Defence

There may be no public declaration of war, but it is clear that liberal democracies are in conflict with Putin-ruled Russia. The answer to how we deal with Russian aggression starts with accepting this grim fact.

Constant conflict with liberal democracies is one of the main pillars of the Putin regime’s domestic rule, and an integral part of its foreign-policy worldview. Putin does not share the Western vision of a Europe at peace, and is not going to stop attacking and undermining Western countries. Putin and his gang of KGB thugs see any attempt at conciliation as weakness and an encouragement for whatever destructive and murderous acts they are currently committing.

The dangers of appeasement were made horrifyingly clear by Belarusian President Lukashenko’s outrageous air piracy, forcing down an EU flight to arrest an opposition figure. He was later displayed on TV showing obvious signs of his brutal treatment to make a false ‘confession’, reminiscent of Stalin’s times. It’s unlikely that Putin didn’t approve this move, and indeed when asked at the St Petersburg Economic Forum if Russia might do the same to capture opposition figures again, his answer was far from a definite ‘no’.

Similarly, when President Biden stated he would waive sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, Putin pounced immediately and announced that Ukraine remaining a transit country for Russian gas depended on it showing “goodwill”. In other words, a nation that has had Crimea stolen from it and has lost thousands of people fighting a bitter trench war against forces controlled, led, manned, armed, and supplied by Russia has to show “goodwill” for the Kremlin to not wreak further damage to its economy.

“Putin’s claim of entitlement to a ‘sphere of influence’ is highly offensive to nations that lived for decades with the Soviet jackboot on their necks”

Nord Stream 2 is entirely a geopolitical weapon for the Putin regime, designed to further undermine Ukraine’s dream of building a Western-style state and economy, as well as to increase leverage over other European states. Ukrainians rightly see the US move as a betrayal. Western countries should be extremely concerned about the further power such a move would place in Putin’s hands. It should be stopped.

Attempting to murder an ex-intelligence officer on the streets of the United Kingdom with a nerve agent; constantly trying to encourage political division on social media and with actual agents infiltrating parties and organisations; running a vast, well-funded propaganda machine based in Western countries pretending to be ‘alternative’ media; co-opting Western politicians and other figures to spread Kremlin-friendly messages and influence; bombing hospitals to prop up the evil Assad regime in Syria; and, hacking government systems. The list of hostile and damaging acts is growing as efforts never cease.

However, we can push back. Doing so robustly gives the Kremlin pause for thought. Ukrainians, for example, rallied as a nation and fought back against the Russian-instigated ‘civil war’. Although it has cost them dearly, it has averted the possible end of Ukraine as a country. UK support has helped, but we must do more to make it plain to Putin that it’s not in his interests to prevent Ukraine from choosing to follow a Western path.

“Those who profit from being close to Putin, who finance his aggression against us, should not be free to enjoy the fruits of the system they undermine”

Putin’s claim of entitlement to a ‘sphere of influence’ is highly offensive to nations that lived for decades with the Soviet jackboot on their necks. They are independent nations, who do not want to live under brutal authoritarian and corrupt regimes. The West must be confident about sending our forces to reassure them, and make it plain to the Kremlin that we will not abandon these nations to its mercy.

Moreover, we must reject Russia’s claims that NATO is encircling and threatening it for the baseless and cynical propaganda they are. The idea that the West would attack or invade Russia is laughable, and we should say so loudly.

As Theresa May, when she was Prime Minister, showed over the Skripal assassination attempt, when we do act with purpose and in concert, we can show the Kremlin we mean business. Her Government’s work to unite allies in response to the heinous act in Salisbury startled the Kremlin with its display of Western unity and resolve.

Sanctions do work, over time. In addition, dubious Russian money, often acquired at the expense of ordinary Russians, should not be welcomed in the West. Those who profit from being close to Putin and who finance his aggression against us should not be free to enjoy the fruits of the system they undermine, by sending their children to study and party here. Even Russian propagandists who spew anti-Western rhetoric from Russians’ TV screens prefer to spend their time in London. This must end. It is uncomfortable to face the fact that we are in a conflict without a foreseeable end, but it is a fact nonetheless. Recognising it is the first step in not losing the fight.

