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Tommaso Rabitti: An Italian job – Italy’s plan to spend EU recovery programme funds

By Centre Write, Foreign

In response to the economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU deployed its ‘Recovery Plan’ programme, “the largest stimulus package ever financed in Europe”. Of the €1.8 trillion total, Italy, the first and economically hardest hit country in Europe, will receive the largest share with €260 billion

The daunting task of overseeing the spending and policy objectives of the Recovery Plan will fall on Italy’s new Prime Minister Mario Draghi. Portrayed by the press as the anointed savior, Draghi, former ECB boss, is faced with an 8.9% fall in GDP and soaring unemployment. Recently, Draghi’s cabinet released the two-hundred-page long plan which sets out Italy’s spending priorities, proposed policies and accompanying reforms. This plan, called the ‘PNRR’, national plan of recovery and resilience, is a once in a lifetime opportunity to revive Italy’s long-standing socio-economic malaise. It is unlikely to be effective.

The PNRR, with its fastidiously complex acronym, does not bode well for Italy’s prospects. The plan is divided into six main ‘missions’: technological innovation, green economy, infrastructure, education and research, social inclusion and health. Inspired by Draghi’s ‘good debt’ mantra in recent interviews – healthy government spending that yields growth in the long run – and underpinned by a framework of common European solidarity, the ambition exceeds its execution.

While the PNRR undoubtedly has potential and is positive in many ways, namely targeted investments in essential infrastructure, improvement of school curriculums and research initiatives, and some red tape slashing among others, its greatest shortcoming is the structural reforms, or sufficient lack thereof. The reforms outlined in the plan attempt to tackle the core areas of inefficiency in the justice system and civil service, as well as reducing complexity for public and private tendering procedures. 

The problem is twofold: the proposed reforms do not go far enough for them to be sufficiently effective and certain key structural areas, such as taxation, labour market rigidities and constitutionally-born flaws of the justice system, are left almost completely untouched. 

Tax evasion, for instance, is a huge problem in Italy. High evasion rates are in large part a consequence of the high tax burden, with a tax bracket of 43% for personal income earnings above €75k. As taxation stifles growth, labour market rigidities, like the power of trade unions, excessive regulation, complexity in hiring and firing, constitute major “access barriers to the market”, especially in regulated professions, resulting in “a negative impact on investments and productivity”.

Furthermore, the proposed reforms for the justice system, aimed at cutting civil trial times, digitising court documents, and encouraging Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, fail to address intrinsic constitutional flaws. Issues such as the separation of careers between prosecutors and magistrates, severe unaccountability of judges, and a broken appeals system are all essential aspects that obstruct the proper delivery of justice as a whole. Consequently, this leads to a hostile business environment that discourages foreign and domestic investors as legal certainty is often legal probability. 

Reforms to introduce tax cuts, jail time for serious tax evasion, labour market deregulation, and a principle-based approach to justice system streamlining and fairness are all essential to allow EU funds to find fertile ground. Otherwise, this plan risks merely dumping money on a broken – or only partially-mended – system, with much of it foreseeably seeping through the rusty cracks due to organised crime, corruption or simple inefficiencies.

This misguided approach also potentially hinders the PNRR’s effectiveness in the long-run. The plan intends to address deep-rooted complexities with the pre-conceived Keynesian notion that government spending can solve everything. Italy, however, ranks 58th in the World Bank’s ease of doing business statistics, with exceptionally low private investment and a savings-dominated economy. Moreover, to find ‘Italy’ in the economic freedom index, you must look all the way down to the 68th position. Less, rather than more, government appears to be the cure. 

As Draghi himself acknowledges in the preface to the PNRR: “one of the factors that limits Italy’s potential for growth is the relative slowness in the implementation of structural reforms”. Yet his attempt, while laudable given the challenging conditions, is shy of what Italy needs. This gap – how big or small only time will tell – may prove to be a huge missed opportunity. 

Ultimately, the Recovery Plan programme is a monumental European effort to chart a common course of economic growth for the future. Italy’s plan lacks sufficient, far-reaching reforms to effectively step up to the occasion.

Italy has surprised us in the past, and its exceptional potential for resilience and creative ingenuity may, yet again, shine through. In the year dedicated to Dante Alighieri’s memory one can only hope that Italy, emerging from the depths, may “come forth to rebehold the stars”

Tommaso is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: World Economic Forum]

Luke Jones: Has British foreign policy moved on since Churchill?

By Centre Write, Defence, Foreign

On 9th October 1948 in Llandudno, Wales, the elder statesman and Leader of the Opposition, Sir Winston Churchill, boasted of a new, post-war vision for British foreign policy at the 69th Annual Conservative Party Conference. In his speech, Churchill outlined three overlapping spheres of British influence: the Commonwealth of Nations, the Anglosphere and a ‘United Europe’. Coined Churchill’s ‘Three Majestic Circles’, the model saw Britain as one of the ‘Big Three’ (Britain, the US and the USSR), destined for a post-war role fit for a great power which reaches beyond the confines of Europe.

