Clean environment

Summary

This analysis unearths public attitudes on the importance of and potential policies for greater and greener housing and infrastructure development levels in the UK.

The specific policies examined herein are derived from the two major Bright Blue research papers that have been completed over the last year. The first paper, Greater and greener homes: more homes, ready for net zero, proposed new policies to achieve two core policy objectives: to speed up the delivery of new homes where development is most sustainable; and to ensure new homes are compliant with reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The second paper, Resilient neighbourhoods, powered by low-carbon energy, suggested policies for the increased development levels of renewable energy infrastructure, and in particular wind and solar power.

In general, through the course of our research on greater and greener development, we sought to reconcile two key objectives in housing and infrastructure policy: the socio-economic, such as more and affordable homes for young people, and more secure and affordable energy; and the environmental, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving biodiversity.

The findings of our papers, combined with the findings of this polling, provide strong policy ideas for — and a strong case to — the Government for improving the development levels of UK housing and infrastructure in a way that is consistent with environmental ambitions.

The key findings are:

Climate risks

• A plurality of the UK public (34%) is not too concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.
• Half (50%) of the UK public say the climate risk they are most concerned about is extreme weather events, such as storms, for their own home and neighbourhood.
• A large plurality of the UK public (48%) had no flood resilience measures introduced to their home or local area, as far as they are aware.

Housing and infrastructure development

• A plurality of the UK public (31%) thinks that between 70 and 85% of UK land should remain undeveloped in the long term.
• An overwhelming majority of the UK public (75%) support more green housing – such as housing with exceptionally low carbon emissions and high energy and water efficiency – being developed in their local area.
• A majority (55%) of the public say they support new housing development in their local area if it meets high environmental standards.
• A majority of the UK public (52%) claim that they are more likely to support a new development in their local area if it is particularly climate resilient.
• A plurality of the UK public (47%) think that the development not releasing new pollutants into the water or air is one of the top two pro-environmental adjustments that would make them more supportive of new development in their local area.
• A large majority of the UK public (65%) support new onshore wind power development, either unconditionally of its location or only in certain areas.
• A majority of the UK public (58%) who only support onshore wind development in certain areas think that green belt land should be excluded from onshore wind development.
• A plurality of the UK public (41%) think it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build onshore wind farms.
• A majority of the UK public (68%) support the development of new solar farms, either unconditionally of its location or only in certain areas.
• Of those who support solar power development only in certain areas, a majority (57%) think that green belt land should be excluded from solar farm development.
• A plurality of the UK public (44%) believe that it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build solar farms.
• When given a choice between different development priorities for English offshore waters, 53% of UK public believe that offshore wind farms should be a priority, and 41% believe that floating solar farms should be a priority. By contrast, only 23% think that oil and gas platforms should be a priority.
• A plurality of the UK public (31%) have no concerns regarding developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon.
• A plurality of the public (41%) would have neither a positive nor a negative response to their neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home.
• A majority of the UK public (58%) would have a positive reaction to their neighbour installing solar panels on the roof of their home.

Policies for greater and greener development

• A plurality of the UK public (35%) is supportive of densifying their local street.
• A majority of the UK public (48%) is supportive of developing new settlements in undeveloped nearby areas.
• A majority of the UK public (59%) believe that local planning authorities should be rewarded by central government in exchange for proactive planning for more renewable energy infrastructure developments, such as onshore wind and solar power.
• A large majority of the UK public (72%) think that it is important for community benefits to be offered to the local community when a new onshore wind turbine is proposed nearby.
• A large majority of the UK public (71%) think that it is important for community benefits to be offered to the local community when a new solar power farm is proposed nearby.
• The overwhelming preference among the UK public for community benefits is for money off energy bills, chosen by 46% of the UK public.
• A majority of the UK public (66%) have said that the support of the local community should be needed to develop a new wind turbine.
• A plurality of the UK public (33%) is unlikely to participate in creating a community-led development proposal for their local area.
• A plurality of the UK public (45%) would be likely to join a community energy group.
• A majority of the UK public (65%) support mandating that a greater proportion of new and existing buildings have solar panels fitted to them.

Being a 2019 Conservative voter, being educated to a lower level and having a lower household income are all generally associated with consistently less positive views about new pro-environmental housing or infrastructure development, but those engaged with the planning system consistently respond more positively than the average member of the UK public for ideas for new pro-environmental housing or infrastructure development. Less prominently, residing in a rural area is generally associated with less positive views about new environmentally-friendly development nearby, while identifying as ethnically non-white is generally associated with having a more favourable view of the development of new settlements and of community energy groups.

The most prominent divide in UK society, however, often remains to be age. Interestingly, younger people are less supportive of new renewable energy infrastructure development. This goes against the sometimes prevailing narrative that older people are opposed to new development. Nonetheless, younger people are more supportive of the greater development of environmentally-friendly housing. Moreover, younger people show greater levels of concern regarding the climate resilience of their homes and awareness of flood resilience measures, however, they are relatively less concerned about extreme weather events. Finally, they are less concerned about local community support when it comes to new development, are less supportive of new settlements and are less likely to participate in creating community-led local development plans, but are more likely to participate in community energy groups.

Based on our findings, Bright Blue proposes four key policy aims that the UK Government should adopt:

• Build more housing and infrastructure.
• Facilitate the transition of buildings towards net zero.
• Consider the interests of the community when bringing forward development.
• Facilitate the development of more renewable energy infrastructure, both on sea and land.

Introduction

The UK is facing sluggish economic growth and increasing intergenerational inequity. The UK economy only grew a meagre 0.1% in 2023, while adults aged 60 to 64 are nine times wealthier than those aged 30 to 34. The housing market in our country is in a state of crisis, with over four million extra homes needed for housing demand to meet supply. The high cost of living and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia have also highlighted the fragility of the UK’s energy supply. In April 2022 alone, the average household energy bill in the UK increased by a monumental 54%. These challenges require that the country builds more: more homes and more energy infrastructure. But achieving this has proven difficult.

In September 2023, the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, set out his “new approach” to climate policy. The tone of his speech was largely negative. “[I]t cannot be right,” the Prime Minister said, “for Westminster to impose such significant costs [in the name of pursuing climate goals].” One’s impression, listening to the speech, might be of a country embroiled in a fight where its people have been asked to sacrifice their prosperity in the name of an overzealous pursuit of climate targets.

But the public consistently realise the potential cost of not facing up to climate change. Climate change is consistently a top four issue as judged by the UK public, and we consistently support a wide variety of public policies and behavioural changes in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change. So, in the pursuit of socio-economic targets – of greater growth, more homes and cheaper energy – we need not and must not jettison our commitment to the environment.

Indeed, the transition to net zero need not be a sacrifice – it can be an opportunity. As demonstrated in Bright Blue’s reports, decarbonising our housing stock and energy supply can also mean more, better homes and cheaper, more plentiful energy.

In light of the urgency of achieving both socio-economic and environmental (both climate and biodiversity) objectives in the UK, we wanted to test public attitudes on some possible approaches to achieving both greater and greener development. Our hypothesis is that the two objectives are not in conflict; that both can and should be achieved. This analysis might provide policy ideas for — and a strong case to — government for reforming the UK’s planning system to facilitate greater and greener housing and infrastructure development.