Chris Hernon is a leading Russia and disinformation analyst and a former journalist for the BBC Monitoring service. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured?. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Russian Defence Industry]

Disinformation campaigns from hostile state and non-state actors continue to thrive and to undermine democracies, leveraging a vast array of communications platforms to exploit elections, referendums, the Covid-19 pandemic, and more. 

The fundamental goals of disinformation remain the same: to undermine democracy, international cohesion, and trust in institutions; and to increase polarisation and promote geopolitical goals. 

This reached a dramatic height when angry mobs stormed the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. Related violence, incited by a web of conspiracies and domestic and foreign disinformation efforts, demonstrate how online disinformation and conspiracies can shake democracy to its core and cause real-world harm to people and the democratic process. 

Western democracies must take notice of the real and emerging threat of disinformation-fuelled radicalisation and violence that hostile state and non-state actors will continue to exploit to achieve their geopolitical goals. Luckily, there’s a vast body of research and practiced methodologies that disinformation practitioners can borrow from the counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism playbooks to curb it. 

Disinformation and radicalisation experts alike study how offline and online behaviors and discourse might predicate real-world harm. At the onset of the mass migration of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria in 2013 and the increase in related domestic terrorism events, radicalisation and counterterrorism practitioners began considering ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors as indicators or vulnerabilities around which to shape their prevention programmes. 

Push factors may be socio-economic, psychological, ideological, and circumstantial (such as discrimination or marginalisation) factors that might make some people more likely to consider or physically mobilise towards violence. Pull factors would include influences, messages, and groups that exploit these vulnerabilities. With these factors in mind, experts and prac-titioners could begin understanding the drivers, external influences, and different stages of the radicalisation process and thus recommend and tailor prevention programmes accordingly. 

Practitioners and global institutions should think about disinformation through a similar lens. Identifying predispositions or push factors will help governments and global institutions avoid one-size-fits-all approaches to disinformation-related prevention programmes, predicated on local-level drivers and influences, and co-opting appropriate credible influencers as part of the resilience building process. 

As Peter Kreko, Director of Political Capital Institute in Budapest states: “Vulnerabilities are easily exploited by malign state and non-state actors who then tailor influence operations to each audience by tapping into these underlying complexities.” By tailoring prevention programmes to address known vulnerabilities, state and non-state actors may see the impact of disinformation campaigns wane.

Just as social and traditional media have become accelerators of terrorist recruitment and radicalisation, artificial intelligence (AI) enabled disinformation could serve as a similar accelerant of disinformation-fuelled mobilisation to violence, if not adequately addressed. 

Deepfake videos online are dramatically increasing. A report from Deeptrace indicates that in 2019, over a ten-month period, there was an increase from 7,964 to 14,678 in deepfakes circulating online. The creation and distribution of sophisticated deepfakes, forged documents, or doctored images presents yet another tool for nefarious actors to exploit. 

Anne Neuberger, White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, echoed this concern by saying that “artificial intelligence could generate disinformation at scale in a way that brings real concern.” 

Governments must be proactive by investing in detection tools and technologies, and domestic and global planning, and put processes in place for information-sharing with social media companies when AI-enabled disinformation has the potential to cause real-world harm. 

Institutions should break down the silos between counterterrorism and counter-disinformation efforts to ensure real-time information sharing, analysis, and future planning, as the lines between counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism efforts and counter-disinformation efforts overlap. While elections, referendums, and the Covid-19 pandemic all present vectors for disinformation-fuelled violence, global institutions and governments should begin anticipating future threats or vectors that could lead to another 6 January-style event.

While it is imperative for global institutions and governments to take critical and swift steps to combat the rising tide of disinformation-related violence, there are important limitations. Not all disinformation or extreme discourse leads to violence. Curbing, or appearing to curb, free speech in the name of countering terrorism or extremism could infringe on protected free speech and cause irreparable damage to democracies while also exacerbating distrust in governing institutions. 

Finally, governments can’t curb the spread of disinformation alone, nor should they be solely responsible. Social media and communications platforms must become less hospitable to the spread of disinformation on their platforms. 

As disinformation enters this new phase and poses an increasing risk to democracy, institutions must act quickly to create plans and programmes that build resilience against this threat. Leveraging the broad array of lessons learned, resources, and tools from recent counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation programmes is a good place to start. 