Some 73 years later, Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party frequently refer to ‘Global Britain’ as a new epoch for British foreign policy outside the European Union. Global Britain, commonly used to refer to the Government’s foreign policy agenda, intends to portray Britain as an outward-looking and confident nation state, committed to reinvesting in its partners and championing the rules-based international order. Its vision of a greater role for Britain, which incorporates but is not limited to Europe, chimes with Churchill’s model.

Further parallels between Churchill’s tripartite model and Britain’s foreign policy today are apparent in the Government’s recently-published Integrated Review. With its message that Britain is “a European country with global interests”, the comprehensive review of Britain’s national security and international policy continues and reaffirms the notion of a greater, global role for an independent Britain. This is Global Britain in action.

The seminal review identifies Churchill’s three circles as key areas of British influence. It envisages Churchill’s first circle, the Commonwealth, as “an important institution in supporting an open ability to strike our own trade deals”. Tying to his second circle, the Anglosphere, the United States is affirmed as Britain’s “most strategic ally and partner” and pledges that we “will continue to invest deeply in our partnerships with Australia, Canada and New Zealand”, often now referred to collectively by the acronym CANZUK. The review vows that his third and final circle, a ‘United Europe’, will not be left ashore for the high seas, assuring that our “European neighbours and allies remain vital partners” and highlights close bilateral relations with France, Germany, Ireland and other European countries.

However, despite these assurances many critics claim that Britain is ‘turning its back’ on Churchill’s third, European circle with Brexit and is, therefore, breaking with his model. Consequently, this has brought into question whether Churchill himself would have supported Brexit.

Despite the overlap between Churchill’s Three Majestic Circles and Global Britain, accompanied by the Integrated Review, the world has also changed a lot since the 1940s. A more recent geopolitical shift towards Asia with the rise of China and the Asian Tigers has occurred since Churchill’s time. As such, the Integrated Review identifies the Indo-Pacific region as a key area for growth in Britain’s foreign policy agenda, claiming that we will establish “a greater and more persistent presence than any other European country”.

In addition to this geopolitical shift, there is also now a great emphasis on the strength of Britain’s soft power. Put simply, soft power is the ability to attract and co-opt, rather than coerce. The Integrated Review draws on this extensively, highlighting Britain’s great contributions to media and culture, education, sport and people-to-people links. Coined by the political scientist Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, the term soft power was not part of Churchill’s rich vocabulary. By this measurement, Britain does still enjoy its great power status, ranking second by the Soft Power 30 study.

These differences reveal the limitations of using Churchill’s model to forecast the future of British foreign policy. Despite historical change, what remains is a shared vision of Britain which rejects the notion that its political class should manage the post-imperial decline of a middling power and concentrate on its regional, European influence. Instead, both note that Britain has had a historically greater role which it continues to enjoy and should take advantage of it by reaching beyond its own European back door. In this way, Churchill’s model for foreign policy has endured with Global Britain. Its efficacy in practice will now be revealed.

Luke is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Levan Ramishvili]

Oli Hunter: A new foreign policy era for the UK?

By Centre Write, Foreign

Following Chancellor Rishi Sunak’s announcement in his Spending Review that foreign aid would be cut from 0.7 to 0.5%, a reduction of some £4 billion, the debate surrounding this issue has reignited. One junior minister, Baroness Sugg, resigned following the decision, calling the cut “fundamentally wrong” in such a time of global crisis, with Sunak defending the decision as a response to the economic fallout of the pandemic. 

Although this cut would remove the UK from the top of the G7 with regards to overseas aid spending as a percentage of national income, with Germany taking the lead with its 0.6%, Sunak argues that the UK would remain the second-highest donor. However, this would not be the case for long, as France may soon overtake the UK, following President Macron’s announcement that he plans to raise France’s official development assistance (ODA) from 0.44 to 0.55% by 2022. This would undeniably reduce the UK’s international reputation as the leader in overseas aid and development. 

So, if the UK were to lose global reputation as a result of this reduction in overseas aid spending, that reputation would have to be recovered by other means, not necessarily outside the realm of foreign policy. Perhaps the solution lies in what the UK can achieve in dealing with the vast amounts of corruption prevalent within the sphere of foreign aid. The level of corruption was made utterly undeniable with the release of a shocking report by the World Bank, which revealed that as much as a sixth of foreign aid funds intended for some of the world’s poorest countries had been lost to corruption. 

In the Elite Capture of Foreign Aid study (released in February), it was discovered that there was a leakage of aid funds at around 7.5% for countries that received more than 2% of their GDP in aid, with this money seemingly turning up in ‘offshore financial centres known for bank secrecy and private wealth management’. This percentage was seen to increase to 15% for countries receiving more than 3% of their GDP in aid, highlighting how the countries which are most dependent on our help are the ones which are suffering the most from these corrupt practices. 