There has been plentiful polling on reasons for support and opposition to housing and energy development, but it appears to overlook how attitudes vary among different demographics.

Methodology

Polling was undertaken by Survation and conducted between the 8th and 14th of February 2024. It consisted of a nationally representative sample of 2,243 UK adults.

The sample was derived using an online interview administered to members of the Survation Panel. Differential response rates from different demographic groups were taken into account. Data was weighted to the profile of all adults in the UK aged 18 and above. In order to be nationally representative of the UK, data was weighted by age, sex, region, highest level of qualification, annual equivalised household income, 2019 General Election Vote and 2016 EU Referendum Vote. Targets for the weighted data were derived from Office for National Statistics Data and the results of the 2019 UK General Election and the 2016 EU Referendum.

We asked respondents whether they have had any former engagement with the planning system. We did this to understand the ease with which different possible policy options could work with the UK’s current planning consenting process. We defined ‘engaged in planning’ as having done any one of the following in the past:

• Objected to a planning application in one’s local area
• Commented on planning applications in one’s local area
• Submitted a planning application
• Taken part in a campaign to stop a development in one’s local area
• Supported a planning application in one’s local area
• Spoken at a committee or meeting about planning applications

We only highlight in our analysis significant difference in attitudes between different socio-demographic and political groups.

Chapter One: Climate risks

We first asked the UK public how concerned they are about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies, such as flooding and overheating. We asked them to take into account the location of their home – for example, whether it is located in an area with adequate flood defences and whether it is in a high-risk flood area. This was to establish public levels of concern regarding the UK’s level of preparedness towards the impacts of climate change.

As seen in Chart 1 below, a plurality of the UK public (34%) was not too concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies. A smaller proportion (28%) was somewhat concerned, and only small minorities were not at all concerned (18%) or very concerned (13%) about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.

Chart 1. Views of the public on one’s home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There is some variation by socio-demographic characteristics in the public’s responses; most notably age, with younger people being generally more concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies. A majority of 18-to-24-year-olds (58%) was in some way concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies, as compared to only 23% of over 65s. Indeed, a majority of over 65s (73%) was either not too concerned or not at all concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.

Those who have engaged in the planning system in the past were also much more likely to be concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies than otherwise; a majority of those who have engaged in the planning system in the past (55%) was in some way concerned about it. The same could be said of only 34% of those unengaged with the planning system, of whom a majority (57%) was either not too concerned or not at all concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.

There is also a notable and expected differentiation by voting history. Those who have voted Conservative in the 2019 general election were less likely to be concerned with the climate resilience of their home. A majority of 2019 Conservative voters (65%) said that they are either not too concerned or not at all concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies. Conversely, a majority of 2019 Labour voters (52%) were in some way concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.

Future climate risks can range from flooding, through overheating, to the introduction of new diseases. Indeed, the CCC identifies over 50 different possible such risks. Therefore, having established significant levels of concern about climate risks in general among the UK public, we asked what particular future risks resulting from climate change the public are most concerned about, grouping them according to some broad categories.

Half of the UK public (50%) said that extreme weather events, such as storms, are one of their top concerns, as shown in Chart 2 below. A large proportion of the UK public also considered the loss of green spaces (40%) and flooding (36%) as one of the most concerning climate-related risks. By contrast, only 18% of the UK public considered new tropical diseases as one of their top such concerns, and only 13% were not able to point to any particular climate-related risk that most concerns them.

Chart 2. Views of the public on the most concerning, for one’s home and neighbourhood, future risks resulting from climate change.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

The most significant socio-demographic variation was again age, with younger people notably less concerned about extreme weather events and water scarcity, as compared to older respondents, but slightly more concerned about new tropical diseases. A majority of over 65s (60%) mentioned extreme weather events as one of their top concerns, as contrasted to only a minority of 18-to-24-year-olds (34%), of whom a plurality (36%) said that flooding is one of their top climate change concerns. Twenty-six percent of 18-to-24-year-olds were also concerned with water scarcity as a top concern, compared to 35% of over 65s, yet 22% of 18-to-24-year-olds listed new tropical diseases as a top concern – more than the 16% of over 65s.

Variation between the responses of the UK public who have engaged with the planning system and those who have not has been limited. A majority of those unengaged with the planning system (51%) consider extreme weather events to be one of their top climate concerns, as does a plurality of those engaged with the planning system (49%). Most notable is that, of those engaged with the planning system, only 5% did not know what climate risk most concerns them; this is as compared to 17% of those unengaged with the planning system.

There was even less variation between respondents of different political allegiances. A majority of the UK public from all parties considered extreme weather events to be a top concern, with that answer being chosen by 53% of Conservative voters, 51% of Labour voters and 56% of Liberal Democrat voters.

Next, we asked the public what flood resilience measures have been introduced to their homes or to their local area. We did this to understand the relationship between individuals’ levels of concern regarding climate resilience and their home or local area already having some visible climate resilience measures present. We asked about flood resilience measures specifically to limit the number of possible answer options, and because flood resilience measures are the most recognisable type of climate resilience measures.

A large plurality of the UK public (48%) had no flood resilience measures introduced to their home or local area, as far as they were aware. This is shown in Chart 3 below. Of the respondents who were aware of flood resilience measures having been introduced to their home or local area, the most commonly highlighted measure were flood barriers (15%). All other responses were chosen by only between 7 and 11% of respondents.

Chart 3. Awareness of the public of the flood resilience measures protecting their home or their local area.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Younger people also showed a greater awareness of the existence of flood resilience measures. A plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (25%) claimed to be aware of the introduction of flood doors in their home of local area; only 20% of 18-to-24-year-olds claimed to be aware of no flood resilience measures in their home or local area. On the other hand, 72% of over 65s were not aware of any flood resilience measures in their home or local area. This is unlikely to be fully explained by younger people living in areas of the country with more flood resilience measures: neither the variation by region nor the variation by urban or rural residence were as strong as the variation by age in our responses.

Those engaged in the planning system showed a much greater awareness of the existence of flood resilience measures protecting their home or their local area. While a plurality of those engaged in planning (35%) were unaware of any such flood resilience measures, a majority of those unengaged in planning (55%) were unaware of them. Most strikingly, while 21% of those engaged in planning were aware of their home or local area being protected by flood insurance, the same was true for only 6% of those unengaged with planning. Since there is no prima facie reason to think that those engaged in planning are much more likely to live with flood resilience measures, this suggests that there is a significant gap between flood resilience measures existing and the public being aware of them.

Variation by voting history among the respondents to this question was only minor. Proportionally most significant was the variation between 2019 Labour and Conservative voters where it came to their home having tiled, instead of carpeted, floors. While 11% of Labour voters have tiled floors, only 5% of Conservative voters do. This reflects the broader trend of Conservative voters generally being less aware of the presence of flood resilience measures in their homes or local area, with a majority of 2019 Conservative voters (59%) being unaware of any such measures, as compared to a large plurality of 2019 Labour voters (44%).

Counter-intuitively, unawareness of the existence of floor resilience measures also correlates negatively with one’s level of concern regarding one’s home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies. Those unaware of the existence of flood resilience measures were less likely to be concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies, with a large majority of such respondents (65%) stating that they are either not at all or not too concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies. This can be compared with the average response in Chart 4 below.

