospitable, with 36% of those aged 18-34 saying the reception is hostile. By contrast, those aged 50-64 are slightly more likely to see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hospitable (38%). A plurality of those on the lowest household income, up to £25,000, see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hospitable (37%). However, a plurality of those with the highest household income, over £100,001, see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hostile (48%).

For ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’, there is little socio-demographic variation on whether the reception is hostile or hospitable. In all age groups, with the exception of those aged 18-34 in which it is the plurality (46%), the majority of the UK public regard that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ is hostile. Likewise, in all household income groups, but for those with household income between £25,001 to £50,000 where a plurality (49%) think it, more than 50% say that the reception of these refugees is hostile. 

For ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’, although there are more people saying that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is more hospitable than hostile across all age groups, younger people are more likely to say that it is hostile than older respondents: 31% of those in the 18-34 age cohort, compared to 18% of those aged over 65 saying so. However, across all age groups, the plurality belief is that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is hospitable, likewise with all regions. In terms of household income, a plurality of those with a household income of over £100,001 see a hostile reception towards ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ (42%). Yet, across all other household income groups, the plurality is that the reception is hospitable.

As Chart 4 below shows, there are also substantial differences in UK public attitudes towards the reception of different types of asylum seekers and refugees by voting history. In general, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to see the reception of different asylum seekers and refugees as hostile, rather than hospitable, than 2019 Conservative voters. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

More 2019 Labour voters believe that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (56%), ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ (42%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (55%) is hostile than hospitable. 2019 Liberal Democrat voters tend to think that the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (58%), ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ (42%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (61%) is hostile. However, more 2019 Liberal Democrat voters judge that the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is hospitable (37%) rather than hostile (32%). 

For 2019 Conservative voters meanwhile, a plurality of 43% and and a majority of 56% believe that the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’ is hospitable, respectively. More 2019 Conservatives find the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ (50%) and ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ (54%) hostile. 

Among 2019 Conservative voters, there is some notable variation by age. A plurality of young 2019 Conservatives aged 18-34 are likely to believe that the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ (42%) is hostile. Meanwhile the plurality view among those 65+ (43%) is that the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ is hospitable.

For all groups of asylum seekers and refugees, except for ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK via official routes’, 2019 Conservatives who intended to vote Labour if elections were held the next day are slightly more likely to see the reception of asylum seekers as hostile than the ‘loyal’ Conservatives – those who intended to vote Conservative if elections were held the next day. A plurality of ‘loyal’ Conservatives’ think the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’ as hostile (49%), albeit still the most common view. Meanwhile, a majority of 2019 Conservatives who intend to vote Labour see the reception of ‘Irregular asylum seekers’, as hostile (57%). 

Interestingly, a plurality of ‘loyal’ Conservatives (48%) see the reception of ‘Vulnerable irregular asylum seekers’ as hospitable. However, 35% of 2019 Conservatives who intend to vote Labour see this reception as hostile, the most common response. 

Only a plurality (49%) of ‘loyal’ Conservatives view the reception of ‘Refugees who first arrived in the UK irregularly’ as hostile, while a majority (57%) of those 2019 Conservatives who intend to vote Labour do.

We, therefore, observe a clear pattern in the responses. With certain exceptions, younger respondents and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to perceive the reception of different asylum seekers and refugees in the UK as hostile than older respondents and 2019 Conservative voters. It is evident that the public perception of the treatment of different asylum seekers and refugees when in the UK varies with irregular migrants being perceived as facing greater hostility. 

We then asked the UK public to select the most important policy priority for asylum in the UK. This was to establish the overriding public policy priority for the design of the country’s asylum system. 

Chart 5 below illustrates the policy priorities for the asylum as selected by the UK public. The top policy priorities that are selected by the largest proportion of the UK public as the most important for asylum policy were ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ and ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ (17% each). This is followed closely by ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (16%). 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is a notable variation in responses across certain socio-demographic groups: age and household income. 

Young adults are more likely to want to prioritise the provision of asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection over the stopping of people smuggling. A policy of ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is the most important for those aged 18-34, with almost a quarter (23%) of them prioritising this. In contrast, older respondents – in particular those aged 65+ (24%) – are most likely to choose ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ as the most important policy priority. This is closely followed by 23% of those aged 65+ who select ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’. 

Those with higher household incomes are also more likely to prioritise the provision of asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection over the stopping of people smuggling. ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is the most popular policy priority among respondents with household incomes of over £100,001 a year (25%). Contrastingly, the most popular policy priority for those with household income below £25,000 is ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’, with one fifth of those on the lowest household incomes prioritising this. This is followed closely by 19% of those with household incomes below £25,000 choosing ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’. 

As Chart 6 below demonstrates, for 2019 Conservative voters, more than a quarter (26%) believe that the primary aim should be ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’, followed by 25% who prioritise ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’. This is not the case for either 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters, for whom ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is most likely to be seen as the most important policy priority (24% and 21% respectively). 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

Our findings also indicate substantial variation among 2019 Conservative voters, interestingly, maintaining the correlation between age and views on asylum policy priorities across the UK population. 

When it comes to age, the policy of ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ is viewed as the most important policy priority on asylum by 2019 Conservative voters aged 18-34 (22%), followed closely by 19% selecting ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’. By contrast, the most popular selections for 2019 Conservatives voters aged 65+ are ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ (28%) and ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (26%).

Moreover, when it comes to household income levels, ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is most likely to be the most important asylum policy priority for 2019 Conservative voters with annual household income below £25,000 (30%). For those 2019 Conservative voters with household income over £100,001, the priority is most likely to be ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ (25%).