This report clearly points to serious corruption within the aid process, which is emphasised by the fact that attempted fraud against the Department for International Development (DFID) has almost doubled in three years, becoming bolder and more expansive. Despite this drastic increase in scale however, the official numbers of fraud losses by DFID have dropped in the past few years, causing some to raise questions concerning oversight and governance. The fact that fraud and corruption appear to be on the rise in the aid process truly highlights the need for proper investigation and perhaps reform in order to prevent such a scale of misconduct from continuing or getting worse. 

This is the battle in which the UK must be on the frontline, especially in light of the recently announced cuts. If there is to be less funding for foreign aid as a result of the current economic crisis, then it is all the more important that the money actually goes to those who need it most, rather than lining the pockets of corrupt elites. Furthermore, a portion of the foreign aid budget could be set aside specifically for ensuring that aid funds for a certain country do not fall victim to corruption, although perhaps not until the temporary cuts are lifted. The removal of such wasted spending within the overseas aid budget would certainly seem advisable given the current economic situation. In fact, the Institute for Fiscal Studies predicts that a fiscal tightening of £40 billion in tax revenue a year by the time of the next election will be needed to balance the books.

Therefore, it seems that the rooting out of corruption concerning foreign aid funds would not only benefit those who are in need of the economic relief provided by those funds, but also the UK, with taxpayer money being more effectively and efficiently spent. The arguably necessary cut in funding must not be seen as the beginning of the end of British aid, but rather as the beginning of a new era for the foreign policy of the UK: one based on compassion and honesty, rather than corruption and misconduct.

Oli is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: Number 10]

James Paterson: SME reform should be at the heart of ‘Suganomics’

By Centre Write, Foreign

Shinzo Abe, who resigned last month as Japan’s Prime Minister for health reasons, leaves behind a mixed legacy on the economy. His administration’s policies, nicknamed ‘Abenomics’, kept the economy afloat in the short term, but largely failed to address its two core problems.  

The first is a plummeting population, set to shrink from 125.7m in 2019 to 88m people by 2065. The second is stagnant productivity. In 2018, Japan’s productivity was the lowest among the G7 members. This has been the case since 1970. Given the imminent demographic crunch, Japan desperately needs to jumpstart its productivity if its economy is to stay afloat.

Fortunately, the appointment of the new Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, is an opportunity for a fresh approach to the economy. Don’t expect anything revolutionary in the short term. Since Prime Minister Suga will have to face an election in the next year, he is likely to focus on getting quick wins for now. However, in the longer term, ‘Suganomics’ should prioritise tackling the fundamental drag on Japan’s productivity: unproductive small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

According to a 2019 paper by the IMF, SMEs in Japan have had significantly lower productivity growth than larger firms. This has crippled Japan’s overall productivity because SMEs represent a significant share of the economy. In 2014, they employed 70.1% of the private sector workforce. Boosting SME productivity is key to lifting overall productivity and preventing the demographic crunch from sinking the economy.

To understand how Suga’s government can raise SME productivity, we must first examine why it is so low.

One reason is that many SMEs face financing constraints. This is because Japanese lending practices put SMEs at a disadvantage. When extending loans to SMEs, Japanese banks rely largely on fixed-assets collateral and personal guarantees, rather than risk-assessments based on business value. This makes it difficult to secure loans for SMEs with good growth prospects but insufficient collateral. Interviews by the Economist Intelligence Unit suggest that these financing constraints are an important reason for many Japanese SMEs spending so little on innovation.

To solve this issue, the government should promote alternative forms of financing for SMEs, such as venture capital. It should also encourage banks to improve their methods of assessing credit-risk, for instance by using IT more and asking prospective borrowers to provide audited financial statements. 

The second reason for low SME productivity is the overly generous Credit Guarantee System for SMEs. Set up in 1950, the system aims to help SMEs access finance and protect them from bankruptcy. Here’s how it works: government-run Credit Guarantee Corporations (CGCs) guarantee many loans made to SMEs by banks. If an SME with a guaranteed loan goes under, the CGCs compensate the lending bank for up to 80% of its losses.

While well-intended, this system’s harmful impact on productivity is a classic example of the law of unintended consequences arising from government intervention in the economy. There are two notable unintended consequences in this instance. 

First, the system creates perverse incentives for banks. While banks are overly cautious when making regular business loans to SMEs, as discussed above, the opposite is true for guaranteed loans. Since the CGCs bear the brunt of the losses when guaranteed loans go sour, banks have a weaker incentive to screen and monitor guaranteed-borrowers. 

This enables non-viable SMEs to secure loans that they would not otherwise have access to. These loans act like life-support, keeping inefficient ‘zombies’ in the market and shielding them from bankruptcy. As a result, an abnormally low percentage of non-viable firms exit the market and the annual rate of firms exiting the market is low compared to other developed countries.

This is disastrous for productivity. Productivity growth hinges on an efficient allocation of resources, which is driven by the dynamic process of firms exiting and entering the market. When zombies continue operating, they hold onto staff who could be employed more productively by more efficient firms. They also drain customers and profits from these firms, making it difficult for efficient SMEs to afford investment. This has reduced investment in Japan, which has harmed productivity. Also, the continued presence of zombies has likely discouraged potential market entrants with higher productivity from entering the market.