Lauren Protentis is a national security and communications expert. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured?. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Brett Davis]

Tobias Ellwood’s article regarding Britain’s fiscal commitment to her armed forces makes for frightening reading. In stark detail he reveals what we have all realised deep down – that we are not living in ‘the end of history’ and that the United Kingdom is just as threatened today as it was 80 years ago. Apparently malevolent actors are gaining influence across the world; in contrast, our armed forces appear to be losing relevance. Yet whilst I agree with Ellwood in that a threat exists, I disagree as to where it is coming from. 

This is because the real threat Western civilisation faces today is of an opaque nature. Rather than fixate our gaze on the return of China to great power status, or Russian manoeuvres in the Donbass, we ought not to forget the very regions from which we are withdrawing.

No doubt many sleepless nights have been spent by those in power over the seemingly inexorable rise of China. Many assume that the rise of such countries is automatically detrimental to our own interests, and must be opposed at all costs. Yet when one stops to think about the threat such nations pose, it appears that such ideas are illusions. The ascendency of China has not been negative for the UK or its interests. The nation’s rise in prosperity combined with its joining of the WTO has massively benefited the British economy, with cheaper imports, reducing business costs significantly and providing a positive supply side shock for the UK. Clearly such developments are not a zero sum game. China, too, has benefitted massively from increased economic engagement with the Western world, with its huge current account surplus underpinning its economy and dramatically improving the lives of its citizens. It is for this very reason that the PRC seeks to avoid conflict with the West (despite its confrontational exterior) – put rather simply, it cannot afford it. 

Ellwood is therefore wrong in describing a nation that has actually benefited British interests as ““the ultimate geopolitical threat””, no matter how despicable CCP rule is for oppressed minorities in China itself. Obviously, this is not the whole story. China continues to make worrying moves regarding the freedom of the South China Sea, as well as threatening the invasion of Taiwan. Were such an event to occur, it could have potentially disastrous consequences given the strategic resources, among them the world’s major source of microchips, contained on the island. Yet whilst the rise of China clearly presents a foreign policy challenge, it does not present a situation akin to the 1930s, that being a dangerous assumption. The West would do well to stockpile strategic resources and improve independence of supply regarding them. But that does not require building a larger army.

Russia too, is a threat grossly exaggerated. Clearly, events ranging from the Salisbury poisonings to alleged interference in the US election are all the hallmarks of a threatening state. However, its potency is overestimated. Unlike China, which genuinely does have the capacity to be a great power, Russia is merely perceived as one. Its economy is weaker than Italy’s and is startlingly dependent on natural gas. Its armed forces, whilst of a fierce reputation, are inferior to the full capacity of NATO’s. Perhaps most significantly, it has more to worry about than the West given both its exposure to jihadism and China’s conflicting claims over Siberia. Meanwhile, even as the size of British armed personnel decreases, our investment in cyber defence has increased as per the Government’s recent enhancement of defence funds. 

Where, then, does the real threat to Britain lie? It is not from despotic regimes, but rather the absence of them. A bold assertion indeed, so let me explain. Across the Middle East and Sahel we see swathes of chaos, some of it of our own making. Poorly managed interventions in Iraq and Libya, combined with a fundamental miscalculation of the impact of the Arab Spring, have exacerbated a surge in radical Islamism across the Middle East. Having eliminated several oppressive dictatorships, we failed to replace them with credible alternatives, leading to power vacuums across the region in which ISIS thrived. This group has now been eliminated but, whilst it existed, did more to threaten Western security, values and lives than any other threat we face today. 

Moreover, whilst ISIS specifically is effectively defeated, its successors remain at large, with ‘ISIS-K’ causing the deaths of British citizens in Afghanistan and Jihadist groups in Mozambique effectively imperilling one of the largest Western investments in Africa to date. Such actors are incapable of governance and leave swathes of unregulated territory in their wake, giving rise to the migrant crisis and rise of radical Islamism that we saw last decade. It is this threat, the threat of anarchy and terrorism, that truly ought to give those in the Foreign Office sleepless nights, for it is not a state. It cannot be reasoned with and has nothing to lose. Moreover, such actors are entirely committed, not to expanding their influence in a conventional sense, but to overthrowing the current world order. Our foreign policy ought to specifically target such areas, lest the rise in extremism and mass migration we have seen in the past decade continue, weakening the social cohesion and the foundation of Britain, not to mention the lives of its citizens. 