Chart 4. Views of the public who are unaware of flood resilience measures protecting their local area or home on their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies.

Base: 1,091 UK adults unaware of any flood resilience measures protecting their home or their local area.

Chapter 2: Housing and infrastructure

Having established that people are concerned about the effects of climate change on their homes and neighbourhoods, we wanted to test public attitudes towards new housing and infrastructure development – in particular, housing and infrastructure that is consistent with reducing carbon emissions and protecting the natural environment, both in terms of climate and biodiversity.

First, we asked what proportion of UK land should remain undeveloped in the long term. We did this to ascertain the overall levels of development that the UK public would find desirable and how those compare to the current levels of development in the UK.

In general, the UK public seems to believe that the amount of land that is developed on in the UK should be far greater than it currently is. As illustrated in Chart 5 below, a plurality of the UK public (31%) thinks that between 70 and 85% of UK land should remain undeveloped in the long term. By comparison, currently in England – the country in the UK with the smallest proportion of undeveloped land – 91.1% of land is undeveloped. The implication of this is that a majority of the UK public (52%) think that the proportion of land that is undeveloped in the UK should be less than what it is. Only a small minority of 8% unequivocally think that the proportion of land in the UK that is undeveloped should be more than it is.

Chart 5. Views of the public on what proportion of UK land should remain undeveloped in the long term.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was very little variation among different socio-demographic groups regarding their responses to this question. A plurality of respondents in all tested groups said that between 70 and 85% of UK land should remain undeveloped in the long term. The greatest socio-demographic variation was between respondents from England and those from the rest of the UK, with respondents from England favouring slightly lower development levels; nonetheless, a plurality of respondents from both England (31%) and the rest of the UK (32%) favoured development levels of between 15 and 30%.

The chief difference between respondents engaged and unengaged with the planning system was the likelihood to answer ‘Don’t know,’ with that option being chosen by 29% of respondents unengaged with the planning system, but only 13% of those engaged with the planning system. A plurality of both groups favoured for between 70 and 85% of UK land to remain undeveloped, with 34% of those engaged with planning favouring this option, as compared to 30% of those unengaged with planning.

Variation was greater, but still small, between the voters of different parties. A plurality of the voters of all three major parties favoured for between 70% and 85% of UK land to remain undeveloped in the long term, with 36% of 2019 Conservative voters, 28% of 2019 Labour voters and 27% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters choosing this option. Notably, Labour voters were around a third less likely to support over 95% of UK land remaining undeveloped in the long term as compared to 2019 Conservative voters.

Given the high levels of support for greater levels of development in the UK in general, we then went on to ask the UK public about the specific kinds of development that they would support.

Housing

First, we asked the UK public how much green housing – such as housing with exceptionally low carbon emissions and high energy and water efficiency – they want developed in their local areas. We did this to understand the desire for greater and greener housing development levels in the UK, as opposed to just development generally.

As can be seen in Chart 6 below, a strong majority of the UK public (75%) support a little (20%), some (34%) or a lot (21%) more green housing development in their local area. A small minority of 10% want none at all.

Chart 6. Views of the public on the development of more green housing in one’s local area.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Responses varied slightly by age and, most prominently, local area. While all age groups were similarly likely to say that they want new green housing in their local area, older respondents were more likely to say that they want ‘none at all,’ with 13% of over 65s choosing that option as compared to only 8% of 18-to-24-year-olds.

Understandably, those living in urban areas were also more likely to support more new green housing in their local area than those living in rural areas. Again a majority of both groups wanted more of such housing, with 77% of respondents from urban areas and 73% of respondents in rural areas choosing that option, but respondents from urban areas were more likely to favour a lot of it; 23% of respondents from urban areas wanted a lot of new green housing in their local areas compared to 18% of respondents from rural areas, and only 9% of respondents from urban areas wanted no new green housing in their local area at all, as contrasted with 13% of respondents from rural areas.

Those engaged with the planning system were generally slightly more supportive of new green housing development in their local area. As with all other demographic variations, a majority of both those respondents engaged and unengaged with planning favoured new green housing development in their local area – 86% of those engaged and 69% of those unengaged – but, while only 18% of those unengaged with the planning system wanted a lot of it, the same was true for 27% of those engaged with the planning system, suggesting that green housing may command good support in the planning consenting process.

Finally, when it came to political variation, 2019 Conservative voters were far more likely to want less new green housing in their local area than the voters of other major parties. A majority of respondents among all political groupings wanted new green housing in their local area – 72% of Conservatives, 83% of Labour voters and 82% of Liberal Democrats – but, while 27% of Labour voters and 31% of Liberal Democrat voters wanted a lot of such housing, the same was true for only 15% of Conservative voters. Conversely, 14% of Conservative voters wanted no such housing at all; the same was true of only 6% of both Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters.

We then asked the UK public how much more likely they are to support a new housing development in their local area if the homes that form a part of it meet high environmental standards, such as if it has exceptionally low carbon emissions or high energy and water efficiency. We did this to understand whether high levels of support for new housing are to do with the housing being ‘green,’ or whether they are to do with support for new housing generally.

It is clear from the results that a housing development being more ‘green’ has a strong positive effect on the public’s level of support for it. A majority of the UK public (55%) was more likely – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘much more’ – to support new housing development in their local area if it meets a high environmental standard. Only a small minority of the UK public (8%) was less likely – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘much less’ – to support a new housing development on account of it.

Chart 7. Views of the public on whether one is more likely to support new housing development in one’s local area if it meets a high environmental standard.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Again, there were some differences in responses between respondents from rural and urban areas. While a majority of respondents from urban areas (57%) said that they are net more likely to support a new housing development on account of it meeting a high environmental standard, only 49% of respondents from rural areas said the same. Moreover, while 24% of respondents from rural areas were ‘much more likely’ to support it, the same was true of only 14% of respondents from rural areas.

Also significant was variation between respondents with different income and education levels. A plurality of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below (47%) said that they net more likely to support a new housing development on account of it meeting a high environmental standard, while a majority of university graduates (67%) said the same. University graduates were also over twice as likely to say they are much more likely to support such a development as compared with respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below; 31% of university graduates picked that answer, but only 15% of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below did the same.

An analogous pattern followed for respondents on different incomes, with a majority of those in households earning over £40,000 a year (61%) being net more likely to support a new housing development on account of it meeting a high environmental standard, as compared to a plurality of those in households earning under £20,000 a year (43%).

Worth noting is that those engaged with the planning system were significantly more likely to find high environmental standards to be a cause for their support for a new housing development; again, a majority of those engaged with planning system (62%) was net more likely to support a new housing development on account of it meeting a high environmental standard, as was a majority of those unengaged in planning (51%), but, while only 18% of those unengaged in the planning system were much more likely to support a more environmentally-friendly development, the same was true for 26% of respondents engaged with planning.