A second unintended consequence of the Credit Guarantee System is that it deters SMEs from expanding. Since firm expansion is key to productivity, this equates to discouraging productivity.

In a market economy, firms typically seek to expand in order to increase profits. This entails hiring more staff and investing in extra capacity, which enables them to exploit economies of scale and become more productive.

However, in Japan, many SMEs choose not to grow. This is because growing past a certain threshold in terms of staff headcount or amount of capital means losing the SME status. This entails losing the generous benefits of the Credit Guarantee System. Many SMEs, avid to hold onto these benefits, prefer to simply stay small, even if it means eschewing productive investments. A 2016 study found that this was an important deterrent to Japanese SMEs investing in capital. 

To fix these problems, the government should significantly reduce the loan coverage offered by the Credit Guarantee Corporations. The Abe administration admirably reduced the top coverage rate from 100% to 80% in 2018, but this remains too high. The new government should be more ambitious. 

A reduced rate would make banks bear a greater proportion of the losses when SMEs with guaranteed loans go bankrupt. This would force them to screen guaranteed-borrowers more effectively, monitor them more carefully and perhaps offer struggling borrowers advice on business revitalisation. 

Admittedly, this reform may not be appropriate while the COVID crisis continues to ravage the economy. The pandemic has left many SMEs vulnerable, including productive ones, and the government has rightly stepped in to support them. However, once the crisis abates, the Suga administration should push ahead with this reform.

How likely is this? The precedents are not particularly encouraging – successive Japanese governments have done little to solve this longstanding issue. Moreover, reforms to the Credit Guarantee System will face fierce resistance. SMEs have a strong vested interest in the status quo and do not want to see their benefits cut.

Nonetheless, the chances of SME reform are now better than ever. The new PM has made his eagerness to reform the economy clear. Additionally, one of his closest advisors, David Atkinson, is an ardent proponent of reforming the Credit Guarantee System. If he is to remedy Japan’s chronically low productivity, Suga should put SME reform at the heart of his economic plan.

James is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue.

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Davide de Carle: How China turned crisis into opportunity in Italy

By Centre Write, Coronavirus, Foreign

Italy’s disapproval of the European Union during the COVID-19 pandemic has been sharp and prompt. 77% of Italians believe the EU will not help during the crisis and 72% say it has not helped. Given its status as the third-largest economy in the trading bloc, this presents a serious challenge to the integrity and cohesiveness of the Union’s wider security issues. Italy is, thus, seen as Europe’s ‘backdoor’, the continent’s corruptible doorman who, given the proper incentive, will allow Chinese and indeed Russian interests to pervade. 

“Italian parliament is afraid to talk about China at the moment, given Movimento 5 Stelle’s close ties with Peking” says Antonio Tajani, vice president of Forza Italia. Tajani is, of course, referring to Luigi Di Maio’s, Italian minister of foreign affairs, signing of the silk road agreement in late March 2019. Di Maio, then deputy Prime Minister and leader of the anti-establishment M5S party, defied the advice of his European allies and with the agreement, opened the door to a Chinese economic partnership. 

Pino Cabras, head of M5S has asserted that no superpower holds the key to hegemony yet so it is important for Italy to keep its doors open to everyone. The Italian public shares this sentiment and seems to have warmed up to China, particularly following the worst of the coronavirus pandemic. In a poll held in late April this year 52% of Italians voted China as Italy’s closest ally, a shocking figure given the 42 percentage point jump from 10% in last year’s poll. 

So, what has actually transpired between the two nations to make such a startlingly positive impression on the Italian public? The answer has partly to do with how little the European Union has done. At the height of the global pandemic, with a death toll in the tens of thousands, Italy’s emergency financial requests to the EU were initially rejected. The European Central Bank’s new head, Mario Draghi’s successor, Christine Lagarde, additionally made matters worse by issuing no promises to protect Europe’s most vulnerable economies, shattering Italian bonds in the process. The result was a state of bitter entrapment; Italy felt chained to a Union of pure pageantry, as when the time came for their closest allies and partners to extend a hand, they instead kept theirs firmly in their pockets. 

Chinese public relations in March and April focused entirely on changing the narrative on the pandemic, shifting its role from the country of origin to the country that came to everyone’s rescue. China magnified any PPE coming into Italy as a benefit of their privileged relationship under the Belt and Road Initiative, calling it the ‘health silk road’ and, wrongly, touting the shipments as aid when they had been paid for weeks prior by the Italian Civil Protection Department. The tactic appears to have worked despite the embarrassing efforts from China’s Global Times at the beginning of the pandemic to pin the blame on Italy for the outbreak, latching onto an interview given by Italian doctor Giuseppe Remuzzi. 

China was not alone in using benevolent disinformation during Italy’s outbreak. Russia too, flexed its soft power by sending a military convoy loaded with PPE through Italy’s Northern regions. Russia paid €200 to Italians willing to make videos of gratitude towards Putin, one of which was of an Italian man taking down an EU flag and replacing it with the Russian tricolour and a sign saying “thank you Putin”.

