Foreign

There is a 1930s feel to the world at the moment. Authoritarianism is on the rise once again, geopolitical power bases are shifting, international institutions are unable to hold errant states and non-state actors to account, and rival states are seriously upgrading their hard power. To make matters worse, there is a clear absence of Western resolve and leadership – over what we collectively believe in, stand for, and are truly willing to defend.

If there was one welcome outcome from the most recent G7 summit in Cornwall, it is the realisation that unless the West becomes less risk averse, regroups, and re-unites, the next decade will get very bumpy indeed.

There is a clear absence of Western resolve and leadership – over what we collectively believe in, stand for, and are truly willing to defend

Russia is an acute threat to European interests as Vladimir Putin seeks to revitalise its superpower status by expanding influence in his backyard. China is the long-term geopolitical threat. An ever confident and assertive Beijing seeks to lure evermore states into its infrastructure, technology, and military programmes, progressively expanding its soft power influence across Asia and now Africa.

Three fresh factors make today’s situation more dangerous than in the lead up to the Second World War.

Changes in technology are altering how we communicate, do business, socialise, and indeed fight. Our openness offers access to both state and non-state actors to disrupt our lives beneath the threshold of direct conflict through disinformation, intellectual property theft, election interference, and cyber attacks.

Covid-19 has seen nations retreat from global exposure, become more siloed and protectionist. Many states have introduced emergency draconian legislation that they will be slow to relinquish.

Finally, climate change is already impacting security and governance in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions. Storms, floods, and droughts will affect agricultural productivity, damage economies, and lead to mass migration, most notably from Africa to Europe.

Large-scale food shortages will unsettle populations leading to intensified competition over resources and regional conflict. Even if COP26 is a success, the damage done to our fragile planet to date will not prevent sea levels from rising before the danger passes.

How the West acts over the next few years will determine how the next few decades play out. As the UK starts to lift its head after the distractions of Covid-19 and Brexit, we must recognise that our options are narrowing to change course.

The Government’s recent Integrated Review of Defence, Security, Development, and Foreign Policy recognises the individual pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, but it hasn’t fitted them all together to form comprehensive grand strategy, nor committed the necessary funds to ensure our defence powers are suitably upgraded for the looming threats we face.

We know we are more vulnerable than during the Cold War, when we spent 4% of GDP on defence. We cannot possibly match today’s threats on a peacetime budget of 2.2%. Although the Integrated Review has got us investing in our cyber and space resilience, without an increase in overall defence spending, our conventional military power will wither on the vine.

Our failure in Afghanistan is an extreme example where the wise use of soft power was trumped by faith in hard power alone

Over the next five years our Royal Navy surface fleet will become smaller than Italy’s. The British Army is the smallest it has been for 200 years. Tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, and nearly 10,000 troops will disappear. We won’t be able to transport or protect what’s left as we also lose 24 Typhoons, all our Hercules and Puma aircraft, and some of our Chinooks. Most worryingly, only 48 of the 138 F-35 Lightning jets are ordered.

It’s not just about hard power, but soft power too. Our failure in Afghanistan is an extreme example where the wise use of soft power was trumped by faith in hard power alone. Now is not the time to cap our defence spending, and we certainly should not be reducing our overseas aid budget.

The international ‘to do’ list could not be more daunting. Repairing our international institutions; reinvigorating Western resolve; and, addressing Russia’s acute aggression and China’s increasing economic, technological, and military clout are bad enough. Convincing friend and foe that we, not mother nature alone, need to tackle climate change is even tougher.

We are a nation that steps forward when others hesitate. The world would be a very different place if we hadn’t stood firm – and often alone – against Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler. Today is no different. “No man is an island” said the poet John Donne. Too many, I fear, have turned in on themselves, confused by a complex world, and fearful of it. It’s often much easier to ignore threats than confront them in time, but never forget that, as with appeasement, political drift preceded decisiveness.

This time, we can’t afford to sleep while our enemies are wide awake – and ever more dangerous.