Finally, when it comes to region, 2019 Conservative voters from London are more likely to see ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ as their most important asylum policy priority (32%). By contrast, ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is, with slight lead, the most common belief by 2019 Conservative voters in other regions, with 24% of 2019 Conservative voters from the South, 26% from the North and 36% from the Midlands. 

Interestingly, we observe a significant difference between 2019 Conservative voters who intended to vote for the Conservative Party and those who intended to vote for Labour if elections were held the next day. While ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is most likely to be seen as the most important asylum policy priority by those 2019 Conservatives who intended to stay loyal to the Conservative party (27%), followed closely by 26% of ‘loyal’ 2019 Conservative voters selecting ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’. Only 12% of 2019 Conservatives intending to now vote Labour choose the former, with the most popular selection for these ex-Conservatives being the policy of ‘Stopping the operation of people smugglers’ (27%).

Overall, the results demonstrate that the UK public wants to see a mixture of compassion and control in government policy on asylum. 

Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to prioritise a more compassionate approach, with ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ being the most common choice. In contrast, older and less wealthy respondents and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to prioritise policies that would increase control over asylum. For these respondents, ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ and ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ were the most common policy priorities. 

Current Government policies on asylum

The Illegal Migration Act 2023 means the UK Government wants to remove all irregular migrants immediately. We wanted to test whether the UK public supported this approach. So we asked the UK public whether irregular migrants should be removed from the UK and under what circumstances: immediately, after their asylum claim has been rejected, or not at all.

A plurality of the UK public believe that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’ (41%). The next most popular view is that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’ – what is now official policy under the new Illegal Migration Act. This is chosen by 34% of the UK public. As such, the UK public seems to differentiate between asylum seekers based on the validity of their claim; more people want to give asylum seekers a fair hearing, rather than a firm refusal. The results are illustrated in Chart 7 below. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is a clear difference between younger and older respondents, with the support for the view that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’ changing from just 17% for those aged 18-34 to 50% for those aged over 65. Instead, a plurality (43%) of those aged 18-34 regard that the Government should first hear the asylum claim before removal, compared to a minority (38%) of those aged over 65. In fact, over a quarter (27%) of those aged 18-34 believe that ‘The Government should not attempt to remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’. 

There are also differences by income. A majority (54%) of those with the highest household income above £100,001 believe that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’. However, for those with a household income of less than £25,000 a year, there is more division, with 38% saying that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’ and 40% believing that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’.

‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’ is the most common belief in all UK regions. Still, in London, there are more people (28%) than in the rest of the UK saying that the view closest to theirs is that ‘The Government should not attempt to remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’.  This compared to 10% of people from the North, 12% from Midlands and 13% from the South. 

Chart 8, below, sheds light on the variation across political groups on the question of the removals of irregular migrants from the UK. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

2019 Conservative voters are the most supportive of ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’, with a majority believing this (56%). The support for this approach is, however, much smaller among 2019 Labour (17%) and Liberal Democrat (19%) voters. The most popular belief for 2019 Labour (43%) and Liberal Democrat (58%) voters is that the Government should only remove irregular migrants if their asylum claim was heard and rejected.

The demographic variation among those who voted Conservative in 2019 largely follows that of the general public. 

The most common response for 2019 Conservatives aged 18-34 is that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’ (48%). In contrast, older 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to say ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK’, with 61% of those 65+ agreeing.

We observe a familiar pattern in responses by socio-demographic characteristics and past voting. Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters favour the view that ‘The Government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has been heard and has been unsuccessful’. Conversely, older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters tend to support the current Government’s approach via the new Illegal Migration Act 2023 of the blanket removals for all irregular asylum seekers.

Ultimately, a majority of the UK public do want to remove irregular migrants from the UK, but the plurality of the UK public is more likely to want asylum seekers to have their claim heard before being removed, rather than being removed automatically, thus showing that the UK public favour due process before deportation.

Having tested UK public attitudes towards the first major part of the current Government’s new asylum plan, the refusal of nearly all irregular asylum applicants, we then wanted to understand what the UK public thought about the second major part of their plan – the immediate deportation of irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda, which, as described earlier, is still pending following legal challenges to it. 

We therefore asked the UK public for their views on the deportation of irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda, specifically which type of asylum seeker they would support being deported. By doing this, we can again ascertain whether the UK public think differently about asylum seekers, this time in how they should be treated depending on the validity of their claim.  

Chart 9 below presents the findings. The two most common choices among the UK public are ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’ (26%) and ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (26%). Slightly fewer respondents believe that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ is the view closest to their own (24%). Again, the UK public seems to prefer giving irregular asylum seekers a fair hearing before taking action such as deportations to Rwanda. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

Younger respondents tend to oppose removals to Rwanda, as ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ is the most popular selection by those aged 18-34 (28%). By contrast, older respondents are more likely to say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (31% for 50- to 64-year-olds) or that they should be deported but ‘only if they are not genuine refugees’ (34% for over 65s). 

Respondents on lower household incomes, specifically those with incomes of under £25,000 a year (29%), are most likely to say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’. This is closely followed by 27% of those with household incomes under £25,000 who say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda.’ Higher-income respondents, meanwhile, are also significantly more likely to say that ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’, with a plurality (47%) of those with household incomes of over £100,001 a year most likely to believe this. 

Respondents from London most commonly say that ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (37%). This was also the most common view in the South, albeit very narrowly, with 27% saying likewise. In the North and the Midlands, the most common belief is that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’, with 29% and 30% believing so, respectively.