Despite its bombastic mask diplomacy, China still managed to sweeten perceptions. News of the West’s losing battle to hang onto a key NATO partner and EU member will almost certainly be disheartening to a US administration that poured $100 million into helping Italy through the crisis and Merkel’s Germany that provided Italy with the vast majority of its imported PPE. In contrast, China made sure no finger they lifted in helping Italy went unnoticed. Every box of PPE was labelled ‘the friendship road knows no borders’. Chinese twitter bots generated nearly half of all posts under the hashtag #forzacinaeitalia (come on China and Italy) and China’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman even posted a video on Twitter of Romans applauding on their balconies to a dubbed Chinese national anthem and insisting there were chants of “grazie Cina” (thank you China).

Nevertheless, the subject remains a precarious one to broach in Italian parliament, particularly as tensions between the US and China are mounting. One might expect Trump to adopt a Bush-era ultimatum on Chinese relations, calling upon his NATO allies to be either ‘with’ him or ‘against’ him in the near future, a decision which will surely test Italy’s resolve and true diplomatic intentions. Close relations with pro-US PM Conte will be critical in the months to come, particularly as the US and China engage in tit-for-tat diplomacy over the banning of Huawei 5G.

Davide is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue. [Image: COP PARIS]

Benedict Rogers and Perseus: We should hold the Chinese regime accountable because we are pro-China

By Centre Write, Foreign

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to take its grip on the world, the political blame game has kicked off and is in full swing. 

President Trump and his officials have referred to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus”, or the “Wuhan virus”, and a diplomatic spat has emerged between the White House and the World Health Organisation.  The British Government has seemingly indicated that “China faces a ‘reckoning’” over their handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, covering-up the start of the outbreak. A China Research Group has recently been set up by senior Conservative MPs, led by Tom Tugendhart MP who explains that the group is needed to “promote debate and fresh thinking” in relation to China’s economic ambitions and global role, adding that the group would not be “anti-China”.

There is an increasing amount of commentary calling for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to take responsibility for the cover-ups and delayed responses which – it is argued by many – has caused COVID-19 to have a far wider reach than it would have had if the CCP had taken action before the mass exodus of those in China for Chinese New Year from the middle to the end of January 2020.

On top of any allegations regarding the role of the CCP in allowing COVID-19 to become a global pandemic, we who work in the field of human rights are more than alert to the many incidents of human rights violations perpetrated by the CCP against Tibetans, Uyghurs, pro-democracy Hongkongers, and anyone who speaks out against the regime or embarrasses party officials. However, it should be remembered that the CCP is not the same as China or her peoples, and that criticism of the CCP should never be mistaken as criticisms of China or her peoples. As such, we stand resolutely together in saying that we are both pro-China, and we both love the country and the peoples of China.

The Chinese Ambassador, Liu Xiaoming, recently wrote in the Financial Times that: “Those who seek to stigmatise China owe Chinese people an apology.”  China is said to have a history of 5,000 years, although the earliest written records of China is thought to date from as early as 1250 BC during the Shang Dynasty. In contrast, the CCP’s history only spans back to 1921, and the CCP has only controlled mainland China since 1949, establishing the People’s Republic of China. The CCP’s 70-year rule of China so far is but a small fraction of China’s long history.

The well-oiled CCP propaganda machine regularly churns out rhetoric across state-controlled media that to be patriotic, you must also love the CCP. However, any criticism of the CCP and its policies is, in reality, no more a criticism of China and her peoples as a criticism of the Royal Family and the Crown, or 10 Downing Street and the governing party, being equivalent to a criticism of the United Kingdom and her peoples as a whole. In a recent conversation one of us had with a media editor in China, the question was raised: “In your personal opinion, do you need to love the CCP to love China?” The editor’s answer: “No. But here is how people are educated, thus to enhance the government’s ruling.”

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes political science as that which is concerned with investigating “fine and just actions”, and what constitutes good, fine and just actions will be subject to “variety and fluctuation of opinion”. The ultimate aim of participating in politics is to promote good (Arist. EN I.3.). By participating in any political dialogue in criticising the CCP, our aims are purely to promote what we feel are “fine and just actions” for China and her peoples. Highlighting how one can love one’s country but oppose the serving government, Dr Sun Yat-sen, who opposed the Chinese Government of his day leading the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, is even revered by the People’s Republic of China and mentioned by name in the preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

Whilst we consider that the CCP must be held accountable, especially those that have resulted in wholesale breaches of human rights, it should also be remembered that this does not make the Chinese people complicit. Indeed, it is the people of China who are the primary victims of the regime’s inhumanity. The unfortunate fact is that the CCP’s propaganda machine prevents many people from knowing the truth of what has happened, and what is happening. World famous dissident artist, Badiucao, did not know of the Tiananmen Square massacre until he came across a documentary embedded in a film that he and his friends at university had downloaded. 