The Rt Hon Tobias Ellwood is currently MP for Bournemouth East. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured? Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Sergeant Donald Todd]

The United Kingdom and the United States should collectively invest far more into developing renewable energy production infrastructure in Africa. First, this would aid the world in its push for carbon neutrality by preventing the industrialisation of Africa from being driven by Chinese backed fossil fuels. Second, it would enable the UK and the US to grow western influence in Africa, provide developing nations alternative options to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and economically combat a growing Chinese hegemony on the continent. 

As part of the BRI, China’s ambitious global trade network with itself at the centre, China has begun the construction of energy infrastructure in Africa to power both future consumer energy needs and Chinese-funded construction projects, such as ports, railways, and water supply systems. 

Despite proclamations from Beijing, this energy infrastructure is largely dependent on fossil fuels. From 2014-2017, 43% of state policy bank loans by the China Development Bank and the Export Import Bank of China went towards oil, gas, and petrochemicals, while 18% went towards coal. Just 3.4% of the loans went towards solar energy production, and only 2.9% were meant for wind production. One could hardly call the energy investment of the BRI “green” or keeping with “the ecological civilisation” promised by the Chinese government. 

This all carries significant implications when we look ahead to Africa’s projected population and energy demand forecasts. Africa’s population is the youngest and fastest growing in the world. One-in-two people added to the world’s population between today and 2040 is set to be African, and with this impending population boom comes a sharp rise in energy demand. Projections based on current stated policies predict that oil demand will grow by 86% and natural gas demand will nearly double in Africa by 2040. Green alternatives could prevent this fossil fuel demand from being met. As the world struggles to meet its current climate targets and limit global average temperature increases to 1.5 degrees C, we cannot afford an industrial revolution in Africa that follows the same path taken by major powers in the mid 18th century. 

It’s true that increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) in African clean energy infrastructure may not seem like a high priority in the wake of the immediate challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic, and we’d be forgiven for thinking some of the money given to African nations from the UK and US, totalling more than £8.45 billion in 2019, can simply be earmarked for wind and solar farms. But this money is already sorely needed for humanitarian aid and health programs, and FDI intended for stability cannot be redirected to green energy production without jeopardising all regional investments. Seeing as increasing investment into African clean energy infrastructure is sure to be a difficult sell, how do we do it? 

Instead of framing climate change as a moral failing of developed countries, it should instead be framed as a financial cost borne by the taxpayers. Estimated future costs of damages from global warming are severe, with rich countries such as the UK and the US likely to foot a disproportionate share of the tab. Global losses from climate change are projected to exceed £17 trillion annually by 2050 on if the Paris climate targets are not met and £41 trillion annually from 2100 even if temperature increases are limited to 1.5 degrees C. 

Additionally, there are political reasons for the UK and US to offer green energy investment in Africa: countering China’s growing influence in the region. China has gained strategic port locations through giving out targeted loans and has expanded the reach of numerous state-owned companies in Africa. Working to meet energy needs on the continent has contributed to a positive image of China in the area, needed for its continued cooperation. 

Developing countries in Africa have no special love for China’s political ideology, nor do they want to doom the planet with massive carbon emissions; they simply want enough electricity to provide for their populations. Most BRI recipient countries are not in the position to turn down coal power plants with the environment in mind, but the UK and the US are able to provide an alternative to the BRI while generating good will and spreading western soft power as a counter to China. FDI spent on mitigating climate change by providing Africa a greener energy alternative is more akin to an investment than a donation. In the case of a looming African fossil fuelled industrialisation and its potential damage to our planet, we can take advice from Benjamin Franklin: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 

Christian Steffen is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Pexels]

Aid is about our values. It offers our generation an opportunity to save and transform the lives of the world’s poorest people, and thereby build a better world.

Aid is also in our national interest. It stops the spread of epidemics, clears landmines, resolves conflicts, and builds free and fair democracies, making Britain healthier, safer, and more prosperous. As we adjust to a post-pandemic world and the rise of an increasingly hostile China, aid can remain both an expression of our values, and a pillar of our foreign and defence strategies. To do so it must become more effective, flexible, and smarter.

