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Jonas Balkus: The removal of the banker’s bonus cap: potential impacts

By Centre Write, Economy & Finance, Politics

One of the main priorities of Chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng in the ‘mini Budget’ was to boost growth against the backdrop of a global recession. With the UK having the lowest level of investment among the G7 countries, one controversial way in which Kwarteng has attempted to boost it is through the removal of the banker’s bonus cap, which would, arguably, increase investment in London and keep it competitive with other global financial hubs.

The banker’s bonus cap was introduced in 2014 by the European Union, with immediate criticism from the UK government; then-Chancellor George Osborne argued it would have a ‘perverse’ effect on the economy. The intended effect was to stabilise the financial system by shifting employee pay from variable bonuses to fixed salaries and therefore shifting the priorities of banks from short-term gain to long-term investments and lessening risk-taking.

Yet, the impacts on the economy were not as significant as hoped; a report by the European Banking Authority suggests there has been ‘no real impact’ on institutions’ financial stability, while also noting that the percentage of high-earners (those who earn 1 million euros or more per financial year) at these institutions rose from 59% in 2013 to 87% in 2014. This trend suggests that the removal of bonus caps may even lead to a slight fall in fixed salaries for many bankers, especially as job losses and salary cuts are forecast this year. Yet the real effect for many in the financial sector will be minimal, as these falls will simply be offset by higher bonuses.

Perhaps the most certain impact will be the greater level of flexibility for banks when faced with economic downturns such as the current one. Banks will now be able to adapt to changing economic conditions by varying the levels of their bonuses, decreasing and increasing them dependent on revenue. With this reduction in fixed costs, some could argue that the cap being scrapped may even benefit those who are currently at risk of losing their jobs at banks— as banks could choose to lower their salaries rather than simply cut jobs. This situation is not ideal, and it has led some bankers to criticise the potential move, but a fall in salaries is slightly preferable to mass job losses.

A potential impact of the cap removal, touted by Kwarteng, is that it would make London a more attractive location for investment from financial companies. Contrary to predictions of a mass flight to Continental Europe by banks following Brexit, the majority of firms have stayed put. London continues to top global financial centre rankings and European centres such as Frankfurt are far from overtaking it. Rather, London should fear competition from Asia and US centres such as New York and Singapore, which have recently been outdoing the UK in attracting skills and talent. By deregulating bonuses, London could compete with US financial hubs and strengthen its current position. Similarly, as the cap removal would apply to all employees of UK-based banks, it could also help British businesses with extensive operations abroad, such as Barclays and HSBC.

Finally, a key concern repeatedly voiced is that the removal of the cap is something of a return to pre-2008 policies, when unregulated banking caused one of the biggest economic shocks of recent memory. The cap in and of itself did not improve financial stability, as reports have shown, and regardless, London’s bankers have remained highly paid. But it may cause issues in once again encouraging short-term risk taking over long-term stability, as some have suggested

The regulatory infrastructure, however, is very different now than to what it was in 2008. The defunct Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been replaced by the more specialised Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), and the memory of the 2008 crisis still looms large in the eyes of policymakers and regulators alike. As long as financial regulatory services themselves are not weakened, and as long as the economy still recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, the risk of a crisis such as what was seen in 2008 remains low.

Overall, the removal of the bankers’ cap, though it may be incredibly poorly timed, is not as destabilising or misguided as has been implied. Whether the policy will go far in injecting life back into an economy with rising interest rates and inflation and low growth, remains to be seen. It may help London’s financial institutions recover against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, but the extent to which it would impact the wider economy, especially as a standalone policy, seems relatively small.

Jonas is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Tetyana Kovyrina]

Adam Kearns: If you’re a true capitalist, then you should support working from home

By Centre Write, Economy & Finance

For many people, COVID-19 was a dark period best forgotten, but we are beginning to see the pandemic’s lasting effect on politics and society. One of the more interesting impacts is a revolution in working from home, which has overturned many assumptions surrounding office life, management, and productivity. 

More than one-third of the UK’s white-collar workforce still works from home, much to the chagrin of certain politicians and business leaders. Notoriously, Jacob Rees-Mogg has been leaving snide notes on the desks of civil servants whom he could not find in the office. The Prime Minister has also publicly called for an end to the working from home model. Also amongst business, organisations such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, PWC, and Google have tried various techniques from carrot to stick in an effort to get the workforce back to the daily commute. All invariably met stiff resistance and eventually relented due to employee protests and an increased turnover. 

I believe that this opposition to working from home is, frankly, anti-capitalist; especially when we look to classic capitalist economists like Schumpeter. 

Schumpeter’s creative destruction – the act of innovation in which new processes replace outdated ones –  is fundamental to the success of an economy. His classic research into entrepreneurship and innovation has been backed up with significant research, showing that economies which allow innovation and change to run their course – such as the change in working from home – free of intervention and regulation, will be significantly more successful in the long run. 

However, many are ignoring Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, and instead are pushing back against working from home. Their main argument put forward to refute working from home is that employee productivity is lower. However, this is disingenuous and empirically disproven. Indeed, amongst other research, a study in The Quarterly Journal of Economics showed that teams working remotely are 13% more productive due to fewer breaks, lower absenteeism, and less distraction. Additionally, remote employees actually put in longer hours, partly down to the time savings from an avoided commute. 

The real opposition to working from home, especially from the Government, appears to come from concerns for the commercial rental market, loss of income to transport providers, and lower footfall across high streets. However, the Schumpeterian approach is not resistance and regulation, but resignation to what is, ultimately, a net positive opportunity. We must get back to thinking like capitalists. 

Imagine what an opportunity it could be if we allowed remote working to force upon the commercial rental market a period of innovation. There are so many buildings that are dedicated to commercial activity which could be repurposed as residential units, without the need for significant building beyond interior remodeling. The transport infrastructure is already there, so we could create massive amounts of affordable homes within pre-existing urban networks. Homeownership is a central tenet of conservative economic thinking, yet for many in Britain, that dream is slipping away due to high prices and limited housing stock. 

With fewer people commuting into our cities every day, turning on their laptops in the living room instead, there would be a significant improvement in air quality and less requirement for carbon-negative transport, whilst simultaneously leaving more money in employees’ wallets. The dream of the ’15 minute’ city would be so much closer to actualisation. It would provide enormous benefits for individual health and wellbeing, the environment, community, and, in the longer term, help boost our economy and attract the brightest talent from overseas on the promise of an improved quality of life. 

Schumpeter’s argument in favour of creative destruction also highlights the ripple effect that occurs from disruptive innovations. Through the destruction of businesses in certain sectors, new economic actors organise fresh production techniques. In the context of working from home, we have already seen leaps forward in remote working technologies over the past two years. Given that we are on the cusp of a metaverse revolution which will offer persistent virtual worlds and augmented reality that combines the digital and physical layers, the United Kingdom would have a unique opportunity to become a global hub for the entrepreneurs in their field seeking to capitalise on the demand for more advanced remote productivity solutions. Goldman Sachs has valued the metaverse as having a likely $8 trillion market capitalisation by 2030, and through embracing the working arrangement revolution we could seize a large part of that. We have the academic and industrial skills, a buoyant workforce, and the venture capitalists, but do we have the vision? 

The future office will not involve rows of soul-destroying cubicles or frustrating hot desk arrangements. Employees will not have to queue at Starbucks for their mid-morning coffee and pay extortionate prices for their lunch. The office will be an interpersonal hub, host to meeting facilities, thinking environments, and social spaces, visited once or twice weekly by staff whose workspace is at home. Frankly, this will happen regardless of the view from the Government. As JP Morgan’s CEO reluctantly acknowledged in his latest shareholder letter, “it’s clear that working from home will become more permanent in business.”

The real question is not whether working from home should stay, but to ask if we can learn the lessons of Schumpeter and embrace this revolution before it leaves us behind. From the comfort of my living room where I write, it is with a sincere hope that we can become a nation of entrepreneurs, not Luddites.

Adam Kearns is a Bright Blue member. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Sigmund]

Edward Forman: Producing LIBs domestically is the only way to be self-sufficient

By Centre Write, Economy & Finance, Energy & Environment

Gazprom, Russia’s largest natural gas company, has once again curtailed its gas supply to Europe. The ‘gas war’ between Russia and the West, which has only continued to spiral, has had serious ramifications on Britain’s energy prices. With gas making up 41.9% of Britain’s electricity supply in June, the reduction in supply has caused energy bills to soar. 

The drastic increase in energy bills and fuel prices has led to a deteriorating cost-of-living crisis, with the average electricity bill per household forecasted to be £3,363 this January, and the cost of fuel rising 17p per litre. As Conservative leadership candidates continue to debate what we must do next, many have called for the UK to shift away from Russian gas towards domestic supplies and become more self-sufficient. 

One proposed way to reduce the UK’s reliance on Russia would be to shift towards greener energy. Not only would this be instrumental in reaching net zero targets, but would also achieve greater self-sufficiency, breaking our current reliance on Russian gas.

By ending our dependence, we will be able to see the benefits of cheaper, renewable energy. According to the Natural Resources Defence Council, electric vehicles (EV) spend on average 60% less on fuel as they avoid spiralling fuel prices. Households can also benefit from this shift to renewable energy, with the International Renewable Energy Agency reporting a 13% drop in fuel prices in 2020 thanks to the increased production of wind farms.

In order to achieve this change, there will be a huge demand for lithium-ion batteries (LIBs). These batteries are needed for the storage of energy which can be used later during on-peak times as well as providing the energy source for EVs; it is also estimated that the UK will need more than 30 million new EVs by 2050 which will also require LIBs. 

With 60 kg of lithium needed per EV battery, sourcing LIBs will be crucial. However, 77% of the world market share of LIB manufacturing is attributed to China. Therefore, we are in serious danger of shifting our reliance on Russia to China.

Although China does account for the vast majority of the LIB market share currently, its lithium reserves pale in comparison to those of Australia and the Lithium Triangle (a region of the Andes dominated by salars abundant in lithium-rich brine). Australia has nearly 4 times the annual lithium mine production of China (while only having 3 times the reserves), and the Lithium Triangle is thought to host 54% of the world’s reserves – China has about 7%.

The reason for this disparity between raw material reserves and market share in production is the Chinese government has spent up to $100bn in subsidising the production of domestic LIBs. This subsidy gave manufacturers 15,840 CNY per new EV which fulfilled the distance and price criteria. Subsequently, profit margins were improved, helping build lithium processing plants, which are vital for turning lithium ore into purer lithium carbonate and thus provided China with a dominating market share of LIBs processing plants. 

While relying on other countries to build these processing plants and outsource lithium from countries with large reserves is one option, a shift towards domestic lithium production in the UK must happen if we want to become truly self-sufficient – luckily Britain can do both mining and processing of LIBs. 

A recent study by the British Geology Survey concluded that there could be minable lithium in the St Austell Granite, Cornwall. This ore-grade lithium-mica granite could yield 3.3 million tonnes of lithium. Cornish Lithium, a mineral exploration company founded in 2016, forecasts production of around 10,000 tonnes per year. By domestically mining LIBs, we will not only be able to ensure long-term supply of LIBs, but also can cut out carbon emissions drastically. Firstly, the distance of transporting LIBs will be cut, but we also can ensure the extraction will not come through brine, ensuring we use more environmentally friendly methods.

Given enough extractable lithium ore, investment into processing plants would be reasonable, reducing production costs as shipping would not be needed whilst helping to catapult the UK to become a technological champion in the race towards net zero – most crucially, would cut the UK’s reliance on China. 

Simply put, manufacturing LIBs in the UK or elsewhere to combat the rising monopoly China has over this market will require huge investment. While this will not be the most economically viable option on a short-term basis, the need for it to become LIB independent from China is not only a wise political option, but also an environmental one. 

Edward Forman is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: possessedphotography]

Martin Guy: Reform primary care funding or live with long waiting times

By Centre Write, Economy & Finance, Health & Social Care

Primary care is under significant pressure. Waiting times have been increasing, with the average wait time for a non-urgent face-to-face GP appointment being 10 days; up by 15% since last autumn. GPs need to see more patients than they do currently, and given the significant problems with GP recruitment and retention, existing GPs will have to be more efficient and productive in order to see more patients. This can be done by replacing the current funding model and introducing Payment by Results (PbR). 

Under PbR, each treatment is classified into Health Resource Groups (HRGs), which are groups of similar treatments under similar clinical conditions, each having a fixed tariff. Healthcare providers are paid per individual case, with the amount depending on which HRG the patient falls under. PbR encourages improvements to productivity and efficiency – providers who see more patients generate more revenue. 