Finally, as with the previous question, 2019 Conservative voters were again less enthusiastic about ‘green’ housing. A small majority of them (52%) was net more likely to support a new housing development on account of it meeting a high environmental standard, but a large majority of both Labour voters (66%) and Liberal Democrat voters (67%) was net more likely to support it. Of the respondents who were much more likely to support a new housing development on account of it meeting a high environmental standard, they were also less likely to vote Conservative than otherwise; only 17% of Conservative voters chose that option, as contrasted with 28% of Labour voters and 27% of Liberal Democrat voters.

Next, we asked a similar question, but regarding climate resilience; we asked the UK public how much more likely they are to support a local development if it is especially climate resilient – for example, if it was ensured that this development is resistant to flooding and that it protects those inside it from overheating. We did this to understand whether climate resilience is a priority for the UK public when it comes to new housing development.

Once again, a similar story features – development being more climate resilient has a definite positive effect on the UK public’s level of support for it. A majority of the UK public (52%) was net more likely – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘much more’ – to support new development in their local area if it is especially climate resilient. Only a small minority of the UK public (8%) was less likely to support a new development on account of it. This is shown in Chart 8 below.

Chart 8. Views of the public on whether one is more likely to support new development in one’s local area if it is particularly climate resilient.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

As before, there were some differences between respondents with different income and education levels. A plurality of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below (45%) said that they are net more less likely to support a new housing development on account of it particularly climate resilient, while a majority of university graduates (64%) said the same. University graduates were also over twice as likely to say they are much more likely to support such a development as compared with respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below; 24% of university graduates picked that answer, but only 11% of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below did the same.

The pattern repeated also for respondents on different incomes, with a majority of those in households earning over £40,000 a year (60%) being net more likely to support new development on account of it being especially climate resilient; for those in households earning under £20,000 a year, this was only a plurality (49%). Twenty percent of respondents in households earning over £40,000 a year were also much more likely to support such a development; a view held by only 13% of respondents in households earning under £20,000 a year.

Those engaged with the planning system were again somewhat more likely to find climate resilience to be a cause for their support for a new development. A majority of those engaged with planning system (57%) was net more likely to support a new development on account of it being especially climate resilient, as was a plurality of those unengaged in planning (49%), but while only 13% of those unengaged in the planning system were much more likely to support a more climate resilient development, the same was true for 21% of respondents engaged with planning.

Finally, non-Conservative voters were more likely to favour climate resilience in development. A half of 2019 Conservative voters (50%) was net more likely to support a new development on account of it being especially climate resilient, but the same was true of 61% of Labour and 62% of Liberal Democrat voters.

Having established high levels of support for greener housing development, we asked the public to specify what pro-environmental adjustments they would most like to see in new developments in their local area. Respondents were able to pick any top two of the possible answers provided. We did this to narrow down whether any particular pro-environmental adjustments were more popular than others where it comes to planning consent.

As can be seen in Chart 9 below, a plurality of the UK public (47%) thought that the development not releasing new pollutants into the water or air is one of the top two pro-environmental adjustments that would make them more supportive of new development in their local area. That said, the least popular pro-environmental adjustment – that the development will not produce any waste resulting from construction – was still a top-two adjustment for a large minority (30%) of the UK public.

Chart 9. Views of the public on the most popular pro-environmental adjustments for local development.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was no strong variation between the responses of the UK public with different socio-economic characteristics. The most significant variation came with age, with younger respondents generally more concerned with development having a small carbon footprint and slightly more concerned with local biodiversity; while a plurality of both 18-to-24-year-olds (49%) and over 65s (49%) agreed that not releasing new pollutants into the water or air is a desirable pro-environmental adjustment, also 42% of 18-to-24-year-olds held that view regarding the development having a small carbon footprint – as compared with 25% of over 65s – and regarding the development maintaining or improving local biodiversity – as compared with 32% of over 65s.

There was no significant variation at all between the responses of those engaged and unengaged in the planning system. A plurality of both groups said that not releasing new pollutants into the water or air an important adjustment, with 47% of those engaged in planning and 48% of those unengaged in planning holding that view.

The voters of different parties were also broadly in agreement on their responses to this question. A plurality of 2019 Conservative voters (44%) found not releasing new pollutants into the water or air an important adjustment, as did a plurality of 2019 Labour (49%) and a majority of 2019 Liberal Democrat (58%) voters. Their greatest disagreement was regarding the importance of the development having a small carbon footprint, with only 28% of 2019 Conservative voters picking that option, as contrasted with 35% of 2019 Labour and 41% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters.

Infrastructure

Having explored the UK public’s views on the development of greater and greener housing, we asked about whether and how they would support the development of more low-carbon energy infrastructure.

First, we asked the public whether they support new onshore wind power development, and, if so, whether they do it regardless of where it takes place or only in certain areas. This question sought to ascertain the UK public’s level of support for onshore wind as compared to other types of development.

As can be seen in Chart 10 below, a majority of the UK public (65%) supported new onshore wind power developments. This is as compared to only 18% who do not. Of those who supported new onshore wind power development, they were almost evenly split on whether they support it unconditionally of its location (31% of the total UK public) or only in certain areas (34% of the total UK public).

Chart 10. Views of the public on the development of new onshore wind farms in the UK.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was some variation between responses from respondents of different ages, with younger respondents generally less supportive of new onshore wind power development. While a large majority of over 65s (70%) supported new onshore wind power developments, the same is true of only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (46%). However, of those 18-to-24-year-olds supportive of new onshore wind power developments, 52% (24% of all 18-to-24-year-olds) supported them regardless of their location; the same can be said for only 39% (27% of all over 65s) of over 65s supportive of new onshore wind power developments.

Responses also varied slightly between respondents with different educational levels, with university graduates generally more supportive of onshore wind; a large majority of university graduates (74%) supported new onshore wind power developments, as compared to a smaller majority of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below (56%).

Those who have historically engaged with the planning system were also more likely to be unsupportive of onshore wind – possibly caused by the fact that their opposition to an onshore wind development proposal is the reason why they are included in the category of ‘engaged with the planning system.’ While a majority of both those engaged (67%) and unengaged (64%) with the planning system supported the development of new onshore wind farms, those engaged with the planning system were almost twice as likely to be unsupportive of it, with 26% of them stating that as their response – this is as contrasted with only 14% of respondents unengaged with the planning system.

2019 Conservative voters were generally less supportive of onshore wind as compared to the voters of other parties: although new onshore wind power developments were supported by a majority of 2019 Conservative respondents (65%), the level of support was even higher among 2019 Labour (74%) and 2019 Liberal Democrat (79%) voters. Conservative voters were also twice as likely to oppose new onshore wind power developments, with 24% of them doing so, as compared to only 12% of 2019 Labour and 11% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters.

As a follow-up to this question, we asked those who only support the development of onshore wind conditionally on its location which areas should not be used for onshore wind power development. We did this to find out what areas would be most suitable for such developments.

Of those who only support the development conditionally on its location, responses were divided as to what locations should be excluded. As can be seen in Chart 11 below, a majority of the UK public (58%) who only support onshore wind development in certain areas think that green belt land should be excluded from onshore wind development.

Chart 11. Views of the public on the areas that should not be used for onshore wind power development.

Base: 766 UK adults who support onshore wind power development, but not in certain areas.

Due to the small sample size here, examining disparities in the responses to this question across other demographic divisions is impossible to conduct accurately.