A five-year time scale would strengthen long-term aid objectives as well as delivering better outcomes to aid recipients

To make aid more effective, the Prime Minister should appoint a Minister for Development of a similar calibre toSamantha Power, the head of the US Agency for International Development. A former Ambassador to the United Nations and Pulitzer-prize winning war correspondent, Power also sits on the US National Security Council, emphasising the interconnectedness of defence, diplomacy, and development. Although the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) was established to better integrate diplomacy and development, Samantha Power has no opposite number in the UK Government.

To deliver maximum impact, aid needs a senior champion in Whitehall with sufficient political clout to support the Foreign Secretary, prevent waste, and ensure aid is focused on poverty reduction, while supporting our foreign policy and defence objectives. A senior figure such as the former Leader of the Scottish Conservatives, Ruth Davidson, might also communicate the lifesaving work of British aid to those sceptical taxpayers on whose generosity aid depends.

To make aid more flexible, the aid target should be moved to a multi-year rolling time frame. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has found that “Frequent delays in the disbursement of funds, combined with the FCDO’s 80% rule – requiring that 80% of funds be spent by December of the financial year of disbursement – often reduces a 12-month programme to effectively nine or even six months with little notice.” Rushing to spend a legally imposed target before a tight deadline risks bad practice. A five-year time scale would strengthen long-term aid objectives as well as delivering better outcomes to aid recipients, while helping to ensure better value for money. The aid target should also be synchronised with the Comprehensive Spending Review.

This would offer greater alignment with departmental allocations and provide reassurance that aid is being spent both strategically, and in keeping with our foreign policy and defence objectives.

In the coming years China will continue to weaponise international development with its Belt and Road Initiative and push into Africa

Finally, delivering smarter aid depends on the full aid budget being replenished as quickly as possible. The Prime Minister said at the time the cut to aid to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI) was announced that “the UK will remain a world leader in international development and we will return to our commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on development when the fiscal situation allows.” The Government has since revealed that will be when the Office for Budget Responsibility’s fiscal forecast shows that, “on a sustainable basis, the UK is not borrowing to finance day-to-day spending and underlying debt is falling”. By 2023, the temporary cut to aid will have already saved approximately £10 billion, more than double the amount set aside for the Levelling Up Fund that will support town centres and high street regeneration. All who recognise the enormous extent to which the UK’s soft power is supported by its commitment to the 0.7% target will wish to see it return as soon as possible.

Protecting the British people and our democracy is the first duty of all governments. It is only right, then, that the UK should be undertaking the biggest programme of investment in defence budget for 30 years.

Similarly, as the Integrated Review made clear, the FCDO was created as a springboard for the UK’s post-Brexit international efforts, fully integrating diplomacy and development to better address the clear link between extreme poverty and the impact of climate change in the developing world, and our security and prosperity at home.

Defence, diplomacy, and development are the three pillars holding up Global Britain, and our success on the world stage depends on the integrated impact of all three.

In the coming years China will continue to weaponise international development with its Belt and Road Initiative and push into Africa, while Russia will seek to maintain its geopolitical position by working to prevent peace in failed states and places like Syria. Meanwhile, the pandemic has revealed that none are safe until all are safe. The world needs Britain’s leadership in international development.

Smarter aid, in support of our diplomacy and defence objectives, can both save and improve lives, defend vulnerable people from authoritarian advances, and keep British values at the heart of international affairs in the twenty-first century.

Ryan Henson is CEO for Coalition for Global Prosperity. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured? Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: UK Government]

Over recent weeks and months, all the talk has been about the G7, NATO, and the role that the United Kingdom can — and should — play in these enormously significant international institutions. Now that we have left the European Union, the UK Government is rightly expending significant energy on looking at alternative international mechanisms through which to exercise our extensive soft power and influence.