There were notable differences in attitudes towards what type of asylum seekers should be deported to Rwanda by past voting behaviour, as Chart 10 below demonstrates. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

A plurality of 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are critical of removals to Rwanda, with 45% and 46% respectively saying that ‘None of the irregularly arriving migrants to the UK should be deported and sent to Rwanda’. Contrastingly, 2019 Conservatives are most likely to say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (40%).

A plurality of 2019 Conservative voters who intended to support Labour if elections were held the next day say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda, but only if they are not genuine refugees’ (36%), followed closely by 32% of those who say that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda.’ In contrast, for ‘loyal’ Conservatives the most common response is that ‘As many irregularly arriving migrants to the UK as possible should be deported and sent to Rwanda’ (43%). 

Overall, while half the UK public are not opposed to the idea of removing asylum seekers to Rwanda, it seems to be their preference that genuine refugees are not sent. The plurality of the UK public would prefer for a deportation only to occur once an an asylum claim has been heard and it is shown that they are not genuine refugees, rather than automatic deportation to Rwanda.

Socio-demographic and political groups that are more sceptical of removals to Rwanda include younger respondents, respondents from London, respondents on higher household incomes and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters. 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower household incomes and older respondents are more supportive of the idea of removals to Rwanda for all irregular asylum seekers. 

We then went on and asked respondents to select the main reason why they opposed or supported the deportations of at least some irregular migrants arriving in the UK to Rwanda. This was so we could explore the underlying reasoning behind support and opposition to deportations of asylum seekers to Rwanda. 

Chart 11 summarises the main reasons for why relevant respondents support the deportation of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda. A plurality of those who support deportations to Rwanda say that the main reason for their support is ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ (36%). This is followed by the ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’ option (22%). 

Base: 1,206 UK adults

Responses from young adults tend to be equally spread between the options. ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is chosen by 22%, ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’ by 19% and ‘Reduce strain on the UK asylum system’ by 17% of people aged 18-34. Older respondents, on the other hand, are clearly most likely to say that they support the deportations mainly ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’, as 45% of respondents aged over 65 say this. 

‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ is the most common response of respondents in all regions. Notably, however, respondents from London are less likely (16%) to say that they support the deportations ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’ than respondents from other UK regions: 22% of respondents from the South, 22% of respondents from the North and 22% of respondents from the Midlands say this.  

2019 Liberal Democrats and Conservative voters are most likely to say they support deportations to Rwanda mainly ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’, with 43% and 44% respectively selecting this. The answers for 2019 Labour voters are dispersed, with 24% of 2019 Labour voters saying that they support deportations mainly ‘[to] Reduce strain on the UK asylum system’, 23% mainly ‘To deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’ and 22% mainly ‘To have less migration into the UK as a whole’.  

We also polled respondents who opposed any removals to Rwanda to find out the main reason for doing so. This is shown in Chart 12 below. 

Base: 539 UK adults

‘Human rights concerns’ is palpably the most commonly cited for opposing the deportations to Rwanda (50%). Next, almost a quarter (24%) of the respondents who say that the Government should not attempt to send irregular migrants to Rwanda also believe that ‘​​The UK should take responsibility for determining whether someone who arrives here should be granted refugee status’. 

Although ‘Human rights concerns’ is the most popular selection for all age groups, a majority of those aged 18-34 (58%) and 50-64 (51%) cite ‘Human rights concerns’ as the primary reason for opposing deportations to Rwanda. Meanwhile, this is only the plurality response for those aged 65+ (41%). Those aged 65+ are notably more likely to cite ‘​​The UK should take responsibility for determining whether someone who arrives here should be granted refugee status’ as the reason for their opposition (31%) than those aged 18-34 (17%).

Those on higher household incomes are much more likely to prioritise ‘Human rights concerns’. Fifty-six percent of respondents with household incomes of between £50,001 and £100,000 a year put this as the main reason behind their opposition. By contrast, 44% of respondents with household incomes below £25,000 a year say this. 

Similarly, ‘Human rights concern’ is significant for the majority of female respondent (56%) but for only a plurality of male respondents (43%). 

The current UK Government has an aim – via the recently enacted Illegal Migration Act 2023 – to detain nearly all irregular migrants upon arrival for the purpose of removing them from the UK. 

To establish the views of the UK public on the use of detention for asylum seekers, we asked them to state their views on who should be detained. This was a multiple-choice question. We were clear that Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) – special facilities used to detain migrants for the purposes of immigration control – differ from other asylum accommodation, such as hotels, emergency accommodation and private housing, as they restrict the individual freedom of asylum seekers. 

The results are summarised in Chart 13 below. ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ is the most common selection (31%). The view that ‘Asylum seekers should not be kept in detention’ is the least popular (13%) of the seven choices. The public again seem to want to treat asylum seekers differently, this time based on the progress of their claim. 

Base: 2,063 UK adults

Support for the use of detention is positively associated with age. The view that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ is held by just 19% of 18–34-year-olds, but a plurality of those in the over 65 age group (45%). Young people are most likely to say that ‘Asylum seekers should only be kept in detention for a limited period of time’, with 25% of adults aged 18-34 saying this, compared to only 16% of those over 65. This is closely followed by 22% of those aged 18-34 who say that ‘Asylum seekers should not be kept in detention’.

Those with household incomes above £100,001 are most likely to say that ‘There should be exemptions from detention for vulnerable groups, such as victims of modern slavery, LGBTQ+ individuals, disabled individuals and unaccompanied children’ (37%). Contrastingly, that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ is the most popular answer in all other household income groups, with 33% of those in the under £25,000 income group saying so.