PbR has been gradually introduced into secondary care between 2004 and 2007. As a result, waiting lists fell from 1.8 million in 2003/4 to 650,000 in 2007/8. Despite its clear success, PbR has only been used in secondary care (where care is given by a specialist), and not in primary care (typically the first point of contact, where care is given by a generalist).

Primary care is currently funded by a capitation model of ‘global sum’ payments, where each practice is paid according to the number of registered patients, weighted by the Carr-Hill formula which considers factors like rurality and demographics. Under this system, there is no financial incentive to see patients, as practices receive funding for having patients registered, not for treating them. Only the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) gives this incentive, as it gives practices additional funding if they meet certain thresholds for patient care. However, QOF has been temporarily suspended to allow practices to focus on vaccination programs and recovery from Covid; and it only provided around 10% of practice budgets. In contrast, global sum payments account for around 50% of practice income. The lack of financial incentive to see and treat patients is a barrier to sufficient provision of primary care services. 

PbR and HRGs could easily be applied in primary care. Due to longer appointment times, face-to-face consultations could be reimbursed more generously than virtual or telephone consultations. Urgent appointments and more serious conditions could be reimbursed more generously too, providing a greater financial benefit for dealing with more difficult cases, encouraging practices to do so. Applying the Carr-Hill formula to PbR would ensure that funding continues to be fair across the country. PbR could be particularly effective in primary care, given that 61% of full-time GPs are partners. This means they own a stake in their practice, and receive a proportion of the annual profits, so there is a direct incentive from PbR. 

And unlike most other reforms advocated for the NHS, changing the primary care funding model to PbR would not require any additional funding. The existing budget would just be reallocated to be used in a more efficient way. The practices which receive less funding would be those that see fewer patients relative to their list size, so there would be an incentive for those practices to see more patients. 

Whilst PbR incentivises doctors to provide more care through seeing more patients, this may come at the expense of quality of care. To counteract this, QOF funding should be increased as a proportion of practice income. Practices would have a greater incentive to adhere to the level of care set out in QOF. In addition, Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspections ensure that practices do provide an adequate quality of care. 

PbR is already used in primary care in other countries with single-payer healthcare systems like the UK. In Australia, their GP practices are funded almost entirely by PbR payments. Despite Australia only spending 6.7% of total healthcare spending on primary care (compared to 7.7% in the UK), their average waiting times are around 4 days, a fraction of the waiting times in the UK. 

Waiting times in primary care are simply too long. This long-running problem has a solution, which has already proved its worth in the NHS, and delivers better results in primary care for our international peers. Applying PbR in primary care is a necessary step to bring down waiting times and ensure all patients get the care they need. 

Martin Guy is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Hush Naidoo Jade Photography]

Ed Galvin: Why the government must harness the potential of railways

By Centre Write, Economy & Finance, Energy & Environment, Transport

The Integrated Rail Plan (IRP) set out by the Secretary of State for Transport has promised to improve; transport links across the North and Midlands, reduce train times and improve stations. This should show signs of promise for British railways, but, it is long overdue. It is imperative that the government acts on their plan in order to take action that is long overdue. 

Improving rail networks in the UK will offer significant benefits, particularly for the North of England in terms of infrastructure and interconnectedness, boosting localised and national economies. Simultaneously, railways becoming a more viable alternative for commuters would be a boost for the environment, as taking trains over cars for a prolonged period of time reduces carbon emissions by 80%, contributing to the Government’s net-zero goals. 

The IRP came off the back of the removal of the Leeds leg from the HS2 project. In principal the plan does show signs of progress, from the currently dilapidated and neglected state of the current system. However, there are significant reasons to be sceptical. Engineers have claimed that the current plans are not possible without segregating services, whilst local Tory MPs claimed they felt “short-changed”, due to the disappointment of the decade long HS2 plan being withdrawn for mere rail upgrades. 

It seems inevitable with the removal of HS2 for the North, that the economic makeup of England will be further deformed by the high-speed rails existing in the Midlands and South-East of the country. In addition, the previous plans for rail reform set out in 2019 remain untouched for over 900 days. The delay to the Rail Network Enhancement Pipeline (RNEP) will undoubtedly have knock-on effects on the IRP. This will further maintain the current economic divide between the North and South.

The benefits of an improved and more viable commuter network in the North would not be limited to the region, but also benefit the country as a whole. Infrastructure projects would produce a multitude of jobs, whilst also improving the length and quality of travel. A connected North would increase worker productivity and efficiency by bringing people and businesses closer together, encouraging further investment and economic expansion. 

In the long-term this would help to create a more balanced national economy and bridge the North-South divide. Research conducted before the cancellation of the northern branch of HS2 demonstrated the economic successes rail improvement in the North would bring. For example, if HS2 were to go ahead with the original plan, a further 3m people and 94,000 businesses would be within a two-hour commute from Sheffield.

Furthermore, trust between those in the North and the central government has been eroded over a number of years due to constant transport promises that have never been acted upon. This is emphasised by the recent HS2 U-turn. As a result of these broken and empty promises, the North is in dire need of significant transport investment. By enacting the IRP plans and developing methods of short-term improvements (such as improving stations and service consistency) to supplement longer-term aspirations, the government would simultaneously develop trust with the public whilst also giving the North the investment it needs.

The environmental upside of an improved transport network in the North are as important as the economic benefits. In 2021 the government announced its net-zero carbon goals. It seems vital to the plans that public transport is a key focus to offset carbon emissions of cars. This is emphasised by statistics that show trains are the most beneficial form of transport for the climate. Further, railways can be electrified, which would reduce both air and noise pollution. Despite the government’s net-zero policy explicitly stating rails would be electrified, the Treasury recently blocked plans to electrify 12,500km of rails due to costs. When it is taken into account that only 179km of rails were electrified last year, the government seems reluctant to push for real change and deliver on decarbonising the railways.

The government must do more to show their willingness to provide an alternative to cars. The newly announced plans to reduce the prices of off-peak travel do not go far enough to encourage commuters to stop travelling by car. Travelling on peak train services remains around 13 times more expensive than car travel. When coupling this with annual price increases, it is unsurprising that the number of commuters taking the trains are diminished. With the current plans to reduce carbon emissions being put forward, now seems like a critical time for the government to heavily invest in viable alternatives to car travel. This alternative can be provided by ensuring ticket prices are frozen, with a view to reducing prices in the future. 

It is imperative that the government harnesses the multitude of opportunities and benefits that the rails can provide the country. The government must use the rails to its strengths in the fight to prevent climate change. It is imperative that RNEP is revisited as this will likely hinder IRP. By making the trains an attractive and viable alternative to cars the government can reduce carbon emissions, especially by electrifying the railways and eventually gain the capacity to convert them to run off entirely renewable energy sources.

Ed is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Ben Collins]

Sam Robinson and Ryan Shorthouse: A vision for tax reform in the 2020s

By Anvar Sarygulov, Centre Write, Economy & Finance, Energy & Environment, Politics

Summary

This report offers compelling principles and consequent policy ideas for an ambitious agenda of tax reform that tackles the leading economic, social and environmental challenges of the 2020s and beyond.

It is the final vision that flows from our multi-year project on tax reform, which has been advised by a high-profile cross-sector, cross-party commission.

The Government recently launched its 2022 Spring Statement Tax Plan, which has been described as the foundations of a future low tax economy. But we believe the Chancellor can be and should be much more ambitious with tax reform during this Parliament.

Thus, to build on this Government’s ongoing thinking about tax in the years ahead, we propose nine key principles that should underpin an ambitious programme of tax reform, supported by policy recommendations to achieve them.

  1. Supports effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism
  2. Fairly taxes income derived from luck, rent-seeking and externalities
  3. Treats similar activities by individuals and institutions more equally
  4. Incentivises investment to facilitate long-term economic growth
  5. Ensures sound public finances
  6. Protects and enhances the livelihoods of the poorest
  7. Is easier to understand and more difficult to avoid
  8. Supports the transition to a net-zero economy
  9. Helps to address regional imbalances, thereby levelling up the country

This final paper includes only policies that derive directly from reports we commissioned for our project on propertycarbonwork and wealth, and business taxation.

Introduction

The past two years have been tumultuous. The world has been rocked by multiple major crises, from the COVID-19 pandemic to the war in Eastern Europe. Divisions in and disruptions to our society and economy have been exacerbated.

The UK economy is now in a fragile state. There is record, rising inflation which is eroding livelihoods.[1] Long-term growth is forecast to remain modest at best.[2] Net public debt and the structural budget deficit are at historic highs, thanks to record levels of public spending necessary to combat the consequences of Coronavirus.[3] The sustainability of the UK’s fiscal position is vulnerable to rising interest rates.

The UK Government has, rightly, committed to three preeminent objectives in the years ahead: economic, social, and environmental. Boosting growth and living standards after the pandemic. Levelling up the country to improve opportunities and outcomes for those living in so-called ‘left-behind’ communities, thereby reducing the geographic inequality which has been particularly pronounced in the UK for too long. And, finally, deeply decarbonising across economic sectors so the UK achieves net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, so as to avoid the most extreme and expensive consequences of rapid climate change.

Despite the uncertain economic and fiscal outlook after the pandemic, this current Conservative Government has committed to increased levels of public spending to achieve these three major objectives. Unusually for a Conservative Government, there is a high degree of tolerance for ongoing historically high levels of taxation and spending. This is a very different situation to after the 2008 financial crisis, when the Conservative-led Coalition Government that came into power cut both taxes and spending, the latter deeply.

Certainly, the traditional centre-right approach to taxation is largely sceptical. The instinct of centre-right politicians and policymakers is to pursue a tax cutting agenda, stemming from a belief in personal responsibility, economic freedom and a smaller state. Indeed, the Chancellor recently announced the Spring Statement Tax Plan, with a vision for a lower tax economy that helps families with the cost of living, boosts growth and productivity, and lets people keep more of what they earn.[4] This seemed to mark a return to conventional Conservative thinking, but in reality official Government policy is still consistent with a more social democratic model.

The truth is that, in a mature economy, governments play a major role in ensuring both efficient and equitable outcomes. As the philosopher Professor Steven Pinker has noted: “The number of libertarian paradises in the world – developed countries without substantial social spending – is zero”.[5] What’s more, there seems little public appetite or institutional capacity for the degree of spending cuts experienced in the 2010s.[6] As such, the centre-right cannot simply look only to slashing taxes.

If high levels of public spending to meet major objectives are to be maintained whilst servicing current budget surpluses, in the 2020s this country will need to pursue a tax reforming – not solely a tax cutting – agenda. Indeed, as well as shoring up the public finances, tax reform can also play a positive part in supporting the Government to achieve their leading economic, social and environmental objectives.

Reforms to taxation, nevertheless, can be incredibly politically contentious. This causes conservatism in the way HM Treasury approaches tax as a policy lever, meaning it is under-utilised as a tool to help achieve positive, far-reaching change.

But if tax reforms are to be suitably effective and ambitious, as they should and can be, then it is vital that policy proposals derive from clear principles that attract sufficient political support.

For the past two years, the team behind Bright Blue’s project on tax reform – advised by a cross-sector, cross-party commission – has sought to do exactly this.

Our project

The purpose of our project has been to generate compelling principles and consequent policy ideas for an ambitious agenda of tax reform that tackle the leading economic, social and environmental challenges of the 2020s and beyond.

To arrive at the principles and policies in this final report, we undertook four main activities.

First, we established and hosted several meetings of a high-profile, cross-sector, cross-party commission to generate and exchange ideas.

The members of this commission included:

  • The Rt Hon David Gauke, Former Secretary of State for Justice
  • The Rt Hon Sir Vince Cable, Former Secretary of State for Business
  • The Rt Hon Lord Willetts, President of the Advisory Council and Intergenerational Centre at the Resolution Foundation
  • The Rt Hon Dame Margaret Hodge MP, Former Chair of the Public Accounts Committee
  • The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP, Former Secretary of State for International Development
  • James Timpson OBE DL, Chief Executive of the Timpson Group
  • Luke Johnson, Entrepreneur and Chairman, Risk Capital Partners
  • Emma Jones MBE, Entrepreneur and Founder, Enterprise Nation
  • Mike Cherry OBE, National Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses
  • Mike Clancy, General Secretary, Prospect trade union
  • Victoria Todd, Head of the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group
  • Sam Fankhauser, Professor, University of Oxford
  • Christina Marriott, Interim Director of Policy and Advocacy, British Red Cross
  • Helen Miller, Deputy Director and Head of the Tax Sector, Institute for Fiscal Studies
  • Giles Wilkes, Former Special Adviser, Number 10 Downing Street
  • Caron Bradshaw, CEO, Charity Finance Group
  • Pesh Framjee, Global Head of Social Purpose and Non Profits, Crowe UK
  • Robert Palmer, Director, Tax Justice UK
  • The Rt Hon Lord Adebowale CBE, Chair, Social Enterprise UK

Second, we conducted an extensive literature review of existing UK and international evidence on taxation, to examine where the UK’s approach to domestic and international taxation is currently failing, identify alternative effective policy approaches from overseas, and ascertain what principles should underlie a program of ambitious, strategic reform of taxation.

Third, we conducted an extensive stakeholder consultation with current and former politicians, special advisers, civil servants, experts from the tax sector, academics, and senior representatives from the private, public and third sectors to learn about and appraise the UK’s current tax system, as well as identify a wide pool of new principles and policies to reform the tax system.

Fourth, we commissioned independent experts to author reports, and propose policies within them, on property, carbon, work and wealth, and business taxation. All these reports have been published over the past year.

This final paper includes only policies that derive directly from these commissioned reports. So, the proposed policies are not intended to be exhaustive and should not be treated as such. They are meant to be examples of some policies that fit with the principles we have generated. There will be many other compelling policy ideas – from a range of individuals and organisations – that should be adopted by the UK Government.

It is also very important to emphasise that members of the commission, although influential in the development of the principles and policies, do not necessarily endorse all of them.

Our principles for tax reform

The Government recently launched its Spring Statement Tax Plan[7], which has been described as the foundations of a future low tax economy. That Spring Statement Tax Plan reveals a determination by the Chancellor to lower taxes to help families with the cost of living, boost growth and productivity, and let people keep more of what they earn.

But we believe the Chancellor can be and should be much more ambitious with tax reform during this Parliament. The Chancellor’s Tax Plan should be supplemented: to not just always ideologically fixate on lowering taxes, and to also use tax as a tool to help a much wider set of economic, social and environmental goals. Ultimately, we believe that tax can achieve its potential as a substantial policy lever than facilitates bigger and bolder changes to our socioeconomic model than it does at present.

Thus, to build on this Government’s ongoing thinking about tax in the years ahead, we propose nine key principles that should underpin an ambitious programme of tax reform, supported by policy recommendations to achieve them.

1.    Supports effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism

2.    Fairly taxes income derived from luck, rent-seeking and externalities

3.    Treats similar activities by individuals and institutions more equally

4.    Incentivises investment to facilitate long-term economic growth

5.    Ensures sound public finances

6.    Protects and enhances the livelihoods of the poorest

7.    Is easier to understand and more difficult to avoid

8.    Supports the transition to a net-zero economy

9.    Helps to address regional imbalances, thereby levelling up the country

 

Supports effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism

Effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism are all essential ingredients to achieve economic growth, which is an imperative as we emerge from the Covid-19 pandemic. Fortunately, GDP has now surpassed its pre-pandemic level[8] and the most recent unemployment rate matches record lows.[9] But economic growth forecasts for the years ahead – including from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – remain modest, from a both historical and international perspective.[10] This country also now faces significant economic problems, especially record, rising inflation.[11] Doing much more to encourage productive activity will in, the near-term, power economic growth to tackle our growing economic problems. In the long-term, it will boost Britain’s notorious sluggish productivity.

More than this, there is a moral imperative for encouraging such activity. Effort is associated with a more productive economy, a societal benefit, but it can also engender greater feelings of agency and accomplishment, benefitting individuals. Entrepreneurialism often involves considerable risk-taking, but can yield substantial private and public rewards in the long-run. Our society prizes deeply the principle that rewards should be linked to effort; it is essential for believing the socio-economic system is fair. So effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism are morally and economically important activities, which should be encouraged by the tax system as far as possible.

This Conservative Government is increasing the National Insurance (NI) headline rate through the new Health and Social Care Levy (HSCL), while planning to reduce the basic rate of Income Tax from 2024-25.[12] This means that tax in this country is increasingly falling on income from work rather than income from other activities. It should be an urgent priority to better reward people’s effort by reducing taxes on work, especially NI and the HSCL.

There are ways of doing exactly this in a way that would both help businesses to minimise their costs in the short-term and, in the long-term, feed through into people’s wages and allow them to keep more of the money they earn from a job, all of which is important when inflation is increasing sharply. Reducing the rate of the new HSCL and NI more generally, and broadening their scope to other forms of income, would spread the impact of these taxes more evenly across the income and age distribution, reversing the troublesome shift of overall tax onto workers.

There is also more that the tax system can do to support enterprise and entrepreneurialism. The Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEISSs) and Venture Capital Trusts (VCTS) are important parts of the tax system that support innovative start-ups. Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR) is important to ensure social enterprises scale up and deliver value for their communities. But at present, these reliefs suffer from poor promotion and long delays.[13] For start-ups with limited access to capital, delays can have a damaging impact, forcing them to delay hiring or in some cases, pause vital projects.

The Government could better support effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism in a number of ways, including these policy ideas:

  • Prioritise significantly lowering the headline rate of the employer element of the HSC Levy from 1.25% on income above the existing employer NICs threshold as soon as possible. Then, if the public finances allow, the rate of employers NICs should then also be cut. This measure would represent a cost to the Treasury in the short term. However, falling employer NICs, initially with the HSC Levy, can be expected to result in greater employment, higher wage levels and/or more profitable businesses in the long-term.
  • The HSCL should be broadened to apply to pensions and rental income. Broadening the scope of the HSCL would enable the rate of the HSC Levy and NI to be cut and ensure revenue for health and social care is raised in a way that spreads the burden of the new tax more equally across society.
  • End the exemption from Class 1, 2 and 4 NICs for those working above the State Pension Age. Exempting those above the SPA from NICs ignores a long-term increase in people working past retirement age. Extending Class 1, 2 and 4 NICs to those above the SPA will contribute to raising revenue to offset the reduction in the rate of the HSC Levy and NI.
  • Venture capital reliefs such as Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) and Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) should be maintained at current levels and the process for qualifying and accessing these reliefs should be streamlined in line with the Office for Tax Simplification’s proposals. These include administrative changes such as allowing applicants to save partially completed forms online, alongside allowing investors to benefit from the Capital Gains Tax (CGT) relief in years where they make an income tax loss.
  • Social Investment Tax Relief should be preserved, but more resources should be invested in promoting the relief. There is a sound economic rationale to allow investors in social enterprises to benefit from reliefs similar to the venture capital reliefs. However, to ensure the relief’s long-term viability, more needs to be done to combat low levels of awareness among accountants and social enterprises.

Fairly taxes income derived from luck, rent-seeking and externalities

Profit-making derived from effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism is economically and socially good. But returns and profits do not always come from these productive activities. Sometimes, they can arise from sheer luck – such as happening to hold shares in a digital company right before the pandemic or inheriting a large sum from your family. Businesses can wield monopoly power to acquire higher than normal returns. Individuals and businesses may profit from activities that cause wider damage, such as pollution, without shouldering enough of the cost. In many ways, the tax system does not adequately tax income derived from these sources. Indeed, if it did, it could lower taxes on effort, enterprise and entrepreneurialism in a more sustainable manner.

First, luck. One of the key trends of the past three decades has been a large and sustained increase in wealth, levels of which have risen from 300% to 700% of GDP since the 1990s. Much of this can be attributed to rising asset prices. This has been largely underpinned by a global and long-term fall in interest rates; put another way, those who held interest-rate sensitive assets at the right time have seen a windfall as interest rates have sharply fallen in recent decades. It is difficult to see why returns based merely on good fortune should attract a significantly lower tax rate, as they do in the UK through Capital Gains Tax (CGT), than for other kinds of economic activity.

For children of parents who have accumulated wealth, they are often fortunate to receive financial support through gifts and inheritances that gives them proven advantages in education and employment. Indeed, inheritances can boost lifetime incomes significantly – by as much as 29% for those with wealthy backgrounds, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies.[14] The current design of Inheritance Tax – with exemptions for gifts made more than seven years before death, and generous reliefs on business and agricultural property – means that many life-enhancing transfers of wealth go untaxed.

Second, rent-seeking. Some can use monopoly power, firm-specific capital, regulatory capture or luck to drive up profits. Here, financial returns take place regardless of effort, enterprise or entrepreneurialism. The excess profit from such activity is known as ‘economic rent’. Taxes on economic rent do not affect investment decisions and behaviour to the same extent that ungenerous taxes on effort, enterprise or entrepreneurialism do. Business taxes in particular should, where possible, focus on economic rent rather than marginal investment and risk.

Third, externalities. The most egregious is the under-pricing of carbon emissions in markets, given the scale of the challenge posed by climate change – which, if not controlled, will result in catastrophic and potentially irreversible effects on the natural environment and society. Overall, to achieve the UK’s legally binding target of net zero emissions by 2050, the amount of taxation on carbon-intensive production and consumption will have to increase, especially in key economic sectors. While a uniform carbon price would disproportionately impact certain economic sectors, it is nevertheless the case at present that the distribution of carbon taxation across the economy is grossly inconsistent and inadequate. The cost of emitting a tonne of CO2 from a car is around £109; aviation, meanwhile, effectively receives a subsidy of around £26.[15]

The flipside of rewarding productive activities in the tax system is fairly taxing unproductive or harmful activities. This could be achieved, to some extent, by some new policies:

  • Narrow the gap in headline rates between Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and Income Tax. Two main rates for all capital gains of 18% at the basic rate and 28% at the higher rate ought to be established, with modifications only for assets that have already paid Corporation Tax. This would end the distinction between standard CGT rates and rates applied on residential property or carried income, as well as end Business Asset Disposal Relief and Investors’ Relief. While this approach would narrow, and not eliminate, the discrepancy in tax rates between CGT and Income Tax, it would represent a simplification compared to the current system.
  • Replace Inheritance Tax with a Lifetime Receipts Tax (LRT). The LRT should have a starting lifetime allowance of £125,700. The headline rates should mirror Income Tax rates from now, with the threshold set at ten times the Income Tax salary thresholds. A tax that applies to lifetime gifts, and not just gifts bequeathed after (or near) death, would end the arbitrary distinction between the timing of gifts. This would also reduce the abilities of wealthier estates to minimise effective tax liabilities, thereby ensuring that inheritances are taxed more progressively.
  • Business Rates should be replaced with a Business Land Tax levied on commercial landowners, based on unimproved land values. This would move the Business Rates system away from taxing investments in commercial property, and focus the tax squarely on the economic rent flowing from the value of unimproved land.
  • Set a ‘target price range’ for carbon taxes across the whole economy by 2030. The range should include a 2030 ‘floor price’ that each economic sector would have to achieve at a minimum. A target price range for the economy would be a significant step towards a coherent carbon taxation framework that reflects the societal cost of emissions. But despite the need for consistency, different sectors will face different challenges in reaching the target price range, hence why a standard, economy-wide tax should be avoided. Indeed, a ‘price floor’ would ensure some flexibility for economic sectors.

Treats similar activities by individuals and institutions more equally

The current design of the tax system leaves individuals and institutions receiving the same amount of income paying vastly different effective tax rates, significantly distorting the economy.

In regards to individuals, self-employed people pay considerably less in tax than workers. In large part, this is due to there being no equivalent to employers’ NICs for the self-employed. As such, businesses have an incentive to contract labour on a self-employed basis in order to minimise tax liabilities. Individuals, especially younger and affluent ones less dependent on state benefits, also have a tax incentive to supply their labour as a self-employed contractor, rather than as an employee.

Another discrepancy is between those deriving income from assets and those who earn income through work: the former pays proportionately less tax than the latter. As an example, someone might be an owner-manager of their own business and take their income as dividends or retain income in the company and take it later as capital gains. Both of these forms of remuneration are more lightly taxed than labour income, which is subject to higher Income Tax and NICs rates.

Indeed, we can observe starkly different overall tax rates for individuals depending on how they take their income. Among very high earners, those earning £100,000 or more, some pay average tax rates of close to 10% – largely driven by the 10% rate on capital gains qualifying for Entrepreneur’s Relief – while others pay close to the headline 45% Income Tax rate.[16]

Institutions that are otherwise similar also face arbitrary distinctions in the way they are taxed. Because interest is tax deductible, investments that are financed through debt are treated differently to investments financed through equity.[17] The result is that projects funded through equity require a higher rate of return to be viable than those financed through debt. Businesses should not face a penalty or advantage based on how they choose to finance their investments.

More thought also needs to be given to bricks-and-mortar businesses versus online businesses, where the former pay more in Business Rates than the latter. Large differentials in Business Rates bills are not necessarily sufficient grounds to create a special tax on online retailers; Business Rates fall mostly, if not entirely, on commercial landlords, and as such only advantage online retailers in the short-term. There may, however, be other justifications for singling out online retailers. Many of the largest online retailers are able to take advantage of profit-shifting to other jurisdictions overseas to reduce tax burdens, which gives them a tax advantage over bricks-and-mortar businesses. The UK should be at the forefront of global efforts to respond to profit-shifting and tax multinational enterprise more fairly and robustly.

There is an economic rationale for reducing the gaps in effective tax rates for otherwise similar individuals and institutions. Doing so would reduce the distortions currently present in the tax system that favour some activities over others. And it would reduce the incentives for individuals and businesses to artificially package their activities in order to lower their tax rate.

At a moral level, reducing such gaps would make the tax system seem fairer. It is not clear why the hard work of an employer, asset manager or self-employed contractor should be rewarded more than the hard work of an employee. Nor is it clear why businesses should pay different amounts of tax merely because of their financing arrangements or business model.

It is therefore important, both for economic and moral reasons, to lessen the differences in tax rates between different legal forms of income and businesses. This does not need to mean complete parity: there are still differences between the nature of different forms of work such as employment and self-employment, and in some cases – such as with individual investments – we do not want to discourage entrepreneurialism and risk-taking. But the scale of current gaps between these different legal forms in the UK cannot be justified.

To narrow the gap in the tax take between different individuals and institutions receiving the same income, the Government as a first step should:

  • Prioritise significantly lowering the rate of the employer element of the HSC Levy from 1.25% on income above the existing employer NICs threshold as soon as possible. Then, if the public finances allow, the rate of employers NICs should then also be cut. Focusing on employer NICs – which are ultimately borne by employees through lower wages – would reduce the effective difference in tax rates between employees and the self-employed. Employer NICs account for most of the difference in effective tax rates between the two, as there is no equivalent for employer NICs for self-employed workers.
  • Narrow the gap in headline rates between Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and Income Tax. Two main rates for all capital gains of 18% at the basic rate and 28% at the higher rate ought to be established, with modifications only for assets that have already paid Corporation Tax. This would narrow, but not eliminate, the gap in headline rates between CGT and Income Tax. As such, it would weaken the tax incentives to convert income to capital gains, and ensure that the capital gains and income from work are more similarly taxed.
  • Eliminate the bias in favour of debt-financed investment by excluding interest from the corporate tax system. The cause of the debt-over-equity bias within our corporate tax system is that payments to holders of debt can be deducted, but the real return necessary to compensate shareholders for providing equity is not. One way to reduce the tax bias in favour of debt would be to effectively exclude interest from the tax system altogether. Debt interest payments would no longer be deductible expenses, but interest payments received would not be taxed either. This would bring the marginal effective tax rate on debt financed investments in line with the marginal effective tax rate on equity financed investments.
  • The UK should lobby internationally for the OECD’s proposed agreement on a 15% global minimum corporate tax to use a cashflow base. At the G7 summit in 2021, agreement was reached on a 15% global minimum corporate tax rate for large multinationals. Lobbying for the global minimum tax to have a cashflow base would ensure tax competition is focus on pro-investment and positive-sum reforms to the tax base. This aspect would better align the global minimum corporate tax with the goal of raising more revenue from highly profitable large multinationals., and ensure tax revenue from online companies and bricks-and-mortar companies is narrowed.

Incentivises investment to facilitate long-term economic growth

Investment from individuals and businesses is key to building a dynamic, productive and prosperous economy. Investment interacts in many ways with the tax system, chiefly through Corporation Tax and Business Rates for businesses, and Capital Gains Tax for individuals.

Admittedly, the Government has recognised the role tax policy can play in spurring business investment through policies such as the ‘super-deduction’, which offers businesses a 130% capital allowance against their Corporation Tax liabilities.[18]

Still, Corporation Tax in the UK has one of the least generous systems of capital allowances among OECD countries. Indeed, before the Covid-19 pandemic, only one OECD country – Chile – had a less generous system of capital allowances than the UK.[19] This penalises long-term investments, particularly when it comes to investments in buildings and structures. Moreover, the super-deduction is currently set to end in 2023, meaning that, combined with the scheduled rise in headline Corporation Tax rates, the corporate tax system is set to become significantly less generous towards investment in the coming years.

Added to this, the treatment of corporate losses, which are currently not adjusted for inflation, is less generous than it could be: due to levels of inflation over the last twelve years, a £100 loss made in 2010 that took ten years to carry forward would lose £24 worth of value.[20] As a result, all things being equal, businesses will prefer safe, short-term investments to risky, long-term investments.

The economic effects of Business Rates can be thought of, conceptually, as a tax on unimproved land value and a tax on improvements to commercial property. Taxes on land value are highly economically efficient; they do not interfere with economic activity as taxing land will not reduce its supply. But through Business Rates, businesses are also taxed for making improvements to their commercial property. This acts as a disincentive for investments to improve infrastructure such as generators, boilers and blast furnaces.[21]

Currently, for individuals, a lower rate of Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and tax-free initiatives such as Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) exist to promote individual investment. But CGT chips away at the normal returns to investment by taxing gains arising only from inflation. At present, a person could make an investment that performed equal to inflation, and get taxed on the nominal returns, making them worse off than they were before investing. It is only fair that, if the upsides of investments are rightly taxed more, more is done to mitigate against the potential downsides.

There are many tax reforms that the Government could take to make investment more attractive, including:

  • Move to the full immediate expensing of capital investment in new plants, machinery, and industrial buildings when the investment super-deduction expires in 2023. Investment in new plants and machinery would be treated in the same way as any other business expense. Moving to full expensing permanently after 2023 for all capital investment would reduce the marginal effective tax rate for investment to zero. It would, in effect, eliminate the tax bias against investment. This would be a significant tax reduction on investment, reducing long-run corporate taxes revenues on a static basis. But this would be offset by higher tax revenues elsewhere resulting from higher output.
  • Allow corporate losses to be carried forward with a factor that adjusts for inflation and a safe rate of return on capital. The 50% annual cap of loss carryforwards should also be eliminated. Although losses can be carried forward and offset against future tax returns, inflation and the time value of money erode the value of the tax losses. This creates a bias towards lower risk investments and distorts firm behaviour. Allowing firms to preserve the present discounted value of losses would encourage investment and risk-taking.
  • Business Rates should be replaced with a Business Land Tax levied on commercial landowners, based on unimproved land values. Currently, Business Rates can be conceptualised as a combination of a highly efficient tax on unimproved commercial land and a distortive tax on improvements to commercial property. By shifting the tax burden away from investment and towards unimproved land, this proposal would have a positive impact on productivity and, in turn, wages.
  • Reintroduce inflation indexation on CGT liabilities. Given the behavioural impacts that a rise in CGT rates could have on individual investment and on tax revenues, rate rises should be paired with offsetting measures that improve the design of the tax base to protect the real value of investments.
  • Allow capital losses to be carried back for up to three years and set against taxable income, with relief restricted to CGT rates. Individual investors are only able to set capital losses against capital gains in the current tax year, or carry them forward to future tax years. In principle, there is no reason why capital loss offsets could not be extended to cover a wider range of assets and a wider period. This would better cushion investors against the downside risk of investments.

Ensures sound public finances

The UK needs to face up to the fiscal challenges ahead. These are the most acute they have been for decades: gross government debt is now more than 100% of GDP, and the structural budget deficit stands in excess of 15% of GDP, up from around 2.6% pre-pandemic.[22] Admittedly, recent inflation has eroded the value of the UK’s national debt. But in the long term, higher national debt leaves the UK vulnerable to interest rate rises.

Simply borrowing more and more to meet today’s spending demands, and thereby ladening future generations with unsustainable levels of debt, is economically and morally unacceptable. A tax-reforming agenda needs to ensure that, overall, the UK’s fiscal trajectory is sustainable.

We do not necessarily advocate for a strictly revenue-neutral approach when reforming taxes. Anyway, this will be difficult to forecast accurately. Proper revenue forecasting would be dynamic not static, as changes to tax prompt changes to behaviour. The issue is that it is hard to accurately predict how individuals and institutions will respond to tax changes, meaning calculating revenue precisely is impossible in advance. Regardless, the overall impact needs to be consistent with sustainable levels of national debt and the ongoing fiscal target to have a structural budget surplus in the near-term.

There are three important considerations when thinking about tax reform and fiscal sustainability.

First, anaemic economic growth, as the UK has experienced for much of the last decade, will worsen our long-run fiscal position. Measures to encourage effort, enterprise, entrepreneurialism and investment should not only be seen as pro-business policies; they should also be seen as an important piece of the puzzle in terms of strengthening the UK’s fiscal position.

Second, borrowing to invest or cut taxes in the present, in some circumstances, can improve the fiscal position by increasing revenues or reducing spending in the long-term. This is particularly important when it comes to climate change, arguably the greatest challenge of this century. The price of inaction today in reducing emissions is higher costs to mitigate worse environmental effects in the future. Indeed, late action to mitigate net zero – waiting until after 2030 – would make public debt as a proportion of GDP 23 percentage points higher than if the UK takes early action and imposes stronger carbon taxes from the middle of this decade, according to the Office for Budget Responsibility.[23]

Finally, value for money in in both spending and tax reliefs should be a key focus, with a drive to cut waste. While direct public spending is often held to a very high standard of scrutiny, the same cannot be said for the UK’s myriad of tax reliefs. Indeed, a large proportion of tax reliefs do not even have discernible objectives and are not assessed effectively – to the extent that some major tax reliefs, such as Employment Allowance, are “almost impossible to evaluate”, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies.[24] A major focus for ensuring fiscal sustainability should be developing a more rigorous approach to evaluating, and where necessary scrapping, tax reliefs in order to make the tax system as efficient as possible.

To ensure sound public finances, there are a number of changes to tax policy that could help:

  • Adopt the German model for scrutinising tax reliefs. Germany legally mandates biannual reviews of corporate tax reliefs based on a standard evaluative framework on a range of metrics including: target accuracy; cost-effectiveness; necessity; and, sustainability.
  • The Patent Box, Film Tax Relief and High End TV Tax Relief should be abolished, and the Employment Allowance should be phased out over the next five years. The empirical evidence suggests that, while Patent Boxes do have some impact on international patent transfers, they have no impact on invention. There are better ways of encouraging innovation. Film Tax Relief and High End TV Tax Relief cost significant more than originally forecast, and largely benefit major international companies rather than smaller scale productions. And the little evidence there is on the Employment Allowance suggests it has a limited impact on employment. Ending these reliefs could raise around £5.2 billion.
  • Set a ‘target price range’ for carbon taxes across the whole economy by 2030, with a 2030 ‘floor price’ that each economic sector would have to achieve at a minimum. The Government should also publish an annual assessment in the Budget for how each economic sector and sub-sector performs against the carbon tax target. Setting a target price for the whole economy would set a clear fiscal framework for action on net zero, and deliver a clear signal to businesses and individuals of action on climate change. But simply setting a target means little unless there is an assessment of whether progress is being made towards it. Therefore, alongside setting a 2030 target range for each economic sector, the Government should be required to publish a set of metrics for forecasting how each sector and sub-sector of the economy performs against the carbon pricing target.
  • Introduce core ‘carbon tests’ as part of the government’s formal impact assessment process to assess changes to any policy that impacts the price of carbon paid by businesses or households. At a minimum, new measures to price carbon should satisfy tests on: impact on carbon price; alignment with net zero target price range; technological readiness; distributional impact; and, economic competitiveness.

Protects and enhances the livelihoods of the poorest

The escalating cost of living has made life miserable for many of those on the lowest incomes. This year, average real household incomes are forecast to sustain their largest yearly fall on record.[25] Current elements of the tax system are falling short in terms of protecting the poorest households. Future tax measures need to ensure the poorest have their livelihoods enhanced.

To its credit, the Government has taken action to blunt the impact of the new Health and Social Care Levy (HSCL), which is a 1.25% increase to National Insurance on employees, self-employed workers and employers, by raising employees’ Primary Threshold – or Lower Profits Limit for the self-employed – for National Insurance to £12,570 per annum – a measure that makes the impact of the HSCL more progressive and ensures that those earning between £10,000 and around £25,000 per annum will pay less tax on their earnings in 2022-23. But more can and should be done with tax to protect the poorest.[26]

Some elements of the tax system are plainly regressive. Council Tax disproportionately hits those in lower-value houses, who pay more in Council Tax as a proportion of their property value than those in more expensive homes. Even taking into account Council Tax discounts, on average someone living in a £100,000 house pays about 0.7% of that value in Council Tax each year, while someone in a property worth £500,000 pays 0.35% on average, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies.[27] In large part, this is because of the disconnect between Council Tax bands, which are based on 1991 valuations, and today’s house prices. The Government has already recognised the role Council Tax can play in alleviating costs for struggling households – it introduced a rebate on Council Tax to mitigate against rising energy bills – but this is only a temporary measure.[28]

We must also be mindful of how societal projects can incur costs on individuals. The transition to net zero, which on some figures could cost the UK £1.4 trillion over the next three decades[29], could – without proper public policy – risk being expensive for the poorest in society. High-profile opposition to higher carbon taxes, such as the ‘gilets jaunes’ movement in France, underscore the consequences of not adequately considering this in the development of climate policy.

It is vital to pursue a just transition to net zero. That means those on low incomes do not bear burdensome costs. This is not only morally fair; it is also key to ensuring lasting political support for deeper decarbonisation. It is also entirely feasible; countries such as Sweden, Norway, Japan and France already hypothecate carbon taxes to reallocate a proportion of revenues through rebates, tax cuts and green investment.[30]

There are many areas of tax in which the UK could do more to protect the least well-off. As a first step, the Government should:

  • Replace Council Tax and Stamp Duty Land Tax with an Annual Proportional Property Tax (APPT) on the capital value of houses, with a tax exemption for houses worth less than £50,000. Doing this would ensure that property taxes in the UK have an explicit link with today’s house prices. An APPT would also be more progressive with respect to property values than the current Council Tax system.
  • Ensure that houses are revalued for tax purposes annually. Or at least on a regular basis, by applying modern statistical techniques to price data to estimate property values. Such an approach is already used in at least 15 other countries. To smooth increases in tax for households, property taxes could be based on a three-year moving average of the property’s value.
  • Create a ‘Green Dividend Framework’ made up of the various carbon pricing schemes that contribute to the Exchequer, and identify a specific portion of funds from the revenues to be used to reduce the impact of rising prices on low-income households and vulnerable customers. Beyond the environmental gain, the key societal value of carbon taxation us the revenue it will generate to fund public services and to reinvest in driving the adoption of green technologies. To ensure individuals feel the value of revenue generated more directly, the Government should establish a Green Dividend Framework. This would allow for a total figure to be set for what has been delivered to the public purse, which could be set out in personal tax summaries. While those on the lowest incomes emit the least compared to all other income deciles, a flat carbon tax would disproportionately impact those households. This is demonstrably unfair and can only be avoided if a portion of the revenues generated by a more consistent regime are redistributed to support those most impacted.

Is easier to understand and more difficult to avoid

There are often good reasons behind the complexity of the UK’s tax system, which needs to reflect a variety of different circumstances and situations. But a needlessly complex tax system is hard to understand, reducing the transparency of taxes and the ability of politicians to explain what tax reforms are achieving.

There are two ways that we can make the tax system easier for individuals and institutions to understand. First, ensuring that the design of taxes is more explicitly linked to their purpose; in the case of property taxes, for example, there should be more resemblance to today’s house prices.

Second, simplifying reliefs. There has been a proliferation of reliefs and offsets to the tax system, to the extent that HMRC does not even maintain a complete and accurate list of all UK tax reliefs; even among those that are monitored, many lack discernible objectives or the cost of them is not known.[31]

Indeed, in large part due to the extensive range of reliefs, businesses often find navigating the Business Rates system is costly in terms of time and effort: some responses to the Government’s Fundamental Review of Business Rates noted that “complexity in the system can lead to ratepayers failing to understand their eligibility [for Business Rates reliefs], or relying on external agents for support in navigating the system”. Too much complexity can have an impact on productive economic activity.[32]

A further concern is ensuring that taxes are harder to avoid. For individuals, some taxes – particularly Inheritance Tax – are relatively easy to avoid: wealthier estates can take advantage of reliefs on Inheritance Tax, or avoid the tax entirely by passing on assets well before death. Multinational businesses often use profit-shifting to minimise their tax liabilities by moving profits to low-tax jurisdictions overseas. In both cases, this makes the tax system both less effective and less equitable, especially when wealthier individuals and larger companies have access to the advice that can ensure they avoid more tax.

Some policies that the Government can pursue to make the tax system easier to understand, and make taxes harder to avoid, include:

  • Replace Council Tax and Stamp Duty Land Tax with an Annual Proportional Property Tax (APPT) on the capital value of houses. Doing this would ensure that property taxes in the UK have an explicit link with today’s house prices, making the system more intuitive for taxpayers.
  • Adopt the German model for scrutinising tax reliefs. Germany legally mandates biannual reviews of corporate tax reliefs based on a standard evaluative framework on a range of metrics including: target accuracy; cost-effectiveness; necessity; and, sustainability.
  • Replace Inheritance Tax with a Lifetime Receipts Tax (LRT). A tax that applies to lifetime gifts, and not just gifts bequeathed after (or near) death, would end the arbitrary distinction between the timing of gifts. This would also reduce the abilities of wealthier estates to minimise effective tax liabilities, thereby ensuring that inheritances are taxed more progressively.
  • Business Property Relief and Agricultural Property Relief in IHT, or the new LRT, should only apply where the donor had a demonstrable working relationship to the business or farm and for at least two years after acquisition. Reliefs for business and agricultural property are there for a good reason: to ensure the viability of family businesses as they are passed down. But they should be better targeted at genuine and viable family businesses. Requiring donors to demonstrate that they owned, worked for, or had significant control in the company or farm, and clawing back relief if the business was sold within two years of acquisition would make sure that these reliefs benefit the group they are supposed to.

Supports the transition to a net-zero economy

Achieving the UK’s legal commitment to net zero emissions by 2050 – meaning that any greenhouse gas emissions the UK does produce by then are offset overall – is the defining and transformative policy goal of this century. Experts have warned that, on a global scale, failing to achieve net zero by 2050 will result in global warming above 1.5 degrees, bringing with it increased risk of irreversible and catastrophic environmental changes, including rising sea levels, loss of ecosystems, and unprecedented flows of migration.[33]

While the key policy drivers of this transition will be investment, innovation and spending, the tax system should nevertheless play a role in supporting the UK’s net zero ambitions.

The new UK Emissions Trading Scheme, a cap-and-trade system which sets a limit on total emissions and creates a carbon market to link emissions to a price signal, is pricing carbon at around £50 per tonne of CO2. But according to Government estimates, prices on carbon may need to rise as high as £125-300 per tonne of CO2 to achieve net zero.[34]

At the moment, the UK’s carbon pricing across different economic sectors is inconsistent and insufficient. Different sectors of the economy are subject to vastly different levels of carbon taxes. The implicit price that taxpayers and consumers pay for emitting a tonne of CO2 can vary by as much as £700, according to the Energy Systems Catapult. If anything, certain sectors such as aviation and residential gas use receive a subsidy for carbon emissions.[35]

The mounting cost of living presents a challenge to the political viability of carbon taxes. Recently, the UK Government has cut Fuel Duty by 5p to support motorists with the rising cost of fuel, which goes against the direction of net zero by further subsidising carbon-heavy activity. In the long term, this is not sustainable for the environment or the Exchequer, since motorists are increasingly shifting to EVs, which are not subject to Fuel Duty. More needs to be done, for transport and beyond, to develop a credible set of reforms to carbon taxes that protects low-income households and builds a lasting political consensus as we make the transition to net zero.

Tax needs to support the UK’s transition to a net zero economy, with some policy ideas including:

  • Set a ‘target price range’ for carbon taxes across the whole economy by 2030, with a 2030 ‘floor price’ that each economic sector would have to achieve at a minimum. Setting a target price for the whole economy would set a clear fiscal framework for action on net zero, and deliver a clear signal to businesses and individuals of action on climate change.
  • Create a ‘Green Dividend Framework’ made up of the revenues from carbon pricing measures. This would allow for a total figure to be set for what has been delivered to the public purse by carbon taxation measures, and increase transparency around green tax reforms.
  • Immediately pilot a voluntary road pricing scheme for all road users ahead of a national rollout from 2030, including ‘Green Miles’ that offer a discount for a period to those driving electric vehicles and on low incomes, as well as surge pricing in congested areas. As drivers switch to electric vehicles (EVs), we need a strategy for replacing the substantial revenues brought in by Fuel Duty. The most viable replacement for Fuel Duty is a road pricing scheme, charging road users on a per-mile basis. Given the danger that the introduction of a road pricing scheme slows adoption of EVs, the Government could introduce a temporary ‘Green Miles’ scheme that offers a proportion of discounted or free miles to those with EVs or on low income. Any road pricing scheme should also include a surcharge for non-residents in urban areas to reduce car use and promote public and active transport.
  • Reform Air Passenger Duty so it delivers a more consistent carbon price and offers discounts for ‘Green Miles’ based on the proportion of sustainable aviation used. A frequent flyer surcharge should also be introduced. Air Passenger Duty (APD) should be reformed so it is directly linked to the net zero target, such as through removing the lower rate on short-haul flights or linking charges more directly to distance travelled. To target the scheme at those with the biggest impact, there should also be a surcharge introduced for frequent flyers, effectively placing an additional ‘rate’ of carbon tax predominately on business travellers. In addition a ‘Green Miles’ scheme could be introduced in the short-term. Such a scheme would mean passengers receive a tax discount for the proportion of the fuel requirement that is sourced sustainably.
  • The Climate Change Levy and Climate Change Agreements should be reviewed again in light of the 2050 net zero target to ensure they fully reflect the carbon content of the fuel being used by businesses. The Government should consult on extending carbon pricing further across energy usage in non-residential and public buildings. Many businesses are subject to the Climate Change Levy (CCL) that puts a carbon price on energy usage across a range of fuels. This acts as an incentive to invest in energy efficiency improvements and consider switching to lower-carbon forms of heating. While changes have been made recently to the Climate Change Levy, electricity still attracts a lower rate than gas use, something that will become untenable once coal is completely removed from the power system in 2024. The Government should therefore review the CCL again in light of the likely trajectory to the 2050 net zero target, making further changes to ensure the carbon prices the scheme delivers are sufficient.
  • A consistent ‘Climate Change Charge’ should be introduced for domestic energy use linked to underlying UK ETS prices that applies across both electricity and gas use, offset by removing low-carbon levies from bills and providing dedicated support for low-income households. While households already pay the pass-through costs of various carbon pricing schemes – such as the Carbon Price Floor – there is no direct carbon taxation placed on domestic electricity or gas use beyond VAT. This situation is already creating challenges for hitting the 2050 net zero target. The Government should introduce a consistent ‘Climate Change Charge’ across both electricity and gas that reflects the carbon content of both fuels, linked to underlying UK ETS prices.
  • Link the new farm payments scheme more directly to the delivery of projects that reduce or store carbon. In addition, before 2030, trial the introduction of tradeable credit markets based on carbon sequestration allowing a long-term route to land-use being included in a dedicated cap-and-trade model. The Government should also establish a ‘Farmland Carbon Code’ to ensure adequate verification of the carbon saved across the agricultural sector. The new Environmental Land Management (ELM) system, influenced in large part by previous Bright Blue policy work[36] has more deeply enshrined the notion of ‘public money for public good’, offering ways for farmers to secure support in relation to taking actions that will support the environment. After the initial pilots, the Government should set a specific target for what the ELM scheme should deliver in terms of carbon savings. This would, in effect, require a specific portion of farm payments to then be spent on carbon-based reduction projects, with requirements rising steadily over time as the target carbon savings required under the scheme grows.
  • Reform the Landfill Tax so it is based on a carbon metric. Over the medium-term, include the waste and recycling sector in the UK ETS. The Landfill Tax is already in place but is not linked directly to greenhouse gas emissions. A first step would be to link the landfill tax directly to the carbon content of waste. Given the waste and recycling sector is, in effect, an industrial process, the most obvious next step would be to eventually include the sector within the UK ETS.

Helps to address regional imbalances, thereby levelling up the country

The current Conservative Government’s flagship policy objective of ‘levelling up’ the country is one that many Governments over the years have attempted. It is a gargantuan task: geographical inequality in the UK is, on some measures, comparable to the economic divide between East and West Germany around 1990.[37] Remedying the UK’s regional imbalances will require a mix of many policies, of which tax is one.

Nevertheless, in some ways the tax system actively holds back progress on levelling up. As house prices have risen relatively faster in some areas, Council Tax falls disproportionately on  properties outside of London and the South East: while properties in areas such as Hartlepool might pay in excess of 1% of their value in Council Tax, in areas such as Westminster this can be as low as 0.1%, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies.[38] While the British tax system is progressive overall, Council Tax is one of the only taxes that is outright regressive.

Stamp Duty Land Tax also plays a part in slowing progress on levelling up. By creating a disincentive for people to move house, the tax slows the housing market. It discourages older residents from downsizing and prevents growing families from moving to bigger houses, promoting inefficient use of living space. Estimates from the LSE suggest that even a two percentage-point increase in SDLT reduces mobility by 37%.[39]

Another central aspect of levelling up is improving equality of opportunity: indeed, the Prime Minister himself said “talent and genius is distributed equally, but opportunity is not”.[40] Inheritances are increasing as a proportion of lifetime income.[41] If left unchecked, this is likely to entrench intragenerational inequalities, with implications for social mobility. Fairly taxing inheritances and gifts will be a helpful tool to reduce the role of geography and affluence at birth in determining life outcomes.

At the moment, though, there are many ways for the richest estates to avoid Inheritance Tax: Business Property Relief and Agricultural Property Relief, which reduce overall liabilities, have loose eligibility criteria. For example, shares on the Alternative Investment Market can attract Business Property Relief, with no requirements for minimum shares in a company and no need to prove a personal relationship to the company.[42] And wealthy estates have the ability to avoid the tax altogether if wealth is passed on well before death thanks to the ‘seven-year rule’. Because of this, the very wealthiest estates pay proportionately less in Inheritance Tax: while most estates were found by the Office of Tax Simplification to pay an effective rate of 20%, for the very wealthiest estates – valued at £10 million or more – the effective rate was 10%.[43]

The tax system can do more to level up institutions as well as individuals. Manufacturing businesses tend to be highly capital-intensive relative to service businesses, and so would stand to gain the most from better capital allowances and incentives to invest through the tax system. They also tend to be based in areas outside of London and the South-East, particularly contributing to jobs and output in the Midlands and the North.[44] Besides being pro-business in general, tax reforms to stimulate investment would aid the levelling up agenda.

Business Rates, too, have a regional bias. As a result of infrequent revaluations that lag behind economic cycles, firms in areas with rising property prices can be caught out by sudden and substantial increases in their Business Rates liabilities. Conversely, businesses in areas with falling property prices can pay over the odds in Business Rates for years until the next revaluation. There is scope to smooth these fluctuations and reduce the compliance costs to businesses.[45]

Some tax policy options for enabling levelling up include:

  • Replace Council Tax and Stamp Duty Land Tax with an Annual Proportional Property Tax (APPT) on the capital value of houses. Properly designed, an APPT would be considerably more progressive than the current system of Council Tax and Stamp Duty Land Tax: in most scenarios, lower value properties would pay less in property taxes, while higher value properties would pay more. Moving to an APPT would also be regionally progressive, lowering taxes in areas such as the North West and shifting property taxes to London and the South East.
  • Replace Inheritance Tax with a Lifetime Receipts Tax (LRT). The LRT should have a starting lifetime allowance of £125,700. The headline rates should mirror Income Tax rates from now, with the threshold set at ten times the Income Tax salary thresholds. By including lifetime transfers of wealth, and making taxes on inheritances harder to avoid, the LRT would curtail the role of geography and background in determining life outcomes, thus helping to spread opportunity.
  • Move to the full immediate expensing of capital investment in new plants, machinery, and industrial buildings when the investment super-deduction expires in 2023. Investment in new plants and machinery would be treated in the same way as any other business expense. Moving to full expensing permanently after 2023 for all capital investment would reduce the marginal effective tax rate for investment to zero, benefitting in particular manufacturing industries in areas outside of London and the South-East.
  • Business Rates should be replaced with a Business Land Tax levied on commercial landowners, based on unimproved land values. This would move the Business Rates system away from taxing investments in commercial property, and focus the tax squarely on the economic rent flowing from the value of unimproved land. This would, in particular, benefit manufacturing businesses who often need to invest in industrial equipment such as blast furnaces.

Acknowledgements

This report, and the tax reform project generally, has been made possible by the generous support of Social Enterprise UK and the Joffe Trust. The ideas expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of our sponsors.

We would like to thank Alex Jacobs from the Joffe Trust and Andrew O’Brien from Social Enterprise UK for their support, patience and advice throughout the project.

Endnotes

[1] ONS, “Consumer price inflation, UK: March 2022”, https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/march2022 (2022).

[2] OBR, “Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2022”, https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-march-2022/ (2022).

[3] Philip Brien and Matthew Keep, “Public spending during the Covid-19 pandemic”, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9309/CBP-9309.pdf (2022).

[4] GOV.UK, “Spring statement tax plan”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spring-statement-2022-documents/spring-statement-tax-plan (2022).

[5] Steven Pinker, Enlightenment now: The case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress (London, 2018), 110.

[6] John Curtice, “Have voters embraced a bigger state?”, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/newe.12264 (2021).

[7] GOV.UK, “Spring statement tax plan”.

[8] ONS, “GDP monthly estimate, UK : February 2022”, https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpmonthlyestimateuk/february2022 (2022).

[9] ONS, “Unemployment rate (aged 16 and over, seasonally adjusted): %”, https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgsx/lms (2022).

[10] OBR, “Economic and fiscal outlook”.

[11] ONS, “Consumer price inflation”.

[12] GOV.UK, “Chancellor announces tax cuts to support families with cost of living”, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-announces-tax-cuts-to-support-families-with-cost-of-living (2022).

[13] Sam Dumitriu, “Energising enterprise”, http://www.brightblue.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Energising-enterprise.pdf (2022).

[14]  Pascale Bourquin, Robert Joyce and David Sturrock, “Inheritances and inequality over the life cycle: what will they mean for younger generations?”, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/15407 (2021).

[15] Josh Buckland, “Green money: a plan to reform UK carbon pricing”, http://www.brightblue.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Green-money.pdf (2021).

[16] Arun Advani and Andy Summers, “How much tax do the rich really pay? New evidence from tax microdata in the UK”, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/bn27.2020.pdf (2021).

[17] Dumitriu, “Energising enterprise”.

[18] GOV.UK, “Super-deduction”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/super-deduction (2021).

[19] Dumitriu, “Energising enterprise”.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] ONS, “UK government debt and deficit: September 2021”, https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicspending/bulletins/ukgovernmentdebtanddeficitforeurostatmaast/september2021 (2021).

[23] OBR, “Fiscal risks report – July 2021”, https://obr.uk/docs/dlm_uploads/Fiscal_risks_report_July_2021.pdf#page=15 (2021).

[24] House of Commons Library, “National Insurance Contributions Bill”, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP13-60/RP13-60.pdf (2013).

[25] Resolution Foundation, “Chancellor prioritises his tax cutting credentials over low-and-middle income households with £2 in every £3 of new support going to the top half”, https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/press-releases/chancellor-prioritises-his-tax-cutting-credentials-over-low-and-middle-income-households-with-2-in-every-3-of-new-support-going-to-the-top-half/ (2022).

[26] IFS, “Spring Statement 2022”, https://ifs.org.uk/spring-statement-2022 (2022).

[27] Stuart Adam, Louis Hodge, David Phillips and Xiaowei Xu, “Revaluation and reform: bringing council

tax in England into the 21st century”, https://ifs.org.uk/uploads/R169-Revaluation-and-reform-bringing-council-tax-in-England-into-the-21st-century.pdf (2020).

[28] GOV.UK, “Council tax rebate: factsheet”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/council-tax-rebate-factsheet (2022).

[29] Jonah Fisher, “Climate change: Can the UK afford its net zero policies?”, BBC News, 23 February, 2022.

[30] Buckland, “Green money”.

[31] Michael Johnson, “Tackling intergenerational inequity at its roots”, https://www.brightblue.org.uk/tackling-intergenerational-inequity-at-its-roots/ (2019).

[32] Adam Corlett, Andrew Dixon, Dominic Humphrey & Max von Thun, “Replacing business rates: taxing land, not investment”, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/libdems/pages/43666/attachments/original/1535625230/embedpdf_Autumn18_Business_Rates.pdf?1535625230 (2018).

[33] IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments”, https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/ (2018).

[34] Joshua Burke, Rebecca Byrnes and Sam Fankhauser, “How to price carbon to reach net-zero emissions in the UK”, https://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GRI_POLICY-REPORT_How-to-price-carbon-to-reach-net-zero-emissions-in-the-UK.pdf (2019).

[35] Buckland, “Green money”.

[36] Ben Caldecott, Sam Hall & Eamonn Ives, “A greener, more pleasant land: a new market-based commissioning scheme for rural payments”, http://www.brightblue.org.uk/portfolio/a-greener-more-pleasant-land-a-new-market-based-commissioning-scheme-for-rural-payments/ (2017).

[37] David Behrens, “Britain’s regions less equal than divided Germany, UK2070 conference hears”, Yorkshire Post, 13 June, 2019.

[38] Adam et al., “Revaluation and reform”.

[39] Christian Hilber and Teemu Lyytikäinen, “Transfer taxes and household mobility: Distortion on the housing or labor market?”, Journal of Urban Economics (2017), 57-73.

[40] Boris Johnson, tweet on levelling up, https://twitter.com/borisjohnson/status/1198340442451935232?lang=en-GB (2019).

[41]  Pascale Bourquin, Robert Joyce and David Sturrock, “Inheritances and inequality over the life cycle: what will they mean for younger generations?”, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/15407 (2021).

[42] Sam Robinson and Ryan Shorthouse, “Rightfully rewarded: reforming taxes on work and wealth”, http://www.brightblue.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Rightfully-Rewarded.pdf (2022).

[43] OTS, “Office of Tax Simplification: Inheritance Tax Review”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-of-tax-simplification-inheritance-tax-review (2018).

[44] Make UK, “Regional manufacturing outlook 2019”, https://www.makeuk.org/-/media/eef/files/reports/industry-reports/make-uk-bdo-regional-manufacturing-outlook-2019.pdf (2019).

[45] CBI, “Business rates system is entrenching regional inequalities – CBI President”, https://www.cbi.org.uk/media-centre/articles/business-rates-system-is-entrenching-regional-inequalities-cbi-president/ (2019).

[Image: Pixabay]

Anvar Sarygulov: Stepping up – public attitudes to addressing the cost of living crisis

By Anvar Sarygulov, Centre Write, Economy & Finance, Health & Social Care

Introduction

The cost of living crisis is hitting the finances of British families hard: the Consumer Financial Confidence Index has dropped to the lowest score in a decade and inflation reached 5.5% in January. 

But we are only at the beginning of this storm: the energy price cap is increasing by 54% in April 2022, and will increase by a further 52% in October 2022 if energy prices remain at current levels, while inflation is expected to peak at above 8% this year. 

The 3.1% uprating in benefits, based on inflation rates in distant September 2021, looks to be disastrously dated, leading to significant reductions in the real income of low-income households.

Bright Blue’s Social security after Covid-19 project aims to develop a policy programme that strengthens the UK’s safety net in the long-term and wins the support of the public and policymakers from across the political spectrum. But given the scale and pressures of the current challenge, and the need for the Government to act quickly and decisively to protect the poorest in the year ahead, we are publishing this short piece detailing extracts of our original polling evidence, giving new insight into what the public thinks about the cost of living crisis.

Methodology

We polled a nationally representative sample of 2,008 UK adults, in partnership with Opinium. Within this overall sample, we also have unweighted subsets of those who have voted for the Conservatives (672), Labour (494) and Liberal Democrats (178) in the 2019 General Election. 

Views on the cost of living crisis

Our polling illustrates that there is a clear expectation from the majority of the UK public that the benefit system helps to address the cost of living crisis, as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Support of UK adults for statements on the role of government, by 2019 GE vote

Total Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats
Benefit payments should be sufficiently high to allow people to pay for their costs of living, such as housing payments, buying essential food and heating their homes 72% 68% 83% 80%
It is the government’s responsibility to ensure that all people have financial support to meet their basic needs 67% 55% 83% 77%

Base: 2,008 UK adults

Overall, the public thinks that the government has a key role to play in maintaining standards of living for those on the lowest incomes: 72% of the UK public supports the idea that “benefit payments should be sufficiently high to allow people to pay for their costs of living, such as housing payments, buying essential food and heating their homes” and 67% of the public supports the idea that “it is the government’s responsibility to ensure that all people have financial support to meet their basic needs”.

These principles enjoy cross-party support: 83% of 2019 Labour voters support both statements. Meanwhile, while 2019 Conservative voters are less likely to agree, a majority still express support, with 68% supporting the idea that benefit payments should be sufficiently high and 55% supporting the idea that the government is responsible for ensuring people meet their basic needs. 