However, Global Britain must be much more than these alliances of developed, Western nations. Global Britain must be about ensuring that the UK doesn’t simply play second fiddle, and instead plays a role in the international arena that truly matches our history, ambitions, and values.

To do this, the UK needs to take advantage of the enormous opportunities that our role at the centre of the Commonwealth affords us. The Commonwealth is undoubtedly one of the greatest products of British history, and acts as an undeniable force for good in international affairs. Our participation and leadership of the institution can allow the UK to exercise truly global leadership in advancing our values, security, and economic interests.

The Commonwealth brings together people from a dazzling array of backgrounds, who nevertheless share a common identity. It began with intrepid Brits setting sail, and has now been transformed into a voluntary association of 54 independent countries, with Britain at its centre. These include some of the largest and most populous — such as India, with 1.6 billion people — and some of the smallest — such as Nauru, with a population of 12,000. All 54 countries signup to 16 core principles, which include human rights, freedom of expression, and the rule of law.

Economically, the Commonwealth is dynamic. The combined GDP of members tops $10 trillion, or 14% of total global GDP. Half of the top 20 global emerging cities are in the Commonwealth, including Mumbai, Nairobi, and Kuala Lumpur.

The Commonwealth has observed over 160 elections in nearly 40 countries since 1980, providing invaluable support for fledgling democracies

Although the Commonwealth has been criticised for being toothless — an example being in 2013, when a summit was held in Sri Lanka despite serious human rights concerns — its record is more positive than critics suggest. On democracy promotion, the Commonwealth has observed over 160 elections in nearly 40 countries since 1980, providing invaluable support for fledgling democracies. On trade promotion, it costs member states on average 21% less to trade with each other than with non-member states. On good governance, Commonwealth nations make up 7 of the top 10 spots on the Ibrahim Index, which ranks African nations using metrics such as human development, economic opportunity, and commitment to the rule of law.

The Commonwealth has demonstrated it can and will take action against members when there are clear violations of Commonwealth norms. For example, Nigeria was suspended in the late 1990s, Pakistan was suspended in 1999, and Zimbabwe was suspended in 2002.

Yet if the argument is that the Commonwealth is not sufficiently effective, this is surely also an argument for greater UK involvement, both to ensure that our values and interests are properly advanced, and to ensure that the Commonwealth can be the force for good that it undoubtedly can be. As the home of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and as one of the world’s most prominent and forceful proponents of liberal democratic values, the Commonwealth’s effectiveness requires our active involvement.

Unfortunately, the UK’s current approach does leave a bit to be desired. Take the recently published Integrated Review. While the G7 is mentioned on 20 occasions, and NATO a whopping 45, the Commonwealth only gets 12 mentions, excluding when the document refers to the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office. The document does describe the Commonwealth as “an important institution in supporting an open and resilient international order” but puts forward nothing in the way of a policy approach or strategy towards this vital international institution.

This is regrettable. In 2012, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on which I sit criticised the UK Government for not having a “clear and coordinated strategy for its relations with the Commonwealth.” We have not come far enough since then in treating this international institution with the respect it deserves.

The UK can, and should, revive its Commonwealth approach by promoting its expansion — bringing countries such as Ireland into its orbit, for example. The UK should also work to promote free trade between member states. To reflect this greater emphasis, the UK should fly the Commonwealth flag outside all British High Commissions.

Finally, we must also learn to cherish and take pride in British history once again. Our national conversation about the British Empire is parochial and myopic. The success of the Commonwealth, the enduring influence of British culture and in particular Her Majesty The Queen, are all indicative of a far more nuanced reality in which the British Empire helped to connect the world and spread British values. The Commonwealth is a force for good because Britain was, is, and will continue to be a force for good.

Andrew Rosindell is currently MP for Romford. This article first appeared in our Centre Write magazine Target secured? Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Sergeant Donald Todd]

When David Cameron rolled out the red carpet to Chinese President Xi in 2015 there was widespread optimism about the future of Sino-British cooperation. Trade between the two nations reached £58bn and Chinese state-owned firms had signed onto a deal to build the Hinkley Point nuclear power station. Six years later, relations have rapidly deteriorated. Is it constructive to view Sino-British through the Cold War lens – a zero sum game?

Unlike in the 1980s, when trade between the Soviet Union and West was non-existent, Britain’s economy today is deeply intertwined with China’s. The Asian superpower is now the UK’s third largest trading partner, with Chinese firms constituting a quarter of all electric machinery imports last year. China’s comparatively low labour, energy and raw material costs makes it an economically advantageous location for British manufacturers to base production. 

A 2015 report commissioned for the Department for Business, Innovation and skills cites the increased competition since China acceded to the WTO in 2001 as a key driving force of lower consumer prices in clothing and footwear. This is reflected in a 47% decline in the clothing retail price index between January 1997 and 2020. Household appliances like washing machines and televisions are now more affordable than ever before thanks to the offshoring of production to Chinese cities like Guangzhou and Shenzhen, drastically improving the standard of living for Britain’s lowest-paid and providing them with far greater disposable income.

Deepening economic ties with China has also brought a raft of jobs to the service sector. A 2020 report by Cambridge Economics estimates that UK ties with China are responsible for 129,000 full-time equivalent jobs, including up to 16,900 positions in London. In the education sector, the value of British net exports to China are estimated at £3.7bn. The 200,000 Chinese students studying on our shores are vital to the revenue streams of the higher education sector, paying fees two to three times as high as their British peers. 

Despite the deep economic benefits from Sino-British engagement, the Cold War mentality adopted by the then-President Trump and now President Biden appears to have shifted British foreign policy. The government banned Huawei from involvement in Britain’s 5G infrastructure after heavy lobbying by former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, despite the security services’ assertion that risk could be mitigated. After backbench Conservative MPs tried to amend a trade bill last March, citing human rights concerns, the then-Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab announced ‘there are no realistic prospects’ of a Sino-British trade agreement on the horizon. Freedom of navigation operations conducted by the Royal Navy in the South China Sea, and the AUKUS pact to help Australia develop stealthy nuclear submarines, send a clear signal that the UK will be following America’s tough line on China moving forward.

Taking a confrontational approach on China is not just against Britain’s economic self-interest, it is also contrary to its immediate security concerns. The British Army does not maintain an extensive array of military bases in the Asia-Pacific, unlike its friend on the other side of the Atlantic. The last thing the UK needs is a confrontation in the South China Sea threatening to choke off nearly 12% worth of GDP in trade. This year’s integrated defence review stressed the need to shift resources from conventional warfare to the cyber and high-tech; thickening military commitments in Asia will merely frustrate this pivot. The review asserted that Russia, not China, remains Britain’s most acute military threat. Thus it is questionable whether Britain should expend its increasingly anaemic military capabilities on reinforcing US hegemony in China’s backyard, despite the region posing little to no hard security threat to the British Isles.

Prime Minister Johnson argued this March that a ‘balance’ can be struck when dealing with China, pursuing Britain’s economic self-interest whilst also advancing liberal internationalist values. Unfortunately, as Britain’s acrimonious break with the EU has demonstrated, one cannot have their cake and eat it in international affairs. Recognising this, the government should strive to deepen the UK’s long-standing mutually beneficial relationship with China and leave playing great power politics to its friends in Washington.

Mattew is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Magda Ehlers]

Almost three years into Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential term and one year away from the next elections, Brazilian politics have reached levels of militarization unseen since the end of the dictatorship in 1985.

Two weeks ago, Congress was voting on a highly contested bill to change Brazil’s voting system—a reform pushed by Bolsonaro as a means to distract public attention from corruption scandals and coronavirus chaos. On the same day, the President ordered a military parade to roll through Brasilia, a spectacle with no precedent since 1985. While Bolsonaro watched the parade from the presidential palace, a convoy of armoured vehicles proceeded through the capital, passing by the Congress and High Court. Although allegedly organized to deliver an invitation to annual navy exercises to the President, after threatening to reject 2022 election results if the electronic voting system is maintained, this show of force suggests an obvious attempt to demonstrate that he has the military’s support, which was condemned from all sides of his political opposition.

The parade comes as the last instance of a much broader trend in Bolsonaro’s militarized politics. Himself a former captain with admitted authoritarian inclinations, as a political outsider unaffiliated to any party, he had to rely on the military to fill his government. By choosing a retired general for Vice President and appointing numerous retired or active-duty officers in his Cabinet and administration, Bolsonaro gave the military significant influence on key policy questions. Military involvement in political matters was further aggravated with the Covid-19 pandemic, which saw the appointment of various members of the armed forces in the Ministry of Public Health. As the situation got increasingly chaotic, the military’s efficiency and coordination expertise was heavily relied on for managing the pandemic from medical care to logistical activities.

Although such developments have rightfully raised serious concerns among domestic and international commentators about the implications of the military’s increasing political involvement, several factors encourage confidence that Brazil’s democracy will survive the test of 2022 presidential elections.

Although simulations suggest he retains about a third of voters for 2022, a poll from July shows 51% of Brazilians disapprove of Bolsonaro—a number up 45% since May and almost doubled since last October. Indeed, the President is currently under parliamentary investigation for his handling of the pandemic (failure to acquire sufficient vaccines, promotion of ineffective treatments, weak lockdown measures, pursuit of herd immunity…) and overwhelmed with protests in a corruption scandal regarding the purchase of vaccines. Further evidence of Bolsonaro’s declining support is the pathetically low attendance –itself reduced to his most hardcore supporters—at the infamous tank parade.

Moreover, Brazil’s democratic system appears to have been consistently able to overcome authoritarian threats since 1985. Bolsonaro’s militarization of Brazilian politics has been particularly troubling in a country where the armed forces have always had important political influence, especially with the enduring memory of the military dictatorship (1964-85). However, although the military has been increasingly involved in politics despite the return to democracy, a somewhat balanced relationship between military and government has survived despite confronting a number of challenges to national unity in the past decade. Courts have continuously defended the media from government attacks and punished Bolsonaro and his associates’ attempts at undermining its legitimacy, allowing journalists to keep reporting freely on the government’s missteps and authoritarian leanings.

It also appears unlikely that the military would intervene undemocratically in favour of Bolsonaro in 2022. The President’s relationship with the armed forces is more complicated than it appears, and seems to be increasingly rupturing. There exists a certain hostility from a large portion of the senior ranks of the armed forces towards Bolsonaro, as military generals have publicly challenged the President’s decisions on several occasions. He even seems to have progressively lost his long-standing popularity among the rank-and-file as he successively failed to act on his campaign promises. Regardless, authoritarianism expert Steven Levitsky asserts that the military will likely persist in its historic ‘moderator’ function rather than associating with individual political figures, especially one as isolated as Bolsonaro currently is.

Furthermore, chances are that Bolsonaro’s threats and his military show-of force are merely threats—expressions of his growing fragility, and that he is not willing to orchestrate a 1960-70s-style military coup, which former presidents and military sources seem to agree on. It is also quite clear that succeeding with such a coup in 2022 would differ greatly from the Cold War context, as the international community would have a much different perspective on Brazil’s internal affairs today. Although a challenge to electoral results in case Bolsonaro loses is inevitable, in the absence of Donald Trump’s example and support, it thus seems to be highly unlikely that Bolsonaro would take the risks of calling for military intervention, or that he would be able to.

Yet, the President’s mercurial personality and such high levels of polarization make it difficult to make definite assertions, which means Brazil must strengthen preventive mechanisms against any potential scenario in 2022. More importantly, as Bolsonaro’s presidency has increased the government’s reliance on and popular confidence in armed forces for public policy decision-making and coordination, it has clearly become imperative to address the problematic consequences of intensive military involvement within a democracy’s politics where the military should not be a political actor.

Charlotte is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Jeso Carneiro]

Many had expected post-Brexit Britain to dramatically tighten immigration when London rejected the EU’s principle of freedom of movement. However, in light of the National Security Law imposed by the Chinese Government in Hong Kong, the UK is now offering citizens of the former colony a fast track route to citizenship through the British Nationals (Overseas) visa. 

The sweeping National Security Law criminalised ‘secession’, ‘subversion’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘collusion with foreign forces’, which incur penalties of life imprisonment. Amnesty International pointed out that the Chinese Government routinely uses these charges to prosecute political enemies, activists, lawyers and journalists. The law has been abused by authorities to crack down on peaceful protests, allowing people in Hong Kong to be arrested for possessing flags, stickers and banners with political slogans. Subsequently, many prominent pro-democracy activists fled after the imposition of the law or sought immigration route. 

BN(O) is a special status created under British law in 1987 that specifically relates to Hong Kong. The new BN(O) scheme allows eligible applicants to live, work and study in the UK, and subsequently apply for settlement and British citizenship. The UK proposed that the BN(O) scheme is a reflection of a historic and moral commitment to the people of Hong Kong who have their rights and freedom restricted. 

The BN(O) visa is a mutually beneficial scheme for the people of Hong Kong and the UK. Under this scheme, the UK welcomes millions of cash-rich Hong Kong immigrants that will drive the British economy. According to a report published by the Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), it is estimated that the bespoke immigration route could bring in £40 billion to the country’s GDP. Likewise, the migrant’s dependents will also add to the British economy through schooling. A Home Office economic impact assessment suggested that the influx could bring a tax boost of up to £2.9 billion to the economy. The CEBR report added that the influx of highly skilled Hong Kong migrants and the long term boost to GDP that they bring could be a “ray of sunshine” to the post-Brexit and COVID-19 economy.

In response to these developments, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments quickly retaliated by declaring that they would no longer recognise the BN(O) passport as a valid document. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson and prominent ‘wolf warrior’ diplomat Zhao Lijian commented on the scheme, stating that: “The UK’s move grossly violates China’s sovereignty, interferes in Hong Kong affairs and China’s internal affairs, and runs counter to international law and basic norms governing international relations.” Additionally, Tam Yiu-chung, a Member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), declared that not only has the UK breached trust and justice, but they have violated the Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong. The view that Britain’s act has violated agreements has been shared by many sympathisers. 

In 2015, former Chancellor George Osborne promised a ‘golden decade’ for Sino-British relations while delivering a speech to the Shanghai Stock Exchange in China where he stated that he wanted “… Britain to be connected to every part of this vast nation.” With the introduction of the BN(O) scheme, London has unilaterally changed the consensus between the two countries. Post-Brexit Britain is now at risk of losing an opportunity to engage with China’s booming economy as the IMF estimated that China would be the only major economy to grow in 2020, while many Western countries struggled during the pandemic. As China grows to overtake EU countries to become Britain’s biggest single import market, post-Brexit Britain will only grow more reliant on Chinese imports. 

The world today is confronting a very different China. The emergence of the combative wolf warrior diplomacy under Xi Jingping’s rule indicates that Chinese diplomats are not afraid to be aggressive and controversial. “London is asking to be humiliated if it cannot tell the trend of the times and engages in political shows that provoke China”, the prominent Chinese state media outlet Global Times wrote. 

Prior clashes with China on issues such as the Huawei 5G network have also severely undermined Sino-British relations. Judging by China’s recent hawkish approaches to its former allies, Canada and Australia, not recognising BN(O) as a travel document may well only be the first step in their response. Consequently, the decision made by London could lead to a similar generational dispute with Beijing, as witnessed by Australia, whom China just ended key economic dialogue with. 

The bilateral ties of Sino-British relations have irreparably changed. While enjoying the capital flow brought by Hong Kong immigrants, post-Brexit Britain will face stern geopolitical challenges as the ‘golden decade’ gives way to a frostier affair. 

Sylvia is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Benh LIEU SONG]