A variation in responses can also be seen across voting history, summarised in Chart 14 below. 2019 Conservative (44%) and Liberal Democrat (38%) voters are most likely to say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’. Conversely, the most popular views among 2019 Labour voters are that ‘There should be exemptions from detention for vulnerable groups, such as victims of modern slavery, LGBTQ+ individuals, disabled individuals and unaccompanied children’ (27%) and ‘Asylum seekers should only be kept in detention for a limited period of time’ (26%). 

Base: 2,063 UK adults

2019 Conservative voters from London are most likely to say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained if they have had a failed asylum claim and have to leave the UK’ (65%). This is the most common response in all other regions with the exception of the North, where 41% say this. Meanwhile, 42% say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained indefinitely until their asylum claim is processed’ and 43% say that ‘Nearly all asylum seekers should be detained indefinitely for the purpose of removing them from the UK’. 

Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes and 2019 Labour voters are more likely to prefer an approach to detentions that include limits on the duration of detention and exemptions for vulnerable asylum seekers. On the other hand, older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters prioritise greater use of detention.

Ultimately, the majority of the UK public do support detention for migrants for the purpose of immigration control. However, the most popular individual belief is that this should only be done for those who have failed an asylum claim and have to leave the UK rather than automatic detention until their claim is processed. Again, the UK public emphasise due process – this time in determining whether someone should be detained.

Overall, however, there is a clear preference among the UK public to treat asylum seekers differently based on the process of their claim: the UK public would rather failed asylum seekers are detained than those waiting for a decision on their claim.

Alternative asylum policies

Having established UK public attitudes to the current Government’s main asylum policies, we wanted to test UK public attitudes towards alternative policies for managing our asylum system, rooted in international experience. 

International experience suggests a diverse range of policies to control and manage irregular asylum seeking that might be implemented in the UK. In this section, we therefore investigate the UK public’s views on potential alternative policies on asylum to manage asylum, rooted in some international approaches including: new humanitarian visas, modified resettlement schemes, modified family reunification and ‘push-back’ policies.  

One policy adopted internationally to tackle the problem of irregular asylum seekers, for example in Australia and Italy, is the so-called ‘humanitarian visa’. Humanitarian visas enable countries to provide relatively controlled and quick pathways for asylum seekers abroad to gain protection without the need for irregular arrival.

Humanitarian visas vary between countries. One of the most prominent examples is the Australian Global Special Humanitarian visa. Under the Australian Global Special Humanitarian visa, asylum applications are processed prior to asylum seekers arrival; successful visa holders are granted permission to settle in Australia.[3] Additionally, in response to the crises in Libya in 2011 and Palestine in 2009, Italy issued visas as part of ‘informal’ resettlement operations, and, upon arrival in Italy, their asylum claims were processed via the ordinary asylum procedure.[4]

Currently, humanitarian visa schemes also operate in Argentina, Brazil, France and Switzerland. Such humanitarian visas do not exist for asylum seekers wanting to come to the UK.[5]

We therefore asked the UK public what they thought about a new visa that allows asylum seekers to arrive legally for the purposes of claiming asylum in the UK. In the question, we informed the respondents that, currently, asylum seekers cannot apply for asylum in the UK unless they are physically present in the UK and that some countries have introduced such visas in the past.  

The results are illustrated in Chart 15 below. A clear majority of respondents are in favour of the introduction of a humanitarian visa, with 57% saying that ‘The UK should allow some asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally into the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum’. In comparison, only 29% of people say that ‘The UK should not allow any asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally into the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum’. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

The level of support for this humanitarian visa differs slightly according to socio-demographic and political differences.

All age groups have a clear majority in support of the introduction of this humanitarian visa. However, a larger majority of younger voters are in favour of the humanitarian visa than older voters. Sixty-one percent of 18–34-year-olds are in favour of the policy, compared to just 53% of those over 65.  

The majority from all income groups are in favour of introducing a humanitarian visa. However, those in the highest household income bracket (over £100,001 a year) have a significantly higher majority in favour of the policy (79%). Conversely, 54% of those with household incomes below £25,000 a year support an introduction of the visa. 

While the majority of 2019 voters for all three of the major parties say that ‘The UK should allow some asylum seekers to arrive legally into the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum’, there is a slight difference in the level of support shown by voters across each party. Those who voted Conservative in 2019 are the least likely to support the introduction of a humanitarian visa (51%), while 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters show higher levels of support, at 64% and 66% respectively. Chart 16 illustrates these differences. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

Among 2019 Conservative voters, young Conservatives are more likely to support the introduction of the humanitarian visa, as 58% of 18–34-year-old Conservative voters favour it. The support decreases slightly with age, with 51% of 2019 Conservative voters above 65 being in favour of the idea. 

Those 2019 Conservative voters that intended to vote Labour if elections were held the next day are much more likely to support the humanitarian visa. Sixty-three percent of 2019 Conservative voters that intended to vote Labour support the idea of the new visa. This contrasts with a plurality (49%) of ‘loyal’ 2019 Conservative voters saying the same.

The results demonstrate a majority support for the introduction of a new visa that would allow asylum seekers to legally come into the UK to claim asylum here. This outcome is consistent across socio-demographic and political groups, with only a few specific exceptions. 

As with previous results, younger respondents, those on higher household incomes and 2019 Liberal Democrat and Labour voters are generally more likely to support the idea. Older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters are less favourable of the introduction of the visa, however, with minor exceptions, a majority of them still support it. 

Next, we tested UK public attitudes towards family reunification of refugees, which has been used in different countries to both widen and restrict access for those seeking sanctuary. Under family reunification schemes in the UK, those granted refugee status can be joined by their immediate family members, such as their legal partner, children under the age of 18 and children over the age of 18 in exceptional circumstances.