Our grand strategy must prioritise the stabilisation of ‘failed states’ and lawless regions. This doesn’t have to involve mass intervention in a neo-imperial fashion, far from it. If anything, having witnessed the negative impacts of Western intervention ever since 9/11, it would be wise to limit it as much as possible. 

In dealing with such areas we must first recognise in a cynical fashion that a despotic regime, such as the returning Taliban, is preferable to disorder, both for the West (which should suffer less terrorist attacks as extremist groups are suppressed by dictator) and the regime’s subjects (which at the very least will not suffer from the scourge of war). Regime change should therefore be consigned to history, not least to avoid the epic material costs of such misadventures in money and resources. Using the Taliban to argue against regime change sounds absurd. But let me present you with an alternative strategy. 

The United States and her allies entered Afghanistan to hunt down Al Qaeda, not to nation build. In that goal they initially failed, with Osama Bin Laden surviving the initial invasion and fleeing to Pakistan. The mission therefore went wrong before NATO decided to nation-build, rather than after it. Put quite simply, our failure to end the war quickly in 2001 started the miserable chain of events that led to the evacuation of Kabul. But imagine a situation in which we had succeeded. What then? Would we have actively continued the war in Afghanistan, overthrowing the Taliban despite our objective being complete? Or would we have left there and then, Al Qaeda being finished and Afghanistan still stable.

It is not that the West shouldn’t consider direct intervention an option, but rather that such intervention be kept to a small scale. Rather than invade the entirety of Afghanistan in 2001, we could have honed in on the Tora Bora mountains, keeping interaction with the Taliban at a minimum whilst ending the terrorist threat. Of course despotic regimes can harbor terrorist groups. Yet it is better to try and alter the status quo as little as possible than to rip it up completely, most likely replacing it with something far worse and less manageable. Therefore, as a general rule, we should refrain from prodding the hornets’ nest. However appalling it may seem, this means leaving dictators such as Assad in place. When scenarios such as 2001 Afghanistan do appear, the West should aim to make incisions rather than amputations in minimising threats to its national security.

So if our policy regarding malevolent regimes were to be minimising engagement, what of our policy regarding regions devoid of order? It is easy to lose sight of the fact that the West’s recent policy in Afghanistan was successful in light of the traumatic events in August. A minor (and relatively inexpensive) US footprint was able, through providing training, logistical support and airpower, able to stabilise large areas of the country. Perhaps, albeit to a lesser degree, we ought to continue such actions when necessary. Such a policy requires only a small armed force, one capable of training foreign armies to stabilise regions whilst minimising its own engagement. When it does engage, it doesn’t have to be a particularly large force. 

So, whilst it would be desirable to increase personnel size, it is unnecessary, especially when considering that we would almost certainly be entering such regions with allies. One might argue that such an armed force, as shown by the Afghanistan debacle, is incapable of operating independently on expeditionary operations. To this I reiterate that such large scale expeditions are undesirable to begin with and of a different nature to the kind of ‘background presence’ for which I am advocating. 

We should indeed aim to increase defence funding, but rather than spend it on expanding the armed forces per se, use it to bolster intelligence and cyber security. Not only will this help manage terrorist threats facing the UK, but it will also enable us to reduce interference in the Western political system from states such as Russia and Iran. So too should we increase the foreign aid budget and, at the very minimum, restore it to 0.7% of GDP. Through a combination of small scale military presence and development programs, the West can help stabilise the biggest sources of terrorism without ever embroiling ourselves in another Afghanistan or Iraq. 

Finally, we must recognise our limits. In the aftermath of Covid-19, the UK simply does not have the resources to significantly increase defence spending and foreign aid. We must, to meet the strategy outlined above, combine with like-minded allies. Countries such as France face similar threats to us given their position in Europe, as well as similar economic limitations. A coordinated intelligence programme should strengthen the UK’s defence as well its ties with like-minded nations. 

The threats we face today are not obvious. And they require unobvious solutions. Looking to the past for parallels with the 1930s is irresponsible. It suggests that we inevitably face a reckoning with nations such as China, when in fact we need to reckon with the crises that face us all, be they terrorism, climate change or pandemics. Global Britain doesn’t require a dramatic increase in defence spending; it merely requires an accurate assessment of where threats lie and an efficient way of dealing with them when they arise. 