Deng Xiaoping, on 10 April 1974, gave a speech at the United Nations. Towards the end of his speech, he said: “If one day China should change her colour and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.” We speak out because, as Deng Xiaoping said, we are identifying, exposing, and opposing the CCP’s social-imperialist policies.  We speak out because of our desire to fight injustice, and because of our love for China and her peoples.

Benedict Rogers is founder and Chair of Hong Kong Watch and Deputy Chair of the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, and works for the international human rights organisation CSW.

Perseus (a pseudonym) is a Hong Konger based in the UK. He is a freelance photographer specialising in journalistic photos, street photography and portrait work. He is also a qualified lawyer practicing in human rights and public law.

Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue.

Joseph Silke: The start of a new approach to China?

By Centre Write, Foreign, Joseph Silke

In 2015, David Cameron heralded the elaborate state visit of dictator President Xi as symbolic of a new “golden era” of relations between the United Kingdom and China. This week, inspired by the historic success of the European Research Group (ERG) in securing the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, a group of Conservative MPs have launched the China Research Group (CRG). In much the same way that the ERG transformed the political landscape on Europe, the new CRG hopes to affect a shift in the British approach to China relations. 

While the new group intends to emulate the successes of the ERG, it starts from a very different place. The ERG was founded by a group of fringe radicals, led by backbencher Sir Michael Spicer, and it would be years before the group became mainstream within the Conservative Party. The new CRG is headed by Tom Tugendhat, the widely-respected Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who said that the group will “promote fresh thinking” by examining China’s long-term economic and diplomatic aims, especially with regard to developing nations.

The COVID-19 pandemic has become a watershed in relations between China and the West. As millions get infected and thousands die across the Western World, scepticism of China’s role on the global stage is only growing. The Chinese Communist Party has been accused of negligence for allowing wet markets to continue trading despite the public health risks, prompting the Prime Minister’s own partner Carrie Symonds to call for stronger action. Moreover, the regime has been condemned for attempting to conceal the outbreak by repressing information and persecuting whistleblowers, allowing the virus to spread around the world more easily. 

For critics, China’s many malign activities have gone unchallenged for far too long: currency manipulation; intellectual property theft; the cultural genocide of the Uighurs; the violation of international waters with the construction of artificial islands; the continued support for rogue states like North Korea; the list goes on. In the UK, particular scorn has been directed towards the tepid UK response to the recent crackdown on political freedoms in Hong Kong. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration commits China to safeguarding democratic norms within the British former colony until 2047. 

As the now-second largest economy in the world, China has undeniably proven to be an economic success story, but that is what makes its rise all the more concerning. It’s more pragmatic approach, of ditching the old communist dogma which contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s creation of an authoritarian pseudo-market system, makes it a more pernicious rival and credible alternative for those disillusioned with liberal democracy, both on the left and the right and especially in poorer regions of the world.  

China has been actively consolidating its geopolitical position for years without much impediment. The Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013 has been especially effective at carving out a dominant market position for the rising superpower. Its massive infrastructure investments in other countries have the dual effect of securing favourable relations with foreign nations as well as often providing outposts for further Chinese operations. Moreover, China has an ever-growing foreign media presence, buying up vast swathes of African media to exert influence over the flow of information there.   

This is not to say that opportunities for fruitful collaboration don’t remain between the UK and China. Some cooperation will always be necessary in such a globalised world. Nor does a new approach to the Chinese regime ever excuse any form of discrmination towards Chinese people under any circumstances. The new CRG group has stressed that they are not “anti-China” and a distinction must be made between the regime of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. Indeed, Tugendhat has accused the ruling party of prioritising its own survival over the welfare of the people. 

A more proactive response to China should not involve taking reactionary steps that ultimately harm the UK either. President Trump’s approach has been to pursue protectionism and isolationism, both of which do more to undermine the global role of the United States than anything else. It is right, for example, that the UK has continued to fund the World Health Organisation despite valid concerns that it has been far too cosy with Beijing. Retreating from the world stage will do little to safeguard the liberal world order. 

The coronavirus pandemic means latent concerns about the role of China on the global stage have now come to the fore. The ERG transformed the Conservative Party into a solidly Eurosceptic force and it is possible that the CRG will succeed in directing Conservative policy in a more China-sceptic direction. China’s rapid expansion has demonstrated that those who cherish liberal democracy cannot afford to be complacent. If the Western World wants to protect itself and its values, it is going to have to start acting like it.

Joseph is Research and Communications Assistant at Bright Blue. [Image: Number 10]

Adrián Legaria: The roots of Euroscepticism

By Brexit, Centre Write, Foreign

Across Europe, populism has surged as populist movements have used the political salience of globalisation, immigration and sovereignty to burst into the mainstream. Many scholars, such as Lukas and Benjamin Kaelin, have argued that Austria’s Freedom Party, Italy’s Lega party, and the UK’s Conservative Party are all examples of parties running populist governments.