On the one hand, family reunification can be used to expand legal and safe routes. On the other hand, restrictions on family reunification can be used to target one of the supposed ‘pull factors’ for irregular asylum seeker migration. For example, Switzerland differentiates between refugee groups, limiting the rights to family reunification for individuals with ‘F-permit’ protection status – individuals and refugees with temporary admission.[8] In Austria, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection – granted to individuals who do not meet the criteria of the Refugee Convention but can show that they would face a real risk of serious harm if returned to their home country – have to wait three years from the recognition of their status before they can begin family reunification proceedings.[9]

We thus asked the UK public what should be the UK Government’s main policy priority on family reunification. Respondents were informed that, in the UK, those who have been granted refugee status even if they arrived irregularly can also be joined by their immediate family members. Immediate family members include partners, children under the age of 18 and children over the age of 18 in exceptional circumstances.

The main policy objective of ‘Reducing exploitation of [the family reunification scheme] by people who are not in genuine need of protection’ received a plurality of support (33%). Chart 19 illustrates this. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

There is a 13 percentage point difference between the support for the preferred option and the second most popular main policy option: ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ (20%). This is followed by ‘Restricting access to family reunification to reduce total migration’ (18%). The answer that receives the least support from the public is ‘Making family reunification more accessible to refugees’ wider family members, such as parents and siblings’ (13%). The public, seemingly, is quite divided on family reunification, albeit expansion of eligibility is not popular. 

A plurality of older respondents believe that the main policy priority should be ‘Reducing exploitation of [the family reunification scheme] by people who are not in genuine need of protection’, with 42% of those aged over 65 believing this. This was in sharp contrast to younger respondents. For those aged 18-34, ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ is most commonly selected as the main priority (29%). 

Both 2019 Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters are most likely to say that the Government’s main priority when it comes to family reunification should be ‘Reducing exploitation of [the family reunification scheme] by people who are not in genuine need of protection’, at 40% and 39% respectively. In contrast, those who voted Labour in 2019 are most likely to choose ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ (30%). This variation is depicted in Chart 20. 

Base: 2,080 UK adults

The UK public are seemingly divided on family reunification, although preventing exploitation is the most preferred priority. 

The data shows that younger respondents and 2019 Labour voters tend to support making it easier for refugees to reunite with their families. 2019 Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters and older respondents are most likely to prioritise reducing exploitation of the scheme.

Conclusion

This analysis has revealed 12 main findings on UK public attitudes towards the principles and policies of the UK’s asylum system.

• Just under half of the UK public say that one of the main reasons why irregular asylum seekers arrive in the UK is because they are ‘driven by the welfare benefits available here’. Notably, however, this is not the most common response for young people aged 18-34, those with household income above £100,001 a year, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters and the respondents from London. The plurality of respondents in these groups tend to say that irregular asylum seekers come to the UK ‘To escape war and military conflicts’.

• The UK public and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to believe there is ‘hostile’ reception towards irregular asylum seekers, rather than a ‘hospitable’ reception, in terms of where asylum seekers stay when they are in the UK, the benefits they can receive and the rights available to them. Notably, younger respondents and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are usually more likely to perceive the reception of different groups of asylum seekers and refugees as hostile than older respondents and 2019 Conservative voters. 

• The main policy priorities for the UK Government on asylum, according to the UK public, are a mixture of compassion and control: ‘providing asylum to all genuine refugees in need of protection’, ‘stopping the operation of people smugglers’ and ‘reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’. Younger respondents, those on higher household incomes, 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters tend to prioritise a more compassionate approach, with ‘Providing asylum to all genuine refugees that need protection’ being their most common choice. In contrast, older and less affluent respondents and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to prioritise policies that would increase control over asylum. For these respondents, ‘S​​topping the operation of people smugglers’ and ‘Reducing the number of irregular crossings across the English Channel’ are more likely to be the main policy priorities.

• A majority of the UK public favours deporting irregular migrants, but favours due process when determining deportations, preferring that government remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK, but only after their asylum claim has rejected rather than automatically, as is the current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. Support for this due process deportations varies greatly by socio-demographic characteristics and voting history. Younger people, those on higher income and 2019 Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are more likely to believe in due process deportations. But interestingly, a plurality of older respondents and a majority of 2019 Conservative voters say that government should remove nearly all irregular migrants who enter the UK automatically.

• The UK public marginally favours due process when determining deportations to Rwanda under the new Rwanda asylum plan, preferring that irregular asylum seekers be sent only if they are not genuine refugees rather than automatically, as is current government policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. In fact, the public are more likely to say that irregular migrants should not be sent to Rwanda at all than sent automatically. 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower incomes and older members of the public are more likely to support the idea of removals to Rwanda for irregular asylum seekers. Younger respondents, those from London and those on higher household incomes are less likely to support deportation to Rwanda.

• The most common reason among the UK public for supporting the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is to ‘deter irregular crossings across the English Channel’. This is consistent across age, region, household income and voting history.

• The most common reason among the UK public for opposing the deportations of at least some irregular migrants to Rwanda is ‘human rights concerns’. There is little variation across socio-demographic characteristic and voting history.

• A majority of the UK public favours detaining irregular migrants, but would rather failed asylum seekers are detained than those waiting for a decision on their claim. Whilst older respondents, those on lower household incomes and 2019 Conservative voters prioritise greater use of detention it remains the case that across almost all socio-demographic characteristics, the plurality response is that nearly all asylum seekers are detained if they have a failed asylum claim. The only socio-demographic groups in which this is not the plurality response are those aged 18-34 who believe that asylum seekers should only be detained for a limited period of time, and those with a household income of over £100,001, who regard that there should be exemptions from detention for vulnerable groups.