We also asked a question about the planning process for onshore wind farms specifically; namely, whether it should be easier or harder to acquire planning permission to build onshore wind farms. The hope here was to draw out those who support onshore wind power provision more broadly but think that it is important to keep existing planning restrictions on its development.

A plurality of respondents (41%) think that it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build onshore wind farms, as can be seen in Chart 12 below. In contrast, the response that ‘it should be harder to acquire planning permission to build onshore wind farms’ was the least common choice among respondents, with only 16% being of that opinion. Indeed, the view that ‘it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build onshore wind farms’ was the most popular choice among all groups for which we were able to test, except for some groups choosing ‘don’t know.’

Chart 12. Views of the public on the planning permission process for onshore wind farms.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

The most variation between responses to this question happened between different age groups, with younger people generally being less in favour of an easier planning process for onshore wind farms. A plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (29%) did not know what their view on the planning permission process for onshore wind farms is. This is as contrasted with over 65s, of whom almost half (46%) thought that the planning permission process for onshore wind farms should be easier; indeed, only a small minority of over 65s (16%) thought it should be harder.

Those who have engaged with the planning system were generally more likely to think that the current planning permission process for onshore wind farms should be more difficult. A plurality of both those engaged (45%) and unengaged (39%) in planning thought that the process should be easier, however, a large minority of those engaged with the planning system (27%) thought that it should be harder; this is as compared to a small minority of 11% for those unengaged with the planning system.

Broadly, there was agreement between 2019 voters of the different political parties on the planning permission process for onshore wind farms. A plurality of both Conservative (43%) and Labour (49%) voters thought that it should be easier. Liberal Democrats were the most supportive of an easier planning permission process, with a majority of them (56%) picking that option.

Having discovered the UK public’s views on onshore wind development, we wanted to do the same for solar development. As such, we asked analogous questions – first, we asked the public whether they support new solar power development, and, if so, whether they do it regardless of where it takes place or only in certain areas.

As can be seen in Chart 13 below, a majority of the UK public (68%) supported new solar farm developments. This is as compared to only 15% who do not. Of those who supported new onshore wind power development, they were almost evenly split on whether they support it unconditionally of its location (33%) or only in certain areas (35%).

Chart 13. Views of the public on the development of new solar farms in the UK.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was some variation between responses from respondents of different ages, with younger respondents generally less supportive of new solar power development. While a large majority of over 65s (74%) supported new onshore wind power developments, the same is true of only a smaller majority of 18-to-24-year-olds (51%).

Responses also varied again between respondents with different educational levels, with university graduates generally more supportive of solar power; a very large majority of university graduates (76%) supported new solar farm developments, as compared to a smaller majority of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below (59%).

Respondents on higher incomes were also more likely to be supportive of new solar farm developments. A large majority of those in households earning over £40,000 a year (72%) supported new solar power development, but the same is true of only 54% of those in households earning under £20,000 a year.

Those who have historically engaged with the planning system were more likely to be unsupportive of solar power. While a majority of both those engaged (67%) and unengaged (68%) with the planning system supported the development of new solar farms, those engaged with the planning system were over twice as likely to be unsupportive of it, with 24% of them stating that as their response – this is as contrasted with only 11% of respondents unengaged with the planning system.

There was broad agreement between the 2019 voters of different parties on the question of solar power, with a large majority of the voters of all major parties supporting new solar farm developments. Seventy-one percent of 2019 Conservative voters supported new solar power development, as did 76% of 2019 Labour voters and 81% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters.

As a follow-up to this question, we asked those who only support the development of solar farms conditionally on their location which areas should not be used for solar power development. We did this to find out what areas would be most suitable for such developments.

Responses to this question were very divided. Of those who support solar power development only in certain areas, a majority (57%) think that green belt land should be excluded from solar farm development, 48% think that farmland should be excluded and 25% think that both farmland and green belt land should be excluded.

Chart 14. Views of the public on the areas that should not be used for solar power development.

Base: 778 UK adults who support solar power development, but not in certain areas.

Due to the small sample size here, examining disparities in the responses to this question across other demographic divisions is impossible to conduct accurately.

We also asked a question about the planning process for solar farms specifically; namely, whether it should be easier or harder to acquire planning permission to build solar farms. The hope here was to draw out those who support solar power provision more broadly but think that it is important to keep existing planning restrictions on its development.

A plurality of respondents (44%) think that it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build solar farms, as can be seen in Chart 15 below. In contrast, the response that ‘it should be harder to acquire planning permission to build solar farms’ was the least common choice among respondents, with only 16% being of that opinion. Indeed, the view that ‘it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build solar farms’ was the most common choice among all socio-economic and political groups for which we were able to test, echoing the findings for UK public attitudes towards planning permission for onshore wind development.

Chart 15. Views of the public on the planning permission process for solar farms.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Again, the most variation between responses to this question happened between different age groups, with younger people generally being less in favour of an easier planning process for solar farms. While not as divided as on onshore wind, older people were again more likely to support an easier planning process for solar power, with a large plurality of over 65s (48%) saying that ‘it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build solar farms;’ this is as contrasted with a smaller plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (32%).

Those who have engaged with the planning system were again more likely to think that the current planning permission process for solar farms should be more difficult. A plurality of both those engaged (46%) and unengaged (43%) in planning thought that the process should be easier, however, a large minority of those engaged with the planning system (26%) thought that it should be harder; this is as compared to a small minority of 11% for those unengaged with the planning system.

2019 Conservatives were slightly more likely to be supportive of a harder planning permission process for solar farms. While a plurality of 2019 Conservative voters (44%) said that the process should be easier, that view was held by a majority of both 2019 Labour (53%) and 2019 Liberal Democrat (56%) voters. Conversely, 19% of 2019 Conservatives thought that the process should be harder, as contrasted with only 12% of 2019 Labour and 13% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters.

For our final question on developmental preferences, we wanted to understand the UK public’s preferences in regard to water use, and not just land use. Therefore, we outlined to the UK public that, sometimes, an area of English offshore waters is suitable for a range of different developments. We then asked which of the listed types of infrastructure government should prioritise when targeting English offshore waters for development.

As is visible in Chart 16 below, both solar and wind power were popular among UK respondents when competing for UK water space, and not just land. When given a choice between different development priorities for English offshore waters, a majority of the UK public (53%) believed that offshore wind farms should be a priority, and 41% believed that floating solar farms should be a priority: by far the two most popular respondents among UK respondents. By contrast, only 23% of respondents thought that oil and gas platforms should be a priority.

Chart 16. Views of the public on the development types that should be prioritised for English offshore waters.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Again, responses to this question varied slightly between respondents of different ages. Most notably, older respondents were more enthusiastic about offshore wind, with a majority of over 65s (65%) choosing it as a development type that should be prioritised for English offshore waters. By contrast, only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (34%) were of the same view.

Responses also did not vary significantly between the 2019 voters of different political parties. A majority of the voters of all major parties agreed that offshore wind farms should be a development priority for English offshore waters, with 59% of 2019 Conservative, 59% of 2019 Labour and 66% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters acquiescing to that view. The most notable difference concerned views regarding oil and gas platforms; while 29% of 2019 Conservative voters thought they should be a priority, only 20% of 2019 Labour voters were of the same opinion.