Furthermore, there is widespread perception that the finances of vulnerable groups have become worse off since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, as illustrated in Table 2 below, which shows the net view (% of respondents who described the group as better off minus % of respondents who described the group as worse off)

Table 2: Net view of UK adults on whether the following groups have become worse or better off financially (better – worse) since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, by 2019 GE vote

Total Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats
Low-income working parents -54% -43% -72% -55%
Those on lower incomes -53% -41% -73% -58%
Those with long-term mental health problems -51% -45% -68% -51%
Those who care for people with long-term health problems -50% -45% -65% -48%
Those with long-term physical health problems -51% -43% -63% -49%
Unemployed people -33% -16% -57% -29%
Those on higher incomes 27% 23% 34% 46%

Base: 2,008 UK adults

There is a common perception among the UK public that a wide range of vulnerable groups have become worse off financially since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. Overall, low-income working parents (-54%) and those on lower incomes generally (-53%) have the lowest net score among the whole UK population, though those with long-term health problems (-45%) and those who care for them (-43%) are also seen to be significantly worse off than before the pandemic. 

While 2019 Labour voters are more likely to think vulnerable groups have become worse off, with those on lower incomes (-73%) and low-income working parents (-72%) receiving the lowest net scores, 2019 Conservative voters also on average share this downbeat assessment. Conservatives are more likely to think that vulnerable groups have become worse off than better off, especially those with long-term mental health problems (-45%), those who care for them (-45%) and low-income working parents (-43%). 

But perceptions of the UK public are much more divided on whether a ‘typical benefit claimant’ receives sufficient or insufficient support from government with their regular expenses, as shown by Table 3 below.

Table 3: Perception of UK adults whether a ‘typical benefit claimant’ receives sufficient support from government to deal with the following regular expenses

   Less than sufficient Sufficient More than sufficient Don’t know
Utility bills Total 43 % 28 % 9 % 20 %
Conservatives 33 % 36 % 12 % 19 %
Labour 61 % 21 % 5 % 13 %
Liberal Democrats 48 % 23 % 6 % 24 %
Food costs Total 38 % 34 % 8 % 19 %
Conservatives 26 % 46 % 13 % 15 %
Labour 56 % 29 % 3 % 12 %
Liberal Democrats 48 % 27 % 4 % 22 %
Housing costs Total 34 % 35 % 10 % 21 %
Conservatives 22 % 47 % 13 % 17 %
Labour 54 % 28 % 4 % 15 %
Liberal Democrats 42 % 24 % 9 % 25 %
Childcare costs Total 34 % 30 % 11 % 25 %
Conservatives 22 % 40 % 16 % 23 %
Labour 54 % 24 % 6 % 16 %
Liberal Democrats 42 % 25 % 7 % 26 %

Base: 2,008 UK adults

As shown by Table 3, UK adults perceive benefit payments as either less than sufficient or sufficient at roughly equal rates, with a significant proportion also reporting ‘don’t know’. Government support with utility bills is the most likely to be seen as less than sufficient (43%), while support with housing costs is the most likely to be seen as sufficient (35%). 

For all types of costs polled, 2019 Conservative voters are most likely to see benefit payments as sufficient, while 2019 Labour voters are most likely to see them as insufficient.  Both 2019 Conservative (33%) and 2019 Labour (61%) voters are the most likely to see support with utility bills as less than sufficient out of all costs polled, but the large gap shows that Conservative voters are much less likely to think that the support is less than sufficient.

Conclusion

Our polling identifies that the UK public, across political divides, supports the idea that benefit payments need to be sufficiently high to allow people to pay for their costs of living, and that the financial support provided by the government needs to meet their basic needs. Furthermore, they believe that the pandemic has made vulnerable people financially worse off. 

But where there is disagreement amongst the public is whether current benefit payments for different types of costs are sufficient to meet needs of a “typical benefit claimant” 

Given the scale of the cost of living crisis, without further government intervention beyond what was announced in the 2021 Spring Statement, many more households are likely to struggle and become much poorer. The Household Support Fund, which provides low-income households with ad-hoc grants or vouchers through their local authority, is insufficient for the scale of the crisis, and to meaningfully help those on low incomes, the Government should bring forward the next uprating of benefits into this year, and match the increase in the Warm Home Discount to the rise in energy prices.

[Image: Pixabay]

Max Anderson: Will London find success with the Super Bowl?

By Centre Write, Columnists, Economy & Finance, Max Anderson, Max Anderson

Last month, we saw the Los Angeles Rams beat the Cincinnati Bengals in the final game of the NFL season, the Super Bowl. Other than football, the halftime show included Dr Dre, Snoop Dogg, Eminem, Mary J Blige, 50 cent and Kendrick Lemar. If you are still not entertained, then there was also a host of comedic and high-budget adverts starring Hollywood’s biggest stars.

After 56 Super Bowls, the event has evolved into a truly impressive affair and is now considered one of the ultimate sporting experiences to attend; if you can afford the minimum $6,600 ticket fee.

The stunning spectacle has managed to capture the attention of British audiences as American football slowly grows in popularity within the UK. The BBC now runs the NFL Show every week, Sky Sports has a single channel dedicated to the NFL and London itself hosts four NFL games per year.

The NFL doesn’t just provide entertainment for the UK. From the four games in our capital city every year, it is predicted London’s economy sees a “direct economic impact of £58 million, with spectator spending nearly doubling this with £41 million”.

The financial benefits of NFL games for the hospitality and tourist industries has also been recognised by other European cities. Munich and Frankfurt have recently announced plans to host NFL games in the near future.

Traditional football fans will also be shocked to learn the impact the NFL has had on British football. For example, the San Francisco 49ers, one of the most established NFL franchises, owns 37% of Leeds United FC.

As American football’s fan base grows and the economic benefits for London become apparent, the opportunity for London to take further advantage of this estimated $15 billion industry is appealing. Coming out of what has been a turbulent and difficult time for the tourist and hospitality industry, it is important we consider the economic benefits of bringing more American football to London.

One man trying to take advantage of Britain’s growing love for American football is Tottenham Hotspur’s owner, Daniel Levy. ‘Spurs’ already have a strong relationship with the NFL, hosting two NFL games every year through a £40 million contract. This relationship was built on Spurs’ recent construction of a new stadium that can ‘transform’ from a traditional football pitch into an American football pitch, which is an impressive marvel of engineering. 

All this has laid the groundwork for Daniel Levy’s bid to host the Super Bowl in 2026 last month. Critics dispute the economic benefits the Super Bowl can bring to a city, but NFL commissioner, Roger Goodell, reckons the game delivers an “economic impact of approximately $500 million plus” for the hosting city.

The other option, which is far more ambitious, is for a franchise (NFL team) to move to London. Unlike football teams in the UK who are usually permanently attached to their city or town, NFL franchises can move at will. A good example is the Super Bowl winners, the LA Rams. Until 1945, they were the Cleveland Rams. They then moved to Los Angeles before moving to St Louis in 1995, before returning to Los Angeles in 2015. 

Although most may think a team moving to London is unlikely, one team is seriously considering the move permanently – the Jacksonville Jaguars. The ‘Jags’ are a relatively new team in the NFL, joining in 1995, and have struggled to achieve both financial and on-field success. This, in part, is due to sharing the state of Florida with two much more established franchises, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and Miami Dolphins, who can squeeze them out of the market. 

At the moment, Jacksonville Jaguars have found in effect a second home in London. They play two of their eight home games in London every year and have continued to try and create a relationship with London’s community.

This relationship reached its crescendo in 2018 when Jacksonville Jaguars and Fulham owner, Shahid Khan, made a £100 million bid to buy and move the ‘Jags’ to Wembley Stadium. The bid ultimately fell through, but the groundwork for an NFL team to move to the UK permanently is there. If this did occur, it is predicted that a franchise would contribute “over £150 million to the UK economy when considering the indirect and induced economic impact”.

Daniel Levy’s and Shahid Khan’s efforts to bring American football to London is worth noting and keeping an eye on. Only time will tell whether these men’s plans come to fruition but if they do, the impact on London’s economy could be substantial. After a pandemic that crippled both the tourist and hospitality industries, perhaps American football has the potential to play an important part in London’s economic rejuvenation?

Max is currently Digital and Communications Officer at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Gov.uk]

Anvar Sarygulov: Sustained pressure?

By Anvar Sarygulov, Centre Write, Economy & Finance

Introduction 

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Government has made a major effort to support the livelihoods of low-income households through increases in various working-age benefits, including the ‘uplift’ to Universal Credit (UC) and Tax Credits, with claimants seeing a weekly £20 increase in their benefit payments. While the uplift was withdrawn in September 2021, the Government has reduced the taper rate from 63% to 55% for UC claimants in work and increased the work allowance for some UC claimants. It is notable that those still claiming the benefits which UC has replaced, such as Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance, have, for the most part, not received any additional support throughout the pandemic.

While the provision of the uplift to UC and WTC claimants only was to specifically provide support for new claimants, who were suffering a sudden loss of income, it is important to consider that all benefit claimants faced substantive challenges to their financial and mental wellbeing before and during the pandemic.

Investigating newly published data from the 2019-20 UK Household Longitudinal Study, this analysis piece provides a snapshot of the financial, mental and social wellbeing of different groups of benefit claimants in 2019-20, just before and during the initial year of the pandemic.

Methodology

Bright Blue used survey data from the from the 2019-20 UK Household Longitudinal Study to perform original analysis examining the living costs, mental wellbeing and social connections of a variety of working-age benefit claimants just before and in the first year of the pandemic, as the survey was conducted between January 2019 and December 2020.  

All survey data has been weighted to be representative of the adult population of the United Kingdom. 

We focus on adults of working age (18 to 64 year olds) and examine six distinct population groups: UC claimants, Working Tax Credit (WTC) claimants, Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants, Employment Support Allowance (ESA) claimants, Income Support (IS) claimants, and those who were not receiving an income-replacement benefit at the time of the survey (‘the rest of the population’)

Table 1. Unweighted sample sizes of each group of interest

Claiming None UC WTC JSA ESA IS
Sample size 20,199 1,080 772 175 789 422

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

It is important to note that WTC, JSA, ESA and IS are all legacy benefits, which have been fully replaced by UC since January 2019. With very few exceptions, it is not possible to make a new claim for one of these legacy benefits, meaning that all legacy benefit claimants would have been receiving this benefit since at least January 2019, and in many cases from before then.

Finally, while all of the above benefits are usually mutually exclusive, meaning individuals can only claim one of them, there are some rare circumstances where an individual might be in receipt of more than one of the above benefits at the same time. In such cases, the individual is counted in the statistics of all the benefits they receive.

Financial wellbeing

We begin by finding that a significant minority of working-age benefit claimants were not up to date on housing (i.e. renting or mortgage costs) and Council Tax payments in 2019-20, as shown in Chart 1 below.

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

Echoing our earlier findings in Benefit to All, a significant minority of benefit claimants report not being up to date with housing and Council Tax payments in 2019-20. UC claimants are the most likely group to report struggling with housing (29%) and Council Tax (29%) payments. Claimants of legacy benefits, such as WTC, JSA, ESA and IS, are less likely than UC claimants to report not being up to date with housing (10% to 17%) and Council Tax (14% to 17%), but still notably more likely than the rest of the population (6% and 5% respectively).

A similar proportion of claimants struggled with household bills (such as utility bills) and with keeping their home warm in 2019-20, as seen in Chart 2 below.

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

We find that a notable proportion of working-age benefit claimants report not being up to date with at least some household bills, and not being able to keep their home warm during winter. Once again, UC claimants are the most likely group to report struggling with household bills (31%), while ESA claimants, who are disabled, are in fact the most likely to report struggling to keep their home warm during winter (19%). Claimants of legacy benefits are less likely than UC claimants to report not being up to date with some household bills (13% to 20%). In comparison, the rest of the population were much less likely to report not being up to date with some household bills (4%) or not being able to keep their home warm during winter (3%) in 2019-20.

Mental wellbeing

Moving on to the mental wellbeing of working-age benefit claimants, we find that they were more likely to report poor mental wellbeing in 2019-20 than the rest of the population, as shown in Chart 3 below.

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

ESA claimants were the most likely to report rarely having a lot of energy (67%) or feeling calm and peaceful (49%) or frequently feeling downhearted and depressed (37%) in the past four weeks. This is unsurprising given that ESA claimants usually have long-term physical and mental health problems. 

However, it is notable that claimants of all benefit groups are more likely to report indicators of poor mental wellbeing in the last four weeks, including those claiming WTC and JSA, in comparison to the rest of the population. Only 21% of the rest of the population reported rarely having a lot of energy, 17% that they rarely feel calm and peaceful, and only 9% that they felt downhearted and depressed most of the time.

Social wellbeing

Finally, considering social wellbeing, we find that working-age benefit claimants were also more likely to report feeling a lack of social connections in comparison with the rest of the population in 2019-20, as shown in Chart 4 below.