If populism is a Europe-wide phenomenon, the same can be said about Euroscepticism. Indeed, it would be wrong to see British Euroscepticism as simply another version of Englishness. Euroscepticism in Europe comes at a time when the continent (and not only the UK) faces pressure between capital and labour; pluralism and conservatism; and, the rise of nationalism contrary to cosmopolitanism. Brexit could be the most prominent event when it comes to Euroscepticism, but the three predicaments mentioned above are embedded in most European countries.

The struggle between capital and labour has been fuelled in recent years by globalisation. Both the Euro and the migration crises spurred Euroscepticism in Austria and Italy, with the latter discussing departure from the Euro. Europeans suspect that the Union has been envisioned for the upper-middle-class, increasing the economic gap within nations. 

The tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism runs parallel to the dispute on how democratic the European Union is. This debate is more sustained in Europe than the migration and economic discussions, because to some extent, all European countries are increasingly worried about the technocratic nature of Brussels. A clear example of this is the European Parliament elections of 2014 that saw widespread support for Euroscepticism. It comes as no surprise that a Eurosceptic party is present in every country. Added to this is the way Germany is being portrayed following both the migration and eurozone crises as the leader of the Union. To some extent, the nature of the Union discredits the concept of a nation-state, throwing up the question of whether it is possible to maintain sovereignty as we know it in a globalised world. Brexit draws attention to the European mismatching between pluralism, national identity and citizenship.

The struggle between pluralism and conservatism, expressed most clearly in the migration dilemma, is linked with the previous critique against capitalism and a cosmopolitan society. This debate is being reframed following the migration crisis by Euroscepticism, mainly in the countries that are part of the Visegrád Group.

The three struggles mentioned above can overlap and are sometimes used interchangeably in Eurosceptic parties. For instance, migration is bound up in debates around multiculturalism, and when it comes in the form of illegal immigration, it is seen to reduce labour’s sway against companies or government.

The European multi-layered and multi-cultural project has become difficult to sell in terms of political community; electorates will be more willing to accept migration when they think their immediate government is controlling it, associating border control with state sovereignty.

The losers of globalisation, therefore, are not only represented in the UK. The Eurozone and migration crises have produced the idea that dealing with a crisis is Europe’s new standard, with record levels of Eurosceptics in the region. The reactive nature of Euroscepticism, mentioned above, means it is possible to link these movements across Europe the way populism is being intertwined. What can be different from each nation is not the nature of the problem but the way each nation addresses it. Britain tested its support and failed; the same can happen in other European countries.

The Union was an economic solution to the strain of nationalist politics in Europe that was seen as a harbinger for both world wars. But in recent years participants in the Union have asked themselves, where are those economic benefits? And because of the technocratic nature of the Union and its inability to deal with discontent, a localised problem, if unattended, can quickly escalate to a desire to leave the Union as a whole.

Brexit will influence the Union; it might not involve a disintegration process such as the one facing the British Isles, but certainly is a decisive point in history. Add to this other crises facing the EU, such as persistent flows of migration from the Middle East, and it is likely that Euroscepticism will spread further if there is no apparent response to it.

Adrián is currently undertaking work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue.

Anastasia Kourtis: A beacon of hope for liberal conservatism in Europe

By Centre Write, Foreign, Politics

Liberal conservatism is under threat in Europe. Several former communist countries, such as Poland and Hungary, have elected right-wing governments, which academics have deemed ‘illiberal’, and at odds with liberal conservatism. The characterisation of ‘illiberal’ is usually associated with practices such as restricting immigration and violating the principles of judicial independence.

However, it is essential to remember that the economics of these countries are not friendly to the free-market. ‘Orbanomics’ in Hungary, for instance, advocates for the establishment of political control over the economy by emphasising re-nationalisation. Other European leaders on the right, such as the leader of the main opposition party in France, Marine LePen, have supported nationalist economic policies such as restrictions to free-trade and the nationalisation of banks.

While the state of economic liberalism might be dire on the European Right, a beacon of hope exists in Greece.

In July 2019, the Greek people elected a centre-right government after four and a half years of rule by a left leaning government. The new Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, has pledged to follow a free-market and pro-business approach. This includes lowering corporate income tax from 28% to 20% by 2020, lowering individual income taxes, and privatising the primary greek oil company Hellenic Petroleum S.A. among others.

During the campaign trail, Mitsotakis pledged to cut the Unified Property Tax, referred to as ENFIA in Greece, by 2020. In the first month in office, the new government managed to offer a 10-30% decrease in the tax, depending on the value of each popery, with lower-income households enjoying a more significant cut.

Another campaign promise that the new government seems to be moving forward with is the Hellinikon Project. This project plans to revitalise the abandoned greek Hellinikon Airport (which has been out of service since 2001), and the use of its lands to develop a multi-purpose hub. Investors are aiming to create a new “Athenian Riviera”, which will include residential communities, luxury hotels,a casino, shopping centers, museums, cultural venues as well as family venues. This eight-billion euro investment is expected to offer thousands of new jobs while also bringing in revenue for the government.