Oliver is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue.

The centre of gravity of global trade shifted towards the Asia-Pacific in the first two decades of this century. In fact, it could be claimed that consumer demand out of China helped drag a number of economies through the Global Financial Crisis.

More recently, however, trade tensions have risen. The threat to global economic wellbeing is real. 

The geopolitical landscape started to change when the new Trump Administration withdrew from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) during the final stages of its negotiation. Paradoxically, the whole idea of such a trade grouping was originally a United States idea, first formulated during the Clinton years.

The Trump exit from TPP was part of a wider withdrawal of US leadership from the rules-based global trading system. Intransigence on judicial appointments at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) also started to destabilise that critically important disputes resolution process. 

At the same time, President Trump entered into a tit-for-tat trade war with China. Unsurprisingly, China also seemed to attach less importance to WTO rules and we saw partial product bans and tariffs being imposed on imports in what appeared to be retaliation for political criticism.

For example, when Australia called for a more rigorous inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, hefty tariffs were slapped on products not essential to the Chinese economy, such as barley and wine.

Until now, China has had a pretty good track record of compliance with WTO rulings. As the first trade minister in the world to sign China up to the WTO, I hope that will continue. 

But political tensions induced by a diversity of issues from the South China Sea, to the treatment of Uyghur Muslims and Hong Kong protesters; the place of Taiwan in the One China future, not to mention alleged malicious cyber activities by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, all require careful, clear diplomatic handling if they are not to further destabilise trade.

For Australasia, much is at stake. China takes at least 40% of Australia’s exports and about 30% of New Zealand’s.

There were intensified efforts to conclude negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving Australia, New Zealand, the ten members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations; as well as China, India, South Korea, and Japan. Sadly, at the last minute India withdrew. That was a significant blow as RCEP was seen as a pathway for bringing India more widely into the global trading system.

The net result of all these manoeuvrings isn’t great. What’s more, the Biden Administration seems in no haste to re-engage with the multilateral trading system. 

All is not lost, however. The TPP was finally concluded as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), with world-leading work on good regulatory practice and a valuable chapter introducing, for the first time in an FTA, sensible remedies for dealing with members failing to implement their own environmental regulation.

Moreover, we saw Japan emerge as a leader in ongoing trade liberalisation work. The question now is – can Global Britain also step up to a leadership role in helping navigate this changed geopolitical landscape? 

First, acceding to CPTPP would have an impact way beyond the narrow economic cost-benefit analysis. It would engage the UK with one of the most rapidly growing parts of the world. But more importantly, it would help bring the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific to the doorstep of Europe. As New Zealand has seen with all our trade agreements, the potential to open minds is enormous.

The UK’s membership of CPTPP may also encourage the US to rethink its position. A transatlantic UK-US free trade agreement seems fraught. Achieving it via CPTPP offers wider benefits to both sides.

The role for Global Britain, though, doesn’t stop there. All are aware that the full potential of the Asia-Pacific region won’t be realised without India. Hence the current thinking around the Indo-Pacific.

Many countries have tried to negotiate free trade agreements with India. Most have struggled and developed countries have failed to achieve anything like a comprehensive FTA.

Britain’s relationship with India goes back a long way and is deeper rooted than most. The chance for Britain to ease open the door to free trade with India is real. If anyone can do it, Britain can.

The United Kingdom has the heft. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Global Britain captures the vision. The first steps are underway – agreement in principle on what looks like a quality FTA with Australia, negotiations close to completion with New Zealand, and accession to CPTPP started.

Dialogue partner status by ASEAN has also recently been granted. It’s a welcome sign from the Asia-Pacific. If Global Britain could help lead a new chapter of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, the benefits would be enormous.

The Rt Hon Sir Lockwood Smith is the former High Commissioner of New Zealand to the United Kingdom. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured?. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image:Number 10]

As the Taliban’s flag was raised over the Panjshir valley, signalling total victory over the final Afghan resistance, thousands of miles away a buoyant Boris Johnson began extolling the successes of the British evacuation of Kabul. As he spoke of the curtain being drawn on 20 years of western intervention in Afghanistan, curtains were being drawn up in Kabul’s universities, creating partitions between young men and women merely looking to learn. 