Development concerns

Having established strong levels of support among the UK public for more housing and infrastructure development generally, we wanted to explore the reasons why one might nonetheless oppose – or at least have reservations regarding – such developments.

First, we asked the UK public about whether they have any concerns about developers in the UK building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon. Respondents could tick all options that apply. We did this to understand whether the public considers that the aims of greater and greener housing development conflict.

As shown in Chart 17 below, a plurality of the UK public (31%) had no concerns regarding developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon. Of those who did have at least one such concern, the most common concerns were that it will make housing more expensive to buy (26%) and that new such housing will swallow up green areas (23%).

Chart 17. Views of the public on developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Responses did not vary significantly between different socio-economic demographics except sex and, most prominently, age. Only 22% of 18-to-24-year-olds had no concerns regarding developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon; a plurality (27%), however, was concerned that it will make housing more expensive to buy. Conversely, 39% of over 65s had no concerns regarding developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon; the most common response of the options available among that age bracket.

Male respondents were also slightly less likely to have concerns regarding developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon, with 35% of them espousing that view as compared to only 26% of female respondents, although it was a plurality response for both sexes. Women (22%) were also much more likely than men (13%) to pick ‘Don’t know’ as their answer.

There were also some differences in the concerns had by people engaged and unengaged with the planning system. The most common response for both groups was to say that one has no concerns – a response given by 29% of those engaged and 32% of those unengaged – but those engaged with the planning system were significantly more likely to be concerned about environmentally-friendly housing swallowing up green areas (29 vs 19%), being uglier (17 vs 6%), taking up space needed for other development (17 vs 7%) and being worse quality (17 vs 8%).

Along party lines, there were no major discrepancies. The most common response among both 2019 Conservative (34%) and 2019 Labour (34%) voters was to say that one has no concerns. 2019 Liberal Democrat voters were slightly less likely to have no concerns (29%), a plurality of whom (29%) were concerned that building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon will make it more expensive to buy.

Second, we asked the UK public about whether they would be concerned about their neighbours making adjustments to their homes that reduce those homes’ carbon emissions. We did this to ascertain whether there would be significant opposition to relaxing the UK planning law on making such adjustments without having to seek planning permission.

The first such adjustment we asked about was heat pumps.

As can be seen in Chart 18 below, more of the UK public (33%) would either welcome – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ – their neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home than have a net negative response to it (17%). However, a plurality of the public (41%) would have neither a positive nor a negative response.

Chart 18. Views of the public on an immediate neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home. 

Base: 2,194 UK adults; those with no neighbours have been excluded.

The most consistent disparity between respondents of different socio-demographic characteristics was between lower- and higher-income respondents, with those in higher-income households generally having a more positive view of their neighbours installing heat pumps. A plurality of both respondents in households earning under £20,000 (42%) and households earning over £40,000 (38%) had neither a positive nor a negative view of an immediate neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home, but those in households earning over £40,000 were twice as likely to have a very positive view of it (18%) as those in households earning under £20,000 (9%).

Worth noting is that there was also again disparity between differently-aged respondents. While a plurality across all age brackets had neither a positive nor a negative view of an immediate neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home, respondents aged 18 to 24 were equally likely to have a net negative view of their neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home as to have a net positive view of it (26%). The age bracket that would respond most positively to their neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home, however, is middle-aged respondents, with those aged 45 to 54 being 25 percentage points more likely to have a net positive view of it (36%) than a negative one (11%).

There was only limited variation in responses between those historically engaged and unengaged in the planning process. A plurality of both those engaged (33%) and unengaged (46%) in planning had neither a positive nor a negative view of an immediate neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home. Most notably, those engaged in planning were over twice as likely to have a very positive view of an immediate neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home, with 21% of them holding that view as compared to only 10% of those unengaged in planning.

2019 Conservative voters were also slightly less likely to have a positive view of their neighbour installing a heat pump. Again, a plurality among the voters of all parties had neither a positive nor a negative view of an immediate neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home – 42% for 2019 Conservative voters, 37% for 2019 Labour voters and 38% for 2019 Liberal Democrat voters – but 2019 Conservative voters were more likely to have a net negative view of it than the voters of other major parties. Only nine percentage points more Conservatives had a net positive view of it as compared to 30 percentage points more Labour voters and 39 percentage points more Liberal Democrat voters.

Last, we asked the UK public how they would feel if their immediate neighbour installed solar panels on the roof of their home.

As can be seen in Chart 18 below, the UK public is even more positive about solar panels than heat pumps by their neighbours’ homes. A majority of the UK public (58%) would have a net positive – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very – reaction to their neighbour installing solar panels. This is as opposed to only 8% who would have a net negative reaction.

Chart 19. Views of the public on an immediate neighbour installing solar panels on the roof of their home.

Base: 2,192 UK adults; those with no neighbours have been excluded.

The most consistent disparity between respondents of different socio-demographic characteristics was again between lower- and higher-income respondents, with those in higher-income households generally having a more positive view of their neighbours installing solar panels. While a majority of respondents in households earning over £40,000 (63%) had a net positive view of a neighbour installing solar panels, this was true of only a plurality of respondents in households earning under £20,000 (45%).

While there was also again disparity between differently aged respondents, this time it was modest. Overall, 50% of 18-to-24-year-olds had a net positive view of their neighbour installing solar panels, as compared to 62% of 45-to-54-year-olds – the age bracket most positive about solar panel instalment.

Among political voting groups, there was little variation. Although a plurality of 2019 Conservative voters (32%) said that they had neither a positive nor a negative view of an immediate neighbour installing solar panels on the roof of their home, it is also the case that only 7% of 2019 Conservative voters had a net negative view of it, while 59% of them had a net positive view. This is as compared to 64% of 2019 Labour voters having a net positive of the solar panel instalment; the most common response among 2019 Labour voters (36%) was to have a very positive view of it.

Again, there was only limited variation in responses between those historically engaged and unengaged in the planning process. A majority of both those engaged (61%) and unengaged (56%) in planning had a net positive view of the instalment.

Chapter Three: Policies for greater and greener development

Having asked about the UK public’s concerns and views on new development, we asked them on specific potential ways in which such development in the UK could be made both greater and greener. The intention behind this was to test the popularity and electoral potential of those policies in the UK. The policies we polled on have been inspired by the papers on greater and greener development published by Bright Blue over the last year, as aforementioned in the summary.

Densification

Densification of residential areas can carry significant environmental benefits over developing more sparse residential development – crucially because it reduces the level of transport emissions produced by the residents of said development. In more dense developments, residents are more likely to use public transport – which is generally a lot less polluting than private transportation – and live closer to where they work, go out and study.

As such, we first asked the UK public how supportive they would be of densifying their local street. We explained that this would happen by developing on abandoned or sparsely used land, the conversion of other developments into residential developments and converting lower density residential developments into higher density ones.

As can be seen in Chart 20 below, a plurality of the UK public was net supportive – either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ – of densification (35%).

Chart 20. Views of the public on densifying one’s local street.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Responses to this question did not vary greatly between different socio-economic demographics. The most pronounced of them was between renters and homeowners, with renters generally more supportive of densification. A plurality of both renters (38%) and homeowners (33%) were net supportive of densification (28%), however, renters were less likely to be net unsupportive (22%) of densification than homeowners, 32% of whom were net unsupportive.

Of those engaged in the planning system, they had stronger opinions on the question than those unengaged, but they were generally not any more or less supportive of densification than their counterparts. A plurality of those engaged in the planning system (39%) were net supportive, as was a plurality of those unengaged with it (33%). However, those engaged in planning were more likely to both be very supportive (14%) and very unsupportive (15%) of densification in comparison to the unengaged, of whom only 7% were very supportive and 11% very unsupportive.

More pronounced was the difference between the responses of the 2019 voters of different political parties, with 2019 Conservative voters generally less supportive of densification than Labour voters. A minority of 2019 Conservatives were net supportive of densification (33%), while a plurality of 2019 Labour voters were (47%). Furthermore, 2019 Conservative voters were a lot more likely to be very unsupportive of it (18%) as compared to Labour voters (8%). Indeed, while a plurality of 2019 Conservatives were net unsupportive of densification (36%), the same was true for only 23% of 2019 Labour voters.

In policy terms, new development often requires a trade-off between either densification of already developed areas or more sparse development on previously undeveloped areas. To draw out which of those two the UK public prefers, we followed up the question on densification with a question on whether the respondent would prefer to develop new settlements in undeveloped nearby areas.

As Chart 21 below shows, the UK public generally prefers more sprawling but less dense developments to densification. A majority of the UK public (48%) was net supportive – either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat,’ as compared to only 17% of the UK public who are net unsupportive of it.

Chart 21. Views of the public on developing new settlements in undeveloped areas.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was only limited variation in responses from respondents with different socio-demographic characteristics. Most significantly, younger respondents were generally less supportive of new settlements. Only 38% of 18-to-24-year-olds were net supportive of new developments, as compared to 54% of over 65s. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that older respondents can remember the development of the English ‘new towns’ – such as Stevenage in the 1940s and Milton Keynes in the 1960s – and think of it as successful.

Curiously, respondents identifying as Black or Asian were also much more likely to be supportive of the development of new settlements. Among Black respondents, 66% were net supportive of new settlements, as compared to 59% of Asian and 47% of white respondents, and among Asian respondents, only 8% were net unsupportive of new settlements – very few in comparison to the 15% of Black respondents and 17% of white respondents who were net unsupportive.

Politically, there was only limited variation between responses. Either half or a small majority of the voters of all major parties was net supportive of new settlements, with 50% of Conservative, 56% of Labour and 54% of Liberal Democrat voters being of that view. Labour voters were slightly less likely to be net unsupportive of new settlements, however, with only 12% being of that persuasion, as compared to 19% among Conservatives.

There was no notable variation in responses between those with different levels of engagement in the planning system. Among those engaged with the planning system, half (50%) was net supportive of new settlements, while a large plurality (48%) of those unengaged were of the same view.

Subsidising planning authorities

Currently, the operation of planning processes for renewable energy developments is often needlessly delayed because of the amount of time it takes for planning applications for such developments to be produced, submitted and approved. The process could be radically sped up if local planning authorities proactively planned for such developments instead.

As such, we asked the UK public whether local planning authorities should be rewarded by central government in exchange for proactive planning for more renewable energy infrastructure developments, such as wind and solar. As with all questions in this section of this polling analysis, the hope was to establish public levels of support for this specific policy.

The policy is very popular with the UK public, a majority of which (59%) agreed with it either ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly,’ as can be seen in Chart 22 below.

Chart 22. Views of the public on whether local planning authorities should be rewarded by central government in exchange for proactive planning for more renewable energy infrastructure developments.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Although the policy was supported by a majority across all socio-economic groups, it was noticeably more popular in London than in the North of England. While a very large majority of London respondents agreed with the policy (69%), the same was only true of 57% of respondents from the North. Northern respondents were also more likely to disagree with the policy; 10% of them did so, in contrast to only 5% of Londoners.

Unsurprisingly, the policy was also very popular among those engaged with the planning system. A vast majority of them (71%) were in agreement with it, as was a small majority of those unengaged with planning (52%). Moreover, those engaged with the planning system were much more likely to strongly agree with the policy. Thirty-three percent of those engaged with planning strongly agreed, while only 18% of those unengaged did the same.

Again, although the policy was supported by a net majority across the voters of all political parties, it was relatively less popular among Conservative voters. A majority of the voters of all major political parties agreed with the policy – 57% of Conservatives, 69% of Labour voters and 74% of Liberal Democrat voters. Furthermore, 14% of Conservatives net disagreed with the policy – far more than the 6% of Labour and the 2% of Liberal Democrat voters.

Mandatory community benefits

Community benefits – funds or assets to communities that host or are affected by the new development – being voluntary can be troublesome, as infrastructure developers can compete on costs between each other on the level of community benefits or use community benefits to ‘bribe’ the most reluctant communities, encouraging communities to be as reluctant to new developments as possible. Those problems could be avoided by institutionalising a mandatory minimum level of community benefits. As such, we explained to respondents what community benefits are and asked them how important it would be for community benefits to be offered if a new onshore wind turbine was proposed near their community. We asked respondents to assume that the wind turbine would be 200 metres tall, with a 100-metre blade diameter, as this is roughly what an average onshore wind turbine measures.

Chart 23 below shows that an overwhelming majority of the UK public (72%) considered community benefits either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ important when an onshore wind turbine is proposed near their local community.

Chart 23. Views of the public on the importance of community benefits for when an onshore wind turbine is proposed near one’s local community.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was only limited variation in responses from respondents with different socio-demographic characteristics. Most notably, older respondents were slightly more enthusiastic about the importance of community benefits; while a majority of 18-to-24-year-olds (62%) found community benefits to be net important, over 65s were overwhelmingly of that opinion (78%). Over 65s were also almost half as likely to find community benefits not that important – only 10% of them believed so, as compared to 19% of 18-to-24-year-olds.

Those engaged with the planning system were more enthusiastic about community benefits than their counterparts, with a very strong majority (81%) of those engaged in the planning system finding community benefits to be net important – a position held by only 67% of those unengaged in the planning system.

Finally, politically, there is almost a consensus between the 2019 voters of different political parties on this question. A big majority among the respondents from all major parties found community benefits to be net important, with 78% of Conservatives, 75% of Labour voters and 79% of Liberal Democrats being of that view.

Having established the important of community benefits in the context of onshore wind developments, we asked the same question regarding solar power. We asked respondents to answer how important it would be for community benefits to be offered if a new solar power farm was proposed near their community. We asked respondents to assume that the farm would take up seven acres of land.

Community benefits continued to be important in the context of solar power. Chart 24 below shows that a majority of the UK public (71%) considered community benefits net important – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very – when a solar power farm is proposed near their local community.

Chart 24. Views of the public on the importance of community benefits for when a solar power farm is proposed near one’s local community.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

There was more pronounced variation in responses from respondents from different age groups, with younger people generally finding community benefits to be less important. While a very large majority of over 65s (78%) found them to be net important, only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (49%) agreed. Moreover, 21% of 18-to-24-year-olds found them to be not that important, as contrasted with only 13% of over 65s, and 13% of 18-to-24-year-olds found them to be not at all important, as contrasted with only 3% of over 65s.

With this question, different levels of engagement in the planning system did not correlate with significant disparity in question answers. A majority of those engaged in planning (72%) found community benefits to be net important, as did 70% of those unengaged in planning.

Politically, there is again almost a consensus between the 2019 voters of different political parties on this question. 2019 Conservatives were marginally more enthusiastic about community benefits, with a majority of them (78%) finding them net important, as did 76% of Labour voters and Liberal Democrats.

Having established that the UK public generally find community benefits to be important when new renewable power infrastructure is being constructed near their community, we wanted to understand what it is specifically that the UK public want from community benefits. As such, we asked them about the kind of community benefits that they would find most desirable when consenting to a new onshore wind or solar power farm.

As can be seen in Chart 25 below, the overwhelming preference among respondents is for money off energy bills, chosen by a plurality of the public (46%). This option was over three times more popular than the second-most popular choice, which was improvements to local infrastructure, chosen by 13% of respondents.

Chart 25. Views of the public on the most desirable kind of community benefits when consenting to a new onshore wind or solar power development.

Base: 2,243 UK adults. 

Money off energy bills were particularly favoured among older respondents. A majority of over 65s (54%) chose this option, as compared to a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (27%). Interestingly, this option was roughly equally popular among all levels of household income, with between 45% and 47% of all income brackets choosing it.

Those engaged in planning were somewhat less likely to favour money off energy bills, as compared to the rest of the public; it was an option chosen by a plurality of them (37%), as compared to a majority of those unengaged in planning (52%).

Politically, there was broad agreement on the most desirable community benefits. A small majority of 2019 Conservative voters (52%) favoured money off energy bills, as did large Labour (46%) and Liberal Democrat (44%) pluralities.

Community support for onshore wind 

One of the key reasons why the development of onshore wind turbines in England and Wales is more limited, as compared to offshore wind turbines in particular, is because of the so-called ‘triple veto’ policy: proposals for onshore wind development have to be located in an identified spatial zone, impacts have to be appropriately addressed and proposals have to demonstrate community support.

We, therefore, wanted to ask the UK public whether they would support abolishing a facet of the ‘triple veto’ policy – in particular, the facet most relevant to public support, namely community support. As such, we asked the public whether they think that the support of the local community should be needed in order to build new onshore wind turbines. We did this after explaining that, currently, in England, in order to build onshore wind turbines, the developer must demonstrate that their proposals have the support of the affected local community.

A majority of the UK public (66%) thought that the support of the local community should be needed to develop new wind turbines.

Chart 26. Views of the public on whether the support of the local community should be needed to develop new onshore wind turbines. 

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Of all demographic divisions, 18-to-24-year-olds were the only one where ‘the support of the local community should be needed to develop new wind turbines’ was chosen by a plurality, instead of a majority, of respondents, with 45% of 18-to-24-year-olds choosing that option. Conversely, older respondents were even more likely to emphasise the importance of community consent than the average member of the public, with 75% of over 65s thinking the support of the community should be mandatory.

Although an equal majority of both those engaged and unengaged with the planning system (66%) thought that the support of the local community should be needed to develop new wind turbines, a greater proportion of those engaged in planning (29%) thought that it should not be needed, as compared to those unengaged (17%).

Politically, a majority of the 2019 voters of all major parties agreed that the support of the local community should be needed to develop new wind turbines. That said, 2019 Conservatives were slightly more likely to hold that view, with 75% of them saying so, as compared to 64% of 2019 Labour and 68% of 2019 Liberal Democrat voters. 2019 Labour voters were the most likely to say that the support of the community should not be needed, with 25% of them choosing that response.

Community power

Given the emphasis on the importance of community decision-making over housing and infrastructure development demonstrated by our research thus far, it becomes clear that policies intending to facilitate greater and greener development levels need to bring the community local to the development onboard. One way to do it is for the community to be directly involved in bringing forward the development.

As such, our next question asked respondents to imagine that the government gave local communities the power and funding to bring forward their own development proposals, which would get around the need for developers to come forward with development proposals; a developer would then be able to move forward according to the proposal of the community. We then polled them on how likely they would be to participate in creating such a proposal for their local area.

As can be seen in Chart 27 below, a plurality of respondents (33%) was net unlikely – either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very unlikely’ – to participate in creating a community-led development proposal for their local area. More of the public reported to be net unlikely to participate rather than net likely (25%). Indeed, the least common response to the question was ‘very likely,’ chosen by only 8% of respondents.

Chart 27. Views of the public on whether one would participate in creating community-led local plans for their area.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Of all socio-economic divisions, age was again the most pronounced. Young people were generally less likely to want to participate in the plans. While a significant proportion of respondents across all age groups reported to be neither likely nor unlikely to participate in them – 26% of 18-to-24-year-olds, with the proportion increasing steadily with age, peaking at 38% of over 65s – a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (43%) said that they would be net unlikely to participate in creating community-led local plans for their area. This is as compared to only 29% of over 65s, of whom a plurality was neither likely nor unlikely to participate.

On different levels of engagement with the planning system, those engaged were again more decisive. A plurality of both those engaged and unengaged considered themselves to be neither likely nor unlikely to participate in creating community-led local plans for their area, with 25% of those engaged and 35% of those unengaged reporting so. However, those engaged in planning were more likely to report every other option besides ‘Don’t know.’

The biggest divide, however, was political. As with most demographic groupings, a plurality of the 2019 voters of all parties considered themselves to be neither likely nor unlikely to participate in creating community-led local plans for their area – 33% of Conservatives, 31% of Labour voters and 31% of Liberal Democrats. However, supporters of the Liberal Democrats were the only demographic grouping that considered themselves more likely to participate than not, with a plurality of Liberal Democrat voters (41%) considering themselves net likely, and only 23% considering themselves net unlikely. At the same time, only 25% of 2019 Conservative voters and 29% of 2019 Labour voters considered themselves net likely, while 35% of Conservatives considered themselves net unlikely, as did 33% of Labour voters. This means that Conservative voters were ten percentage points less likely than otherwise to participate, while Liberal Democrats were 18 percentage points more likely than otherwise.

Having established the level of enthusiasm for community-led local development plans, we wanted to explore the potential of community-led energy provision as well. As such, we asked the UK public about whether they would be likely to join a community energy group. We explained that a community energy group is a group of locals who develop and own small-scale renewable energy infrastructure, such as small wind turbine, to lower the local community’s energy bills. To do this, they receive help from local government and can access some government funds.

As visible in Chart 28 below, the public was divided on this question, with a plurality of respondents (45%) saying that they would be net likely – having chosen either ‘likely,’ ‘very likely,’ or ‘already belong to one’ – to join a community energy group. That said, other responses were also chosen by large minorities of respondents – 41% said that they would be net unlikely – either ‘unlikely’ or ‘not at all likely.’ It is worth mentioning that 2% of respondents claimed to already belong to a community energy group, so they are included as ‘net likely’ to join such a group, with the probability of it being 1.

Chart 28. Views of the public on one’s likelihood in joining a community energy group.

Base: 2,243 UK adults.

Once again, age was the most significant socio-economic divide, with younger people generally more likely to join a community energy group than older respondents. Overall, 