• A clear majority of the public think that asylum seekers should be able to apply for humanitarian visas that can be offered overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum. While this result is consistent across socio-demographic groups and voting history, the majority support is slightly weaker among 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower household incomes and older respondents.  

• A plurality of the UK public support some form of expansion of resettlement schemes, with the most popular option being that schemes be expanded from specific fragile countries but the number of places capped. This is consistent across socio-demographic and political groups. Support for reduction of resettlement schemes is notably higher among 2019 Conservative voters, those on lower household incomes and older respondents. 

• A plurality of the UK public believe that the Government’s policy priority on family reunification should be ‘reducing exploitation of it by people who are not in genuine need of protection’. The second most popular answer – ‘Making it easier for refugees to reunite with eligible family members’ – is more popular among younger respondents. There is very little support for expanding eligibility of family reunification to a wider set of family members.

• The UK public favours due process on maritime push-back policies, preferring that UK authorities block irregular migrants arriving by small boats from going ashore, but only if the return of the boats is safe and in line with international law, rather than even if it violates international law’. Compared to other socio-demographic or political groups, older respondents and 2019 Conservative voters are more likely to support the measure even if it violates international law. 

Our polling shows that socio-demographic characteristics and voting history are often associated with differing views on the asylum principles and policy. 

For almost all questions, we observe high variation by age, household income and voting history. Gender and region are sometimes associated with certain differing views on asylum policy. Remarkably, for some questions, we observe significant variation among 2019 Conservative voters by current voting intentions. In particular, ‘loyal’ Conservative voters have significantly different views to those who intend to vote for Labour in the next general election.

Many variables in our sample are likely to be statistically correlated. We, therefore, cannot draw any conclusions on the causal relationship between being a member of a specific socio-demographic group or having a particular voting history and holding a certain attitude. 

Based on our findings, Bright Blue recommends four asylum policies that the UK Government should introduce to better reflect the UK public attitudes and better enable a reduction in the flow of asylum seekers arriving irregularly in the UK. 

Recommendation one: The UK Government should commit to an annual quota for the number of refugees under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, subject to official review each year, and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.

Our research showed that the UK public is favourable towards expanding resettlement schemes, if they are capped and preferably from specific countries. 

The UK Government currently operates four schemes that accept referrals from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): the United Kingdom Resettlement Scheme (UKRS), the Community Sponsorship Scheme, the Mandate Scheme and the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS).[13] With the exception of ACRS, these programmes are not restricted to specific countries and accept people from any countries, but usually from war-torn regions. 

In 2022, the UK resettled 1,200 people under the UNHCR resettlement schemes.[14] This puts the UK in ninth place globally in terms of number of resettlements under the UNHCR that year.[15] However, in the years prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, the UK used to resettle more than 5,000 refugees through the UNHCR resettlement schemes a year.[16]

Except for ACRS, the UK did not commit to a formal quota for the number of refugees under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, which makes the country an outlier internationally.[17] Quotas for resettlement schemes under UNHCR are used in the United States, EU member states, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and other countries. Most commonly, quotas are set as annual targets and are subject to annual reviews by parliament or a designated authority. 

Historically, resettlement quotas have been effectively deployed by the UK Government. In 2015, the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS) was expanded to resettle 20,000 of the most vulnerable Syrians fleeing the civil war by 2020.[18] The Vulnerable Children’s Resettlement Scheme (VCRS) launched in 2016 aimed to resettle 3,000 at-risk children and their families who had fled Syria and now were in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey by 2020.[19]

We, therefore, encourage the UK Government to commit to an annual quota for the number of refugees taken under the UNHCR resettlement schemes, subject to official reviews each year. The numbers taken should reflect the fragility of certain countries and the most common-sense countries for irregular asylum claims as evidenced in the policy recommendation below.

This expansion in this legal and safe resettlement route, clearly capped, would create more resettlement opportunities for asylum seekers from fragile countries without a UK specific resettlement scheme catering for them, thus particularly reducing the flows of migrants travelling irregularly, albeit marginally. A clear annual quota will also enhance public scrutiny of the Government’s conduct on resettlement.

Recommendation two: The UK Government should introduce a new humanitarian visa that would allow a capped number of asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum, subject to official review each year and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.

Currently, foreign nationals can only apply for asylum in the UK if they are physically present in the country. This is one possible reason why asylum seekers use irregular routes to come to the UK even when such routes are often dangerous and expensive. 

A new humanitarian visa would allow the UK Government to provide a legal and safe alternative for some asylum seekers while retaining control over who arrives in the UK. The Home Office could conduct the appropriate checks prior to the arrival and then use the existing process for asylum once the visa is granted and the recipient arrives. 

The UK already processes some existing visa applications online. A new humanitarian visa that can be applied for online would therefore technologically be open to almost everyone from wherever they are applying around the world. 

An annual cap on the number of places available under the new humanitarian visa would allow the government to control the inflow of asylum seekers in the UK, plan ahead the processing of asylum applications and ensure that asylum seekers receive appropriate welfare support and housing. 

A humanitarian visa could be designed to ensure a proportionate spread of successful applicants who come from specific countries, especially those countries which currently have a very high approval rate for asylum claims. For instance, in 2021, Iranian nationals constituted 29% of irregular channel boat crossings and were granted asylum in 89% of cases. The same year, 10% of channel boat crossings were nationals from Eritrea, and the initial decision grant rate for Eritrean nationals was 97%.[20] A new humanitarian visa could therefore potentially redirect some asylum applicants to legal and safe routes from irregular routes. 

This is why we recommend that the UK Government introduces a new humanitarian visa that would allow a capped number of asylum seekers to apply for a visa overseas to arrive legally in the UK for the purposes of claiming asylum, subject to official review each year and numbers proportionate to the fragility of certain countries.   

Recommendation three: The Rwanda asylum agreement should be amended rather than abolished, and the UK Government should arrange for the removals of migrants to Rwanda only when they have had their asylum claims heard and refused and are failing to leave the UK voluntarily. 

The Home Office has so far not provided conclusive evidence that nearly all of those who arrive in the UK irregularly for the purpose of claiming asylum here are not in genuine need of protection. This is why Bright Blue cannot support the automatic removal of nearly all irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda before hearing their asylum claims. The UK public, as shown in our research, also tends to only support the deportations of asylum seekers to Rwanda once their claim has been heard and rejected. In other words, the UK public are looking for due process before such strict measures are applied. 

We believe that the Rwanda asylum agreement could be amended to ensure the removal to Rwanda of those asylum seekers in the UK who had their asylum claim heard and were refused asylum in the UK. 

Over the last decade, the number of people the Home Office removes from the UK has been in decline.[21] When asylum seekers’ claim is rejected, some of these migrants find a way to stay in the UK and fail to comply with the deportation notice by the Home Office.[22]

The ability to effect removals was substantially affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Still, even in the years prior to the pandemic, the total number of returns of asylum seekers was significantly below the number of refusals on asylum applications. For instance, in 2018, there were 1,665 returns, compared to 8,162 refusals, according to the available statistics by the Home Office.

One of the main reasons behind such low removal rates is the lack of agreements with third safe countries that would be willing to accept refused asylum seekers from the UK.[23] The majority of asylum seekers, especially irregular asylum seekers, come from countries that are not recognised as safe by the UK.[24] Hence, the Home Office cannot return these refused asylum seekers directly to their countries of origin – of the 3,632 people who claimed asylum in the UK and were refused in 2020, only 314 were returned to their country of origin.[25]

At the moment, the Rwandan Government has confirmed that it is ready to accept 1,000 asylum seekers during the trial period of the new Rwanda asylum agreement, but has the capacity in the long-term for more.[26] The Home Office currently plans to remove nearly all irregular asylum seekers to Rwanda, which is likely to be tens of thousands of people. This is unrealistic. Based on the available data, under our policy proposal, it would be more realistic for Rwanda to accept any asylum seekers who have had their asylum claims rejected.[27]

This is why we encourage the UK Government to use the Rwanda asylum agreement to remove all migrants to Rwanda only when they have had their asylum claims heard and refused and are failing to leave the UK voluntarily. 

Recommendation four: The UK Government should reinstate for a long trial period the two-tier system that existed between April 2022 and June 2023, enabling and promoting differential treatment of refugees who arrived via legal routes and those who arrived irregularly. Only if the evidence after the trial shows that it impacts the decision-making of asylum seekers should it be made permanent.

In June 2023, the Government announced that it would be pausing the two-tier system for refugee protection. Under the two-tier system, refugees that first arrived in the UK via irregular routes were granted Group 2 (temporary refugee permission) status.[28]

This meant they received permission to stay in the UK for shorter periods of time and had to wait longer to apply for settled status than asylum seekers who arrived via legal routes -such as family reunion visas or by already being here legally but on a time-limited basis – and received Group 1 refugee status.[29] While Group 1 refugees were granted permission to stay in the UK for a minimum five years and apply for settled status after this period, Group 2 refugees were only allowed to stay for a minimum of two and a half years and were entitled to a settled status after 10 years of living in the UK.[30]

This system, introduced under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, by the Conservative Government, was partially designed to deter asylum seekers from arriving in the UK irregularly and instead encourage them to use legal and safe routes.[31]

However, the measure was never properly implemented. In 2022, just 56 people received Group 2 refugee status, compared to 16,649 of those who received Group 1 status. This was likely affected by the slow processing of asylum claims.[32]

While we cannot support blanket inadmissibility rules that the Irregular Migration Act 2023 imposes, as they are very likely to exclude asylum seekers in genuine need of protection, we believe that it is right to try and reduce the ‘pull factors’ associated with irregular migration and reward those who choose legal and safe routes. 

If implemented appropriately, the two-tier system could potentially decrease the incentives to arrive in the UK irregularly. It should be noted, however, that for the two-tier system to be most effective, the UK Government should implement additional measures to raise awareness about the differential treatment of refugees who arrive irregularly and those arriving via legal routes among potential asylum seekers before they arrive in the UK. Currently, the evidence suggests the details of UK asylum policy do not impact on asylum decision-making.[33] The UK Government should also increase the accessibility of legal and safe schemes, as we recommend in this report, to ensure that asylum seekers have a real choice between irregular and legal routes. 

This is why we recommend that the UK Government reinstates for a long trial period the two-tier system, promoting differential treatment of refugees who come to the UK irregularly and refugees who arrive via legal routes, and ascertaining whether this affects the decision-making of asylum seekers.

Authors

Mikhail Korneev, Eve Redmond, Cosima Zaveta and Thomas Nurcombe

Acknowledgments

This report has been made possible by the generous support of Unbound Philanthropy. We are especially grateful to Will Somerville for his support and feedback. The ideas expressed in this report are those of Bright Blue and do not necessarily reflect the views of our sponsor.

We would like to thank Ryan Shorthouse and Bartek Staniszewski for reviewing and editing this report. We would also like to thank James Crouch, Calum Weir and the rest of the Opinium team for their hard work and attention to detail. 

Notes

The relevant data tables for the polling can be found here.

Endnotes

[1] Home Office, “New plan for immigration: policy statement (accessible), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/new-plan-for-immigration/new-plan-for-immigration-policy-statement-accessible (2023).

[2] Home Office, “Irregular migration to the UK statistics”, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-statistics (2023).

[3] Australian Department of Home Affairs, “Subclass 202: Global Special Humanitarian Visa”, https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/global-special-humanitarian-202#When.

[4] European Parliament, “Humanitarian visas: option or obligation?”, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509986/IPOL_STU(2014)509986_EN.pdf (2014), 44.

[5] UNHCR, “Humanitarian pathways”, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-we-do/build-better-futures/long-term-solutions/complementary-pathways-admission-third-0#:~:text=Humanitarian%20visas%20can,of%20each%20country.

[6] The Migration Observatory, “Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-to-the-uk-asylum/#:~:text=28%20June%202022.-,Refugee%20resettlement,in%20operation%3A%20the%20UKRS%2C%20Mandate%20Scheme%2C%20Community%20Sponsorship%20Scheme%2C%20and%20ACRS.,-Afghan%20Citizens%20Resettlement (2022).

[7] Home Office, “How many people do we grant protection to?”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-statistics-year-ending-march-2023/how-many-people-do-we-grant-protection-to#resettlement (2023).

[8] Stephanie Motz, “Family reunification for refugees in Switzerland: legal framework and strategic considerations”, https://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/11/201710-CSDM-UNHCR-FamReun-for-Refugees-in-Switzerland.pdf (2017).

[9] Asylum Information Database, “Not there yet: family reunification for beneficiaries of international protection”, https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Family-Reunification.pdf (2023).

[10] Migration Policy Institute, “Maritime migration to the United States is a reminder of chapters past”, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/maritime-migration-united-states-rise (2022).

[11] Helena Smith, “Greek government under fire after video shows ‘pushback’ of asylum seekers”, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/19/greek-government-under-fire-after-video-shows-pushback-of-asylum-seekers (2023).

[12] “British navy rejects plan to push back Channel migrant boats”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/british-navy-rejects-plan-push-back-channel-migrant-boats-2022-02-02/ (2022).

[13] UNHCR, “Resettlement country chapter: United Kingdom”, https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-handbook/wp-content/uploads/sites/153/2023/04/Country-Chapter-United-Kingdom-2023.pdf (2023).

[14] Home Office, “How many people do we grant protection to?”; Note that this figure includes only UNHCR resettlement schemes and excludes cases relocated under Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP), ACRS ‘Pathway 1’ and Ukraine schemes.

[15] UNHCR, “Resettlement data finder”, https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#eP4Z.

[16] Ibid.

[17] In 2022 the Home Office committed to resettling 5,000 people under ACRS in the first year and 20,000 in the following years. As of summer 2023, this target has, however, not been met.

[18] UNHCR, “UNHCR resettlement handbook: country chapter – United Kingdom”, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/40ee6fc04.pdf (2018).

[19] Ibid.

[20] Migration Observatory, “People crossing the English Channel in small boats”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/people-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats/#:~:text=Since%202018%2C%20the,2022%20(Figure%205) (2023); Migration Observatory, “Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK”.

[21] Migration Observatory, “Deportation and voluntary departure from the UK”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/deportation-and-voluntary-departure-from-the-uk/#:~:text=Return%20to%20top-,In%202021%2C%208%25%20of%20returnees%20were%20asylum%20seekers,were%20around%2010%2C600%20asylum%20returns%2C%20making%20up%2023%25%20of%20all%20returns.,-Figure%205 (2022).

[22] Home Office, “Asylum and resettlement datasets”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/asylum-and-resettlement-datasets#:~:text=Outcome%20analysis%20of%20asylum%20applications%20(MS%20Excel%20Spreadsheet%2C%20410%20KB)%0AAsy_D04%3A%20The%20initial%20decision%20and%20final%20outcome%20of%20all%20asylum%20applications%20raised%20in%20a%20period%2C%20by%20nationality (2023).

[23] Migration Observatory, “Policies to deter people from claiming asylum”, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/uk-policies-to-deter-people-from-claiming-asylum/#:~:text=The%20lack%20of%20safe%20third%20countries%20willing%20to%20accept%20asylum%20seekers%20from%20the%20UK%20is%20one%20reason%20few%20people%20have%20been%20returned%20under%20existing%20policies (2023).

[24] Migration Observatory, “People crossing the English Channel in small boats”.

[25] Rajeev Syal, “Nine in 10 people refused asylum in 2020 free to remain in UK”, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/22/nine-in-10-people-refused-asylum-in-2020-free-to-remain-in-uk-home-office (2022).

[26] “What is the UK’s plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-61782866 (2023).

[27] Home Office, “Asylum and resettlement datasets”.

[28] Migration Observatory, “Asylum and refugee resettlement in the UK”.

29] Group 1 status does not apply to resettled refugees that have different scheme-specific provisions.

[30] Sarah Tudor, “Refugees and asylum-seekers: UK policy”, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-uk-policy/#:~:text=The%20applicant%20is%20recognised%20as%20a%20group%201%20refugee%20and%20granted%20asylum%20with%20five%20years%E2%80%99%20leave%20(permission%20to%20stay%20in%20the%20UK)%2C%20after%20which%20they%20may%20apply%20for%20permanent%20residence (2022).

[31] Home Office, “Nationality and Borders Bill: a differentiated approach factsheet”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nationality-and-borders-bill-differentiation-factsheet/nationality-and-borders-bill-differentiation-factsheet#:~:text=discourage%20them%20from%20travelling%20to%20the%20UK%20by%20means%20of%20dangerous%20journeys (2022).

[32] Home Office, “How many people do we grant protection to?”.

[33] Migration Observatory, “People crossing the English Channel in small boats”.