Johnson had little to say, however, about what we should expect of any future foreign policy, instead opting to recycle Theresa May’s slogan from his days as Foreign Secretary: ‘Global Britain’. 

Many have been quick to criticise this post-Brexit mantra for being devoid of any morsel of meaning, with the former foreign minister, Sir Alan Duncan, describing it as “utterly meaningless” in a recent Bright Blue interview. 

Atop the noise of daily warning shots fired in response to anti-Taliban protests in Kabul, the rest of the world remains silent. The optimistic chorus of Pax Americana has all but vanished and if Britain is to reinstate itself as a global leader, we must see actions that demonstrate the short- and long-term ideals of Global Britain. 

There are three key objectives which need addressing. Firstly, a clear and proactive policy must be implemented to deal with the immediate humanitarian crisis unfolding in Afghanistan. Secondly, we must begin to forge a longer-term strategy for the region, less reliant on US directives and military intervention. Finally, we must begin to look for more global partners, creating a framework to heal increasingly prevalent political fissures in the Middle East and Africa. 

Kabul-centric reporting means an escalating humanitarian crisis is now sweeping across Afghanistan largely unnoticed. 5,000 people have died in the conflict since January, with more than a hundred times that many having fled the country as refugees. Millions more have been rendered unemployed by the incessant fighting, and the twin spectres of a devasting drought coupled with an imminent famine mean much of Afghanistan will soon find itself on its knees. 

As Sir David Lidington quite rightly identifies, “now is not the time to be cut[ting] our soft power capabilities” and we must begin to wield various arms of our foreign aid budget including the British Council. Furthermore, we must continue to play an active role in Qatar-led negotiations to reopen Kabul airport, as this remains the most likely avenue of access for vital humanitarian relief. 

Looking to the longer term, success will inevitably arise out of adept blending of both soft and hard power. We must not forget that a constant military presence in the region over the last 20 years has led unquestionably to greater freedoms for women and minorities. The allied forces oversaw an entire generation of 3.6 million women able to access education. Many of these women now cower in their homes, distrustful of the Taliban’s empty rhetoric, vowing to ‘to honour women’s rights’. Although Prime Minister Boris Johnson has taken a more optimistic view of their promises, Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab quite rightly reminds us, we must judge the Taliban “on their actions and not their words”. 

Regionally, increasingly strained Israel-Iran relations threaten to destabilise much of the recent economic prosperity that has developed between Britain and the Gulf. We would do well to maintain the Qatari alliance, cultivated by Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, in light of Qatar’s recent ambitious military scale-up, multiplying their fighter jet fleet eight fold. 

On tackling many of these issues, our friends and partners in Europe appear instinctive allies, especially with the impending refugee crisis providing common ground. The diplomatic E3 triumvirate of the UK, France and Germany will be key to providing leadership in NATO whilst the US remains on hiatus. Furthermore, as James Skinner excellently outlines, the inter-continental alliance of CANZUK must form a central tenet of any Global Britain going forward, providing invaluable trading opportunities as well as a convenient door in into the Indo-Pacific region. 

Moreover, China’s increasingly provocative posturing over Taiwan means having allies in these territories is vital to ensure Britain can muster any necessary rebuttal. 

There remain plenty more questions for Global Britain to answer in the coming years, but our foreign policy cannot freeze up, uncomfortable with the role we must play on the global stage. Swift, compassionate action in Afghanistan, accompanied by the forging of vital alliances built on shared values, are the keys to realising a Global Britain, fit for a new world order. 

Will is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Number 10]

The political shock of the West’s defeat in Afghanistan has hammered home the truth that we can no longer take for granted some of the key assumptions that have underpinned much of the public and parliamentary thinking about our country’s security. 

First, the international order established after the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union is visibly and rapidly fraying. 

Putin’s Russia occupies parts of Georgia and Ukraine, seeks to subvert democracy in Eastern and Central Europe and has used both radiological and chemical weapons to kill people in the United Kingdom. 

China not only rails against the ‘unequal treaties’ imposed on it during its period of weakness in the nineteenth century – about which it has a reasonable point – but also exults in the erosion of Western influence and presents its own system of authoritarian rule coupled with the ruthless use of surveillance technology to identify and suppress dissent as a model for other nations to follow. 