Almost twenty years after the last flight took off from Hellinikon airport, this land has not been taken advantage of. Development projects had been proposed, yet were stalled. According to the Greek Reporter, “a massive and unprecedented mountain of bureaucratic obstacles arose in the last few years, placing one problem atop the other, and preventing any investment [at Hellinikon] from actually taking place.” Bureaucracy is indeed an issue in Greece, and Mr. Mitsotakis’s party, while still in opposition, blamed the previous leftist Syriza government for not moving forward with the project on the grounds of not wanting foreign businesses involved.

Indeed, in 2015, Syriza MP Nantia Valavani called for the abandoned airport facilities to be renovated into a waste management facility, a statement which founded the deputy-minister for the Environment, at the time, in accord. Two years later, several Syriza MPs, including Mrs. Valavani, further objected to the project by stating that the old airport is of “archeological significance” and that its abandoned buildings should be “listed as protection for historical monuments.”

Even though the free market and liberal conservatism may be under threat in Europe, it is essential to remember that there is still hope. In the post-Brexit United Kingdom, it would be necessary for Conservatives here in the United Kingdom to shy away from the anti-free market tendencies we see in many places in central Europe.

Rather, the UK should focus on fostering private investment and large-scale and sustainable development projects that will add many jobs to the economy as the Greek case shows.

Anastasia Kourtis is currently undertaking a week’s work experience at Bright Blue. Views expressed by the author are not necessarily those of Bright Blue.

Robert Mirante: Where’s Italy come and where the heck is it going?

By Centre Write, Foreign

Across the West, we have felt the rise of populism with the marks of Brexit and the election of Trump being the clearest examples of this. While the West has been fixated on the details of Brexit and the Sino-American Trade War, we see other nations trying to stem the tide of far-right populism. In Italy, the new coalition between the Five-Star Movement (M5S) and the Democratic Party (DP) offers a new look on how to address the needs of the citizenry, with an alternative to the populist policies of the Right.

Italian politics has always been dominated by strongmen who have held the limelight in their time. In 2019 we see nothing different, in Beppe Grillo and now Giuseppe Conte, the anti-establishment, anticorruption and uniquely democratic Five-Star Movement has taken the stage to address the “ills” of the Italian political establishment. The party was born in 2009 out of the reaction to the inability of Italian governance and to address the needs of the changing country. The party itself is populist, but it sits uniquely on the left and with the election of 2013 it broke into the Italian parliament as one of the largest parties, taking it from a comedian’s blog into the mainstream of Italian politics. 

The party has a unique mechanism for engaging with the citizenry and advocated direct democracy in building its platform in parliament. Members of the party have the ability to vote directly on the party website on decisions they would like the parliamentary party to make, and it has been instrumental for revoking an aggressive policy regarding immigrants and recently  the creation of the M5S-DP coalition. The coalition between the two parties is significant because until the collapse of the coalition between the M5S and La Lega (the League), the far-right party of Salvini, the two had been enemies.

The Democratic Party (PD) was founded as an amalgamation of the former Communist Party of Italy and other smaller leftist parties in a new effort to invigorate the Left in the early 2000s. The PD was the prime example of establishment and elitism that the M5S was fighting against. This antagonism forced the coalition with Conte and Salvini, which has only lasted a year of very tense power sharing between a party fighting for the people and a party reinvigorating Italian nationalist politics. The two populist parties, though united in their design to bring government back to the people, were divided in how extreme they were willing to go to achieve the best for Italians.

The policies produced by the M5S-Lega smacked of poor economic planning and nationalist tilts. The budget plan that was put forth had Italy over the EU deficit limit of 2%, promised too much and delivered too little. All it did was allow room for Salvini and La Lega to work the political scene and influence the people towards his version of Euroscepticism, nationalism and xenophobia. The poor economic prospects in Italy have been a driver in the past for the right, and Italians have warmed back up to the ideas of the far-right. Salvini sells Italians a nostalgia for the prosperity Italy experienced before WWII, and a leader not willing to be dictated to by the remote EU. Unfortunately, these sentiments have found willing listeners which have propelled the popularity of La Lega into the second most popular party in the most recent 2018 election, with 125 deputies in the Parliament.

The coalition ended with the resignation of Conte, leader of the M5S, as the PM drew up the prospects of a general election in which Salvini was posed to win a majority after gaining popularity into Southern Italy, traditionally the heartland of M5S. Luckily, with the support of its party member’s vote, the M5S has ironed out its differences with the PD in order to side-line La Lega, prevent an early election and return Italy to a more levelled form of political discourse.

What is needed from this unlikely team is reasoned policies that address the needs of everyday Italians. With reform, economic growth and an outwardly capable looking government, the Five-Star Movement can pull Italians away from their flirtation with the far-right and potentially be the first Western democracy to put to bed the idea of the return of the spectre of Fascism. If the pair can pull Italians out of poverty and bring investment back to Italy, there is still hope that common-sense politics can be brought back into the mainstream.

Robert Mirante is an external contributor to Centre-Write. Views expressed in this article are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue.