Coronavirus

The British music industry entered 2020 with a spring in its step. The previous year had seen its gross value added (GVA) to the UK economy rise by 11% to £5.8 billion; a record-breaking 33.7 million people had attended live events and spending from ‘music tourism’ had added a further £4.7 billion to the British purse. 

But what began as an exciting year for the sector quickly turned to one of its worst. Lockdowns made live music all but impossible, with online revenue for music events forecast to fall from £1.025 billion to just £440 million. The live music industry, previously valued at around £1.5 billion, lost an estimated £900 million, while many freelance musicians lost up to 75% of their income during consecutive lockdowns. 

Relative to society’s other sufferings at the hands of the pandemic, this may not look so exceptional, but the tragedy here is how avoidable many of the worst effects are. Amid the scramble to reach a deal with the EU in December, negotiations were too pressed to address the needs of the sector. Under the new deal, artists from Europe’s largest music industry, which is four times larger than our fishing industry, have lost their right to free movement around the EU, adding significant and, in many cases, insurmountable hurdles to touring the continent. Whilst the change won’t hugely impact the biggest artists, the financial and administrative burdens of navigating European visa and instrument import laws and costs country by country will stifle up and coming acts, hampering the industry in the long run. 

Furthermore, such an effective source of soft power could be protected better. British music has an annual export value of £2.9 billion and in 2020 two of the top five most streamed albums in the world stemmed from British artists. While the Cultural Recovery Fund that was unveiled in July provided some desperately needed relief, the economic devastation of the pandemic endures and the self-employed need ongoing support. However, in October Rishi Sunak set the limit of governmental support under the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) to just 20% of trading profits before raising it to 80% in the face of fierce protests. Such volatility has raised doubts among musicians’ organisations as to whether the level of support will remain the same for SEISS’ fourth term, from February to April. 

Nor have musicians seen much financial respite in the boom of music streaming throughout lockdown. Over the course of 2020, pent-up Brits racked up a record 139 billion streams, a 22% increase on 2019. But in the face of such impressive figures, it’s easy to overestimate the ability of musicians to negotiate. In October, an inquiry by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) committee into the economics of music streaming found that artists in the UK usually receive as little as 16.5% of the revenue generated when one of their songs is played on a streaming service; for context, almost 40% is taken by the record label. 

Whilst the Government rightly has bigger and more urgent fish to fry at the moment, long-term legislative solutions to all of these issues exist and could be easily implemented. For starters, the Chancellor should consider continuing to support musicians financially until the pattern of lockdowns recedes for good. Regarding the digital realm, the introduction of a new system of Equitable Remuneration being proposed to the DCMS committee could promise artists a 33% increase in revenue from digital music streaming. Furthermore, a petition calling for a Europe-wide visa-free permit that would replicate the circumstances that artists thrived in before Brexit has received over 250,000 signatures, and the Government could revisit this issue to generate political as well as economic capital. 

History tells us that the industry has survived worse; after Cromwell came Purcell, from the trenches came The Planets; even Britpop eventually passed. But if the Government wants to maintain British music’s financial and international clout, these issues must not fall on deaf ears. 

Ralph is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. 

2020 has undoubtedly been a year like no other. The routines of our daily lives have been turned upside-down and many people have faced hardships and difficulties. Children have felt this disruption particularly acutely, with the closure of schools for most, the shutting of play parks and other leisure activities, and the removal of basic rights for some of our most vulnerable children – children in care and children in contact with the criminal justice system. A report published yesterday to mark Human Rights Day looks back at how well the UK Government has respected children’s rights since 2016, as part of the first step in its examination under the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC). Sadly, it concludes that children’s rights have regressed in many areas, with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating pre-existing issues even further.

The Civil Society submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, endorsed by 90 children’s charities and led by the Children’s Rights Alliance for England (CRAE), has found that despite some welcome developments to embed children’s rights across Government, children are still worryingly low on the political agenda. England is also lagging behind other parts of the UK –we’re concerned that there has been no progress in incorporating children’s rights into domestic law, as in Scotland, and there is currently no Cabinet Minister with responsibility for children’s rights. During the pandemic, we continued to see this lack of focus on children’s rights in important policy decisions where emergency legislation, regulations, and guidance affecting children were brought in without the usual parliamentary scrutiny, consultation period or consultation with the Children’s Commissioner. Regulations on children’s social care, for example, significantly watered-down legal protections and were recently found unlawful in Court. 