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

Once again, ESA claimants tend to be the most likely to report feeling that they have a lack of social connections of all types, with 32% reporting often feeling lonely, 31% reporting often feeling isolated and 22% reporting having no friends, though this is expected given that many ESA claimants have health problems which limit their mobility and opportunities to socialise. 

However, other groups of claimants are also more likely to feel lack of social connections, with 28% of IS claimants, 19% of JSA claimants, 18% of UC claimants and 13% of WTC claimants reporting often feeling lonely, in comparison to 8% of the rest of the population. Meanwhile, 26% of IS claimants, 21% of JSA claimants, 18% of UC claimants and 11% of WTC claimants often feel isolated, in comparison to 8% of the rest of the population.  Similarly, while 23% of JSA claimants, 19% of IS claimants and 15% of UC claimants report having no friends, only 9% of WTC claimants and 6% of the rest of the population reported the same.

Benefit claimants were not only more likely to lack social connections in 2019-20, but less likely to be able to rely on the social connections that they do have as a support network, as shown in Charts 5 and 6 below.

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

Benefit claimants tend to be slightly less likely to report being able to talk about their worries with someone in their social network, whether it is a partner, friends or immediate family. JSA claimants and ESA claimants in particular are more likely to report only being able to open up a little or not at all to their partner (32% and 22% respectively), friends (31% and 35% respectively) and immediate family (47% and 46% respectively). The quality of social connections of UC and WTC claimants is less poor, particularly in terms of their partners, where 18% and 16% respectively report not being able to open up about their worries. In comparison, 12% of the rest of the population report the same sentiment about their partner, 22% about their friends and 31% about their immediate family. 

Similar disparities are found for working-age benefit claimants when asked about being able to rely on a social connection in 2019-20 if they have a serious problem, as shown in Chart 6 below.

Source: University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, NatCen Social Research, Kantar Public. Understanding Society: Wave 11, 2019-2021, (2021).

ESA claimants are the most likely to report not being able to rely on their friends (33%) and immediate family (32%) if they have a serious problem, while it is JSA claimants that are most likely to report not being able to rely on their partner (23%). When looking at the rest of the population, they are more likely to report being able to rely on their connections if they have a serious problem compared to nearly every other benefit group, and only 19% reported being able to rely a little or not at all on their immediate family, 18% on their friends and 6% on their partner. 

Conclusion

This analysis piece has highlighted that all groups of benefit claimants, especially those on legacy benefits, experienced poorer financial, mental and social wellbeing than the rest of the population in 2019-20, the year when the COVID-19 pandemic first struck the world. All of this was despite the financial support provided to some benefit claimants during the pandemic.

First, it is vital to highlight that in 2019-20 at the beginning of and even just before the pandemic, a significant minority of all groups of benefit claimants struggled with a range of living costs, including housing payments, Council Tax payments, household bills generally, and heating costs specifically. While UC and WTC claimants received additional help during the first 18 months of the pandemic through the £20 a week uplift, and UC claimants in work are now able to keep a greater portion of their wages and benefits through a taper rate reduction in November 2021, most legacy benefit claimants did not receive additional help during the pandemic, and are now facing increasing living costs, especially in terms of heating as a result of rising energy prices.

Second, all groups of benefit claimants are more likely to experience issues with mental and social wellbeing than the rest of the working-age population, indicating the need for many benefit claimants to have stronger support networks. 

With rising inflation, it will be vital for the Conservative Government to monitor closely whether a significant number of benefit claimants, particularly those claiming legacy benefits, will face increasing financial hardship, while lacking the social connections that might be able to help them directly or indirectly.

 

[Image: Liza Summer]

Anvar Sarygulov: Blown off course? Public perceptions and expectations of the current Government

By Anvar Sarygulov, Centre Write, Economy & Finance

Introduction

We are now reaching the mid-term of the current Conservative Government, over two years since Prime Minister Boris Johnson secured a landslide victory in the 2019 General Election. This period in any government’s lifecycle is often the most precarious. But the simmering displeasure over rising cost of living and the fury over pandemic rule-breaking inside Number 10, now pose a significant threat to a Prime Minister who delivered an 80-seat majority only a few brief years ago.

As we go into this new and already politically turbulent year, it is worth considering how the public assesses the performance of the current Government so far, what they think Government priorities will be in 2022, their views on the best way to help low- and middle-income people and businesses, and on how prepared the Government is for major challenges in the year ahead. 

To answer these questions, we have conducted public polling in partnership with Techne UK.

Methodology

Polling was undertaken by Techne UK and conducted between 17th and 28th December 2021. It consisted of one nationally representative sample of 2,036 UK adults. From this overall sample we also have unweighted subsets of those who have voted for the Conservatives (511), Labour (393) and Liberal Democrats (140) in the 2019 General Election. The sample was weighted by Techne UK to reflect a nationally representative audience.

A link to the full data tables and detailed polling methodology can be found at the bottom of this piece.

Performance since December 2019

In 2019, the Conservatives won record levels of support amongst those who are on low incomes. However, as Chart 1 below indicates, the UK public overwhelmingly thinks they have become worse off since the last General Election.

 The UK public clearly thinks that more affluent income groups have been less likely to suffer financially since the last general election, with very few people (9%) thinking that those on high incomes have become financially worse off since December 2019, a significant minority (38%) thinking that people on middle incomes have become financially worse off, and large majorities thinking that those on low incomes (71%) and the poorest (70%) have become financially worse off since December 2019.

There is also consensus across different groups of voters in identifying that many income groups are facing financial hardship, including people on low incomes and the poorest in society: 58% of 2019 Conservative voters think people on low incomes have become worse off financially since the last general election, and 62% of 2019 Conservative voters think the same about poorest in society, in comparison to 83% and 82% of 2019 Labour voters respectively.

The current Government also gets poor marks from the public on addressing key policy issues, as shown in Chart 2 below, which shows the net view (proportion of respondents saying they have been better than expected minus proportion of respondents saying they have been worse than expected) across all parties.

The UK public is more likely to say that the Government has been worse, rather than better, than expected on all the key policy issues polled. Notably, climate change (-14%) and healthcare (-19%) receive the highest net score, while local government funding (-37%) and social care (-34%) receive the lowest net scores. 

Interestingly, 2019 Conservative voters give a net positive view only on two policy issues: climate change (13%) and healthcare (13%). These voters give the Government’s performance on all other areas a net negative score, with local government funding (-21%) and pensions (-24%) being the lowest. Unsurprisingly, 2019 Labour voters view the current Government as strongly underperforming, with climate change (-33%) receiving the highest net score and coming notably higher than others, while social care (-63%) receives the lowest score.

Priorities for the Government in 2022

The UK public is somewhat divided on what they think will be the main priority for the current Government in 2022, as shown in Chart 3 below.

Improving healthcare is seen as the most likely main priority of the current Government in 2022, with 22% of the UK public thinking that this will be the main priority. This is more likely to be said by 2019 Conservative voters (30%) than 2019 Labour voters (20%). 

Reducing government debt is seen as the second most likely main priority by the UK public (16%) and by 2019 Conservative voters (19%), while addressing climate change is seen as the third most likely (9%) by the UK public and the 2019 Conservative voters (11%). However, it should be noted that a substantive minority (17%) responded “don’t know” to this question.

There is some similarity with the above to what the UK public thinks should be the main priority for the Government in 2022, as shown in Chart 4 below.

Improving healthcare emerges again as the top choice for the UK public as a whole (30%), and also for both 2019 Conservative voters (33%) and 2019 Labour voters (32%), with what should be the main priority for the current Government in 2022. 

However, improving social care (14%) and cutting taxes for those on low and middle incomes (14%) comes in joint second place as what the UK public think the Government’s priorities should be. Similarly, 13% of 2019 Conservative voters select both of these choices in second and third place, while 2019 Labour voters chose improving social care (17%) and addressing climate change (14%) as what should be the main choice in second and third place. 

Reducing government debt is seen as what should be the main priority for the Government by only 4% of the UK public, and only 6% of 2019 Conservative voters, indicating that public debt is still not a major focus for the public, and highlighting a significant mismatch in what people expect will be the main priority, as shown in Chart 4 further above, and what they think it should be.

Furthermore, both the UK public as a whole, and 2019 Conservative voters specifically, are more likely to think that a variety of government policy areas require more spending, despite mixed assessment on the effectiveness of current spending, as shown in Chart 5 below.

It is notable that the public as a whole, and 2019 Conservative voters, want to see more spending on average, with healthcare receiving the highest average score (8.0 and 7.8 out of 10 on average respectively), while working-age benefits received the lowest average score (6.9 and 6.3 on average respectively), but which is still indicative of greater support for more spending. While 2019 Conservative voters are slightly less likely than the public to be supportive of more spending on key government policy areas, they would still like to see more for all policy areas polled. 

However, the UK public and the 2019 Conservative voters have a mixed view on the effectiveness of current spending on key government policy areas, with climate change and policing more likely to be judged as effective by the UK public (5.1 on average for both) and healthcare being more likely to be judged effective by 2019 Conservative voters (6.1). On the other hand, both the wider UK public and 2019 Conservative voters judge social care as the key policy area where spending has been the least effective (4.6 and 5.4 on average respectively). The UK public as a whole is slightly less likely than 2019 Conservative voters to judge spending on key government policy areas as effective.

Supporting people and businesses in 2022

Views are divided on the best way the Government can support people on low and middle incomes in 2022, as shown in Chart 6 below.

Keeping prices for everyday goods low (25%), increasing the minimum wage (23%) and cutting taxes (19%) are seen as the three best ways to help people on low and middle incomes by the UK public. The same ranking is given by 2019 Conservative voters, with keeping prices for everyday goods low (32%) coming first, followed by increasing the minimum wage (23%) and cutting taxes (19%). However, 2019 Labour voters are most likely to prioritise increasing the minimum wage (27%), followed by cutting taxes (18%) and keeping prices for everyday goods low (16%). 

The UK public is similarly divided on the best way the Government can support businesses in 2022, as shown in Chart 7 below.

Among the UK public, providing grants and loans to businesses affected by the pandemic (28%), cutting taxes (18%) and providing more apprenticeships and training schemes (15%) are seen as the best three ways to support businesses in 2022. Both 2019 Conservative voters and 2019 Labour voters see providing grants and loans to businesses affected by the pandemic (33% and 25% respectively) as the best way to support businesses. However, while 2019 Conservative voters selected cutting taxes (20%) and providing more apprenticeships (18%) as the next best ways to support business, 2019 Labour voters selected providing more apprenticeships and training schemes (16%) and keeping prices for everyday goods low (15%).

Preparedness for major challenges in 2022

Thinking about the potential major challenges which the Government could face in 2022, the UK public thinks that they are unprepared to deal with them, as shown in Chart 8 below.

As illustrated in Chart 8, the majority of the UK public thinks the current Government is unprepared to deal with all of the polled potential major challenges, with 73% believing that they are unprepared to deal with rising energy prices, 69% believing that they are unprepared to deal with rising poverty, and 69% believing that they are unprepared to deal with rising crime. Even in terms of a new pandemic wave, only 39% believe that the current Government is prepared, while a majority of 54% believe they are unprepared.

Notably, 2019 Conservative voters also have a very pessimistic assessment of the current Government’s preparedness for potential major challenges in 2022, as shown in Chart 9 below.

A majority of 2019 Conservative voters see the current Government as unprepared for all potential major challenges which we polled, with the exception of a new pandemic wave. Rising energy prices (67%), flooding (61%) and rising crime (60%) are the challenges which 2019 Conservative Voters believe to be as the most likely for which the current Government is unprepared. Nonetheless, a majority of 2019 Conservative voters (58%) do believe that the Government is prepared for a new pandemic wave in 2022.

Conclusion 

This polling provides a snapshot of public opinion at this critical juncture for this Conservative Government, illustrating the overall negative perception of how the current Conservative Government has performed since 2019 and its preparedness for future challenges in 2022.

Damningly, the public as a whole, including 2019 Conservative voters, believe that on this Government’s watch, people in poverty and on low incomes have become financially worse off, despite the promise to ‘level up’ the country. In addition, the UK public also believe that the Government has performed worse than expected on dealing with issues across all major policy areas, and that it is unprepared to deal with rising prices, crime, flooding and poverty in the year ahead.  

The UK public thinks that the best way to help struggling families is by keeping prices for everyday good low, raising the minimum wage and cutting taxes. They are most likely to report that improving healthcare will and should be the main priority for the current Government in 2022. Across all key government policy areas, the public believe the Government should spend more on them, but have mixed views on whether current spending is effective. 

Overall, there is no denying the stark message from the UK public, and the 2019 Conservative voters, to the UK Government: step up and deliver.

Appendix

Full data tables.

Detailed methodology.

[Image: Dave Darshan]