Second, the United States is questioning its own international priorities. ‘America First’ is a slogan associated with Donald Trump, but the idea predates his presidency. President Obama insisted that Britain and France had to take responsibility for leading allied action in Libya, and now President Biden has decided to stick with his predecessor’s commitment to a speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan, with scant regard paid to the views of coalition partners. 

This is not isolationism, but rather a ruthless focus on those things that matter most to US interests. Allies, especially those in Europe, including the UK, are expected to spend more on their own security and take responsibility for leadership in regions like Africa and the Balkans, which are a lesser priority for Washington. 

Third, it is becoming more difficult to define a neat boundary between peace and conflict. Our adversaries deploy hard and soft power together to promote their strategic objectives. The Belt and Road extends China’s strategic as well as its commercial influence. Russia deploys troops in Georgia, Crimea and Transnistria; mercenaries in the Donbass, Syria and Libya; cyberattacks, economic muscle, information warfare, and cultural organisations to advance its interests.

Fourth, there is no longer any demarcation line between domestic and international security. The Salisbury attack was the most stark recent illustration of this, but any chief constable will tell you that there is now almost no serious and organised crime that lacks an international dimension. Digital communications enable the transfer across continents of extremist doctrines, laundered money, and nuclear and biological know-how. 

Our security is threatened by criminal enterprises, from terrorists to cyber-gangs to drug and people traffickers, which are every bit as professional and well-organised as any legitimate transnational business. As I learned when in government, criminal gangs may also have close connections with hostile states and serve, in effect, as surrogates for them. 

Fifth, our security will depend in large part on whether the democratic world can renew its capacity for innovation and technological advance. China is openly aiming for a leading position in all the key twenty-first century technologies, from synthetic biology to quantum computing, by 2025. It aspires to global dominance in those markets by the centenary of the communist revolution in 2049, with the geopolitical clout that that would give. 

This is not about Huawei or TikTok – the Chinese Communist Party’s treatment of Jack Ma, and now of China’s online education sector, shows that it cares little about individual companies. Rather the challenge is whether, by mid-century, the UK, the US or any other democracy will have any choice other than to rely on Chinese suppliers of advanced telecoms, robotics, or AI. 

So, what is to be done? We face hard choices. The UK will need to modernise its hard power – spend more on robots, drones, cyber, and space – and maintain, rather than cut, our soft power capabilities like our aid programme and the British Council. 

Alliances and international institutions can amplify Britain’s influence, but there will still be limits to what we can do.

The Government’s Integrated Review, published earlier this year, identified technology as key to our security interests. We now need the leadership and the difficult, detailed work to turn its ambitions for a new technological revolution into a strategic plan to implement the necessary policy reforms on education, skills, and industrial development. 

We have to keep persuading the US that it should continue to see the security of Europe, including the UK, as a vital national interest of the American people. That means maintaining the quality of our armed forces and intelligence agencies and their relationships with US counterparts and also showing that the UK can be effective in convening and leading groups of allies to defend Western, including American, interests through both diplomatic and military means. 

The UK is a European power with global interests and a global outlook. We should work more with countries like Japan, Australia, and South Korea, but also build a new strategic security relationship with our European neighbours. Some of that can be done through NATO, for example through the UK’s leadership of the Northern Group. Outside NATO, the E3 diplomatic network of UK, France, and Germany has continued to function well throughout the travails of Brexit. 

Alongside our bilateral relationships we will need to rebuild a strategic security relationship with the EU as an institution. Even France and Germany seek to influence and are in turn influenced by European Union decisions. The EU has responsibilities under its treaties for police and justice cooperation, for data sharing, sanctions policy, and a lot of soft power capability – from development spending to police and military training. An effective set of security relationships with our European neighbours is an integral part of Global Britain, not an alternative to it. 

I hope that defeat in Afghanistan will spur a willingness to make a reality of the vision embodied in the Integrated Review and make the hard policy choices that that will entail. We have no time to waste.

The Rt Hon Sir David Lidington CBE is the Chair of the Royal United Services Institute and was de facto Deputy Prime Minister under Theresa May. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured?. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Royal Navy]