The report also highlights that 4.2 million children are already living in poverty in the UK and families are now living in deeper poverty than five years ago, despite rising employment before the pandemic. During COVID, there was no targeted financial support for families with children in poverty, except free school meal vouchers during lockdown and over the summer holidays, and some temporary funding to local authorities to help families in crisis. Given the impact of the pandemic on jobs and the wider economy, child poverty is expected to increase even further. We’ve also seen the number of homeless households with dependent children increase, as has the number of homeless families staying in completely unsuitable temporary accommodation. 

Unsurprisingly, our findings show that black children and Gypsy and Roma Traveller children have continued to suffer persistent discrimination across many aspects of their lives, including being disproportionately represented in school exclusions and across the criminal justice system. BAME children are also much more likely to experience the use of police force, be held overnight in police cells, and be remanded to unsafe child prisons.   Inequalities in children’s health outcomes, such as mortality and obesity, have also widened since 2016 for children in poverty and BAME children. The educational attainment gap has also increased further as a result of COVID-19, with children from disadvantaged and BAME backgrounds falling further behind their peers.  Despite the urgent need for a solution and numerous reviews, there is still no cross-government strategy for preventing and addressing systematic racism and race discrimination.

Additionally, we have found that suicide is among the leading causes of death for 5- to 19-year -olds, despite increased investment into mental health services. It is estimated that one in six (16%) 5- to 16-year -olds in England have a mental disorder, with recent studies showing that COVID-19 is worsening the mental health of young people even further. 

There have been some welcome developments to children’s social care legislation, but these have been undermined by the fact that funding for children’s and youth services has been decimated, whilst the numbers of children needing care or protection are rising, and with the pandemic putting additional pressure on services. 

Our bleak findings are the result of children’s rights not being prioritised by successive governments coupled with the impact of COVID-19. We hope it acts as a wake-up call. Despite the unprecedented challenges that have arisen during the pandemic, the Government must take urgent action so that COVID-19 doesn’t leave a lasting scar on our youngest generation. 

Louise King is Director of the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, part of Just for Kids Law. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: gratuit]

Beyond its immediate threat to physical health, the coronavirus pandemic puts a considerable strain on individuals’ mental wellbeing. Factors such as social isolation, financial stress, and mourning for the loss of loved ones have taken their toll; a survey conducted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) reveals that rising demand for professional help has caused a disruption in mental health services of 93% of countries worldwide. Addressing the widespread COVID-19-induced decline of mental health is of utmost urgency, and it should be made a public priority.

One example of a proactive response to this emerging crisis can be found in Australia, where the government announced on 9 October that it will expand the scope of its existing Better Access to Mental Health Care initiative. Operative since 2006, this scheme provides individuals with a GP, psychiatrist or pediatrician’s referral with Medicare support for up to 10 individual and 10 group therapy sessions per year. Under the recent reform, it has become even more powerful, granting those experiencing pandemic-related duress eligibility for up to 10 additional sessions per year until 30 June 2022. As a result, an unprecedented $5.7 billion has been dedicated to mental health spending in 2020-21 (1 Australian Dollar is roughly equal to 0.55 Pound sterling, i.e. around £3.1 billion).

Though the Better Access to Mental Health Care initiative faces criticism for having a negligible impact on the prevalence of psychological distress of the population as a whole, evidence suggests that those who have taken advantage of its services met with positive outcomes. Accordingly, it should not be entirely dismissed just because of its imperfections. With additional measures to overcome socioeconomic and geographical disparities, as well as targeted efforts to encourage uptake by those who need it, the scheme has great potential for ameliorating psychological hardships among the Australian population.

The UK can learn much from the Australian undertaking to enhance its own mental health services in the time of the COVID-19. According to an ongoing long-term study led by the Mental Health Foundation, high proportions of Britons have reported feelings of loneliness, anxiety, fear, and hopelessness since March, with young populations, the unemployed, and those with pre-existing mental or physical health conditions having been disproportionately affected. In a time of crisis, these issues, especially among those with pre-existing mental illness diagnoses, should be of immediate concern. Yet, a staggering press release from Mind UK revealed that, in May 2020, 22% of surveyed mental health patients had appointments cancelled, or faced difficulty getting through to their GP or Community Mental Health Teams. Nevermind those seeking to reach out for help for the first time.

Unfortunately, the reproachable state of mental health services at the peak of the first national lockdown is a thing of the past. Although it cannot be retrospectively addressed, it can and should be learned from. Today, with a clear anticipation of the ongoing influence of coronavirus on populations’ day-to-day lives, policy makers are in a position to combat the onset of its chronic effects, and prevent further deterioration of the conditions of those currently afflicted by mental illness. Offering heavily subsidised therapy sessions may be an excellent solution to accomplish this goal.

Though it may be expensive – considerably more so than in Australia, given the size of the UK’s population – reduced-cost therapy sessions will likely only be attended by those who really need them. The effort involved in obtaining a professional referral, as well as the time-intensive nature of psychologist appointments serve as a hefty deterrent to those who do not expect to extract at least some benefit from the use of mental health services. As demonstrated in Australia, provided that the sessions are up to standard, those who seek help have the opportunity to achieve mental relief. 

Treating mental illness, either through psychological or pharmacological means, is and will continue to be an expensive project. If not for the sake of alleviating suffering, there is an economic argument for providing high-quality mental health support. Beyond its toll on individual suffering, mental health problems create large costs for both affected individuals and broader society. As detailed by a Mental Health Foundation report, the provision of health and social care, lost employment, missed opportunities, and output losses takes a considerable toll on the UK’s economic performance. The NHS estimates that, in 2016, the total cost of mental health problems is roughly £105 billion.

The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated the state of mental health worldwide; the fact that this matter demands prompt address is indisputable. Australia’s Better Access to Mental Health Care initiative, and even more so the recent announcement of its expansion, should serve as a guide for the UK Government moving forward.

Izabela is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Benh LIEU SONG]

Last month, Prime Minister Boris Johnson commented on the UK’s ability to tackle the second wave of coronavirus, saying that countries like Italy and Germany have responded more effectively because Great Britain is a “freedom loving country”. This comment sparked debate about why countries like Italy, the first affected country in Europe, succeeded in diminishing daily cases to 6,000 compared with 17,000 in the UK.

Researchers have outlined that possible explanations for a second wave in the UK are linked to its moderate restrictions especially regarding face coverings that were implemented too late and too lightly. In England, face coverings only became mandatory for people visiting shops, supermarkets, and public transportation on the 24th of July 2020 with rules not applying to retail, supermarket and transportation staff. 

On the other hand, Italy implemented mask-wearing early on in the pandemic. During lockdown, masks had to be worn both indoors and outdoors with no possibility of exercising outdoors. Failure to do so could lead to €400 to 1000 fine. 

Even though the United Kingdom has implemented similar fines of £100, £50 if paid within 14 days, compliance is very low. Only 38% of British people wear masks in public places compared to 83% in Italy, according to You Gov. Why is compliance so low? 

Low compliance could in part be linked to major supermarkets chains in the UK such as Waitrose, Co-op, Sainsbury’s, and Asda refusing to enforce the rule despite police pleas. These companies urge shoppers to “play their part”, giving too much choice to its customers. This is increasingly problematic for the British Government which finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. 

On the one hand Boris Johnson is historically inclined to emphasise personal freedom, and to shy away from authoritarian tendencies. On the other hand, the Prime Minister’s close personal brush with the virus, and the fact that cases continue to creep up, underline the fact that COVID-19 is a deadly threat which should not be underestimated. 

Meanwhile, in Italy, bars and restaurants are keen to enforce the rules as police checks are increasingly frequent. If a customer is found flouting a rule, like mask-wearing, then not only is the customer fined but so are staff and the owners of the establishment. This could be applied to the UK in pubs, restaurants, and supermarkets, enabling the shift of responsibility from the customer to the owners and staff. Retailers would be more incentivised to take a proactive attitude towards enforcing these rules. 

In addition, face-mask wearing should be extended to staff members working in an indoor environment in an attempt to legitimise their plea for their customers wearing one, together with higher fines. This incentivises companies to enforce the rules, refusing entry to those failing to wear a face mask and ensuring the safety of all its customers. 

One of the criticisms of these policies is the perception that civil liberties are being infringed upon. In July 2020, hundreds of people gathered in Hyde Park to protest against face masks having become mandatory. Further restrictions could potentially exacerbate the current situation and lead to rising numbers of protests. The use of masks, however, should not be seen as an infringement on personal liberty but rather as a collective, necessary precaution unique to this particular historical moment. 

Opponents to these measures state that there are too many economic downfalls in implementing harsher restrictions. However, according to one study, wearing face-masks could actually benefit the economy in the long run. These measures would help to control the spread of the virus, diminish its daily growth amongst the population of approximately 1.5%, and prevent a second round of lockdown measures that would otherwise hit GDP significantly. 

According to the data collected in the first lockdown by the Office of National Statistics, between March and April 2020, the UK faced a GDP fall of 20.4%, three times worse than the 2008 crisis. Moreover, the wide-spread use of masks could create reassurance in shoppers who are more willing to resume their normal shopping activities both in town centres and high streets. This will contribute to consumer consumption growth and stimulation of the economy. 

Therefore, compliance is tremendously important in controlling the virus and protecting the economy. Learning lessons from the Italian Government, the United Kingdom should start to adopt stricter regulations regarding face masks, which should include penalising the shops, restaurants and bars, and higher fines for transgressions. This could be the most pragmatic, economically-friendly way forward to deal with this complex crisis.

Eleonora is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Nickolay Romensky]

The COVID-19 pandemic is causing economic mayhem, reducing tax receipts just as increased calls on health and emergency spending occur. This threatens some countries’ ability to service their debts, prompting requests for relief, repayment holidays, or outright cancellation. There are serious obstacles to getting creditors to cooperate and borrowers to behave. Proposals for delivering debt relief need to address these issues to succeed.

All countries borrow for spending that produces future benefits. The unforeseen pandemic is causing or exacerbating financial problems from Argentina to Zimbabwe. In countries without adequate financial safety margins, urgent public spending increases and reduced tax revenues make debts unsustainable and insolvency likely. Sovereign debt defaults hamper future borrowing. 

Besides the world’s poorest nations, largely in sub-Saharan Africa, many others also have barely sustainable debt burdens and now need urgent help. The G20 has frozen bilateral loan repayments for 76 countries until the end of 2020. Some 165 low-income and emerging economies need at least $2.5 trillion, which is beyond the IMF’s capacity to provide.

In crises, the poorest and most marginalised people suffer most. Debt relief for low income countries to help weather the COVID-19 storm understandably appeals to liberal minds, recalling rockstar-led campaigns like Make Poverty History. Lenders want to ensure repayment, but there are layers of difficulty to be resolved.

First, there are three different types of lender, with different goals. The largest group are commercial investors who hold emerging market government bonds in their portfolios.  These private creditors account for most of the sovereign debt of middle income countries and also have some exposure to low income African nations. 

Multilateral financial institutions like the IMF and the development banks also provide loan facilities, often in contexts which market-led actors would avoid or with a concessionary element. 

Then there are bilateral lenders – countries. China is a major player: with conventional aid funding and the infrastructure focused Belt and Road Initiative it accounts for nearly one-fifth of African debt.

These groups’ goals range from commercial returns to philanthropic concern for citizens of recipient countries. Commercial lenders will want to secure their repayments and may hold out against conceding any losses.

Concessionary lenders will typically have multiple aims such as helping governments limit the spread of COVID-19, protecting the livelihoods of poor people threatened by lockdowns, and ensuring that money is not withdrawn from current development spending.

Despite their different objectives, commercial and official lenders’ interests may coincide in appropriate policy measures and concessions to reduce the pandemic’s impact. Preventing the worst disruptions to economic activity will sustain incomes, tax revenues and loan repayments.  

A key obstacle to debt relief is the need for collective action by all of a country’s creditors.  Otherwise, concessions by some lenders just release resources to repay others.  Only if all lenders agree some shared sacrifice can this prisoners’ dilemma be resolved.  

Getting all players to cooperate in orderly debt relief takes time, especially when some countries will have many debt instruments and hundreds or even thousands of individual lenders.

A second challenge, particularly for official lenders with humanitarian or development objectives, is deciding which of the countries lacking an adequate financial safety margin to help. Should the focus be on, say, the areas of greatest need or the greatest likelihood of success? Supporting a government does not necessarily help its most deserving citizens.  

COVID-19 related finance, like other funds, may be squandered, siphoned off by corrupt officials, diverted to inappropriate projects or may facilitate capital flight. Countries in the lower reaches of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index are not ideal welfare recipients, and offering help subject to intrusive conditions may not work.

Allocating a budget across different countries requires trade-offs between the risk of losing money and the likelihood of achieving objectives. For example, Zimbabwe has a record of poor governance, misuse of aid and a monetary policy manipulated to enrich those in power. Large payment arrears on official loans already preclude it from further multilateral funding, but COVID-19 coincides with a food crisis and is putting many livelihoods in danger.  Whether bilateral donors should direct scarce resources to Zimbabwe or address needs elsewhere is a tough call.

Thirdly, lenders supporting a borrower against the pandemic need to decide between many options for rescheduling interest and principal repayments. Leniency may be hard for commercial lenders if their own finances are under pressure, but the track record of the recipient and how far lenders need to retain control of the initiative will also affect the outcome.  

Making sure that resources are used as intended, a case of the principal-agent problem, is harder when institutions are weak. Releasing finance against performance milestones is one way of dealing with distrusted administrations. Others are providing budget support or aid in kind directly to governments, and cash transfers to families.

Incentives matter because they affect behaviour. If borrowers lacking an adequate financial safety margin know that they can escape the full consequences if things go wrong, a ‘moral hazard’, there is a perverse incentive to take risks. Previous debt relief initiatives have required countries to meet quality of governance targets to qualify for full benefits.  

Cooperation is certainly needed from the country in question.  Argentina for example is negotiating to restructure $83bn of commercial debt. The country has a terrible record of past defaults, so has a strong incentive to avoid another, as of course do its creditors. 

There is one proposal which might overcome many of these obstacles. The authors say it offers “a concrete roadmap to achieve an effective coordinated debt relief between the official and commercial sectors”.

A fund called a central credit facility (CCF) would be established for any country requesting debt relief, supervised by a multilateral financial institution. All debt interest due within a specified period, say the next year, would be paid into the CCF on schedule by the debtor country.  That money would then become emergency funding available for the country to use for monitored spending solely to counter the effects of the pandemic, mitigating the costs of disruption, social distancing and lost livelihoods for vulnerable people.

Repayments of debt principal falling due during the specified period would also be deferred, and there are various options for handling these. Creditors would receive stakes in the CCF equal to their diverted interest payments, which would be senior claims in any future debt restructuring. All creditors, official and commercial, would receive equal treatment.  

Such a scheme should reassure lenders on two counts. No payments would be going to other creditors, so no money would be diverted from countering COVID-19, and all spending would be authorised and monitored by the CCF. Furthermore, resources could be quickly directed towards urgent needs in the debtor country without the tortuous coalition building often seen among creditors.

This blueprint offers a potential solution to the problems of creditor coordination and borrower behaviour while making resources available promptly to countries facing the dual threat of economic harm and greater spending needs. Whether it will work in practice remains to be seen.

Andrew is a member of Bright Blue and a former UK Government economist. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Matt-80]

With Brexit an accomplished fact and ongoing negotiations over future relations between the UK and the EU reportedly hanging perilously in the balance, a series of questions concerning the future of Britain’s European policy and the nation’s wider geopolitical strategy arise

The Prime Minister has repeatedly stressed the UK’s will for continued partnership and friendship with its European neighbours. It is obvious, however, that should the European Union ever experience an even limited federalisation of an ‘inner core’ of member states, for example through a tightly integrated geopolitical cooperation of France and Germany as prepared in the Treaty of Aachen signed last year, it could become an even more formidable international competitor than it already is at the present moment. 

Influencing the course and extent of European integration in the interest of British competitiveness is an extremely complex task that will require supreme statesmanship, keen understanding of continental affairs and skilful diplomatic tact, from any British government. It will also require the cooperation of a reliable partner on the continent, which will be able to present British concerns in Brussels and take the UK’s sovereign interests into active consideration. This European partner should be Germany. 

Historically, Britain’s view on Germany has always vacillated between admiration and distrust, warm friendship and bitter hostility, alternating phases of war and peace, conflict and reconciliation. While the memory of the Second World War looms large in British public memory, Germany and the United Kingdom are today connected by liberal-democratic and humanitarian values; the cooperation in international organisations, such as NATO, UN, OECD, WHO; and diverse mutual interests, ranging from frictionless trade and the defence of international law to the combatting of existential threats to human life such as the current Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, the fight against international terrorism and the resolute struggle against transnational far right extremism. 

Germany is the nation’s second largest trading partner and an important market for British businesses, especially in the vital field of digitising key sectors of German economy, which has been declared a national priority by the Chancellery. British businesses engaged in software development and artificial intelligence research could and should profit from this national agenda by combining digital expertise developed in London, Oxford and Cambridge with Germany’s advanced technological skills and deep know-how in such critical areas of innovation as automation, medicine, biochemistry, transportation, robotics, clean energy and heavy industry. 

This could, for example, be achieved through the creation of Anglo-German tech clusters, favourable visa arrangements for entrepreneurs and businessmen, as well as regular exchanges between German and British start-up communities, investors and developers. At the moment, Germany is in the middle of a complex shifting of international priorities, in which it seeks to establish new security arrangements and alliances in the face of an American retreat from the global stage, a resurgent China and a geopolitically ambitious Russian Federation on NATO’s Eastern flank. 

In the EU, meanwhile, Germany will hold the presidency of the European Council in the second half of this year and will therefore be able to decisively shape Brexit negotiations and serve as a vital British ally on the continent, whose support will be critical in maintaining favourable cross-border trading conditions. 

On the issue of Brexit, Merkel has shown herself pragmatically appreciative of British concerns and has repeatedly sought to soften the blows of a potential no-deal scenario, which could be catastrophic for German industry, while the various candidates for the upcoming December elections for chairman of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU), have generally shown themselves sympathetic to the UK’s position. 

Thus, the party’s conservative darling Friedrich Merz, who is the Brexit representative in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (‘NRW’) has expressed his concern for the potential negative economic ramifications of a no-deal scenario, while his contender, NRW’s Prime Minister Armin Laschet has personally thanked the British government for its support in the creation of his state after the Second World War and affirmed his enduring commitment to Anglo-German friendship. 

Similarly, candidate Norbert Röttgen, the chair of Bundestag Foreign Affair Committee, and MP Tom Tugenthat have called for a friendship treaty between the UK and Germany post Brexit. On the level of the Länder (federal states), Bavaria’s popular conservative Prime Minister Markus Söder has already announced the opening of a dedicated Bavarian diplomatic representation in London in 2020, which will become an important additional communicative hub for the deepening of Anglo-German relations next to the existing German embassy in Belgrave Square.

The UK, on the other hand, could strengthen Germany’s position in the UN security council and serve as an important conduit between the EU and an increasingly isolationist and distrustful US. In the field of military cooperation and international security, the UK and Germany could also forge closer bilateral ties through intelligence-sharing agreements, as well as through the establishment of an Anglo-German Brigade (similar to the already existing Franco-German Brigade) to be deployed in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states.   

A close Anglo-German alliance will not only be beneficial to both nations, as well as European welfare and security, but will also allow Britain to pursue its geopolitical ambitions without nurturing its historic fears about the rise of a hostile hegemonic power on the continent and assert a more pronounced global role with the support of a strong, friendly partner in the EU that shares its values, ideals and interests. 

To achieve this ambition, the UK will have to cultivate not only high-level contacts between Downing Street and the Chancellery in Berlin, but also crucially deepen relations with the government of the Länder, such as Bavaria, Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia, whose regional economies will be the key to a successful Anglo-German relationship post Brexit. 

Carlo is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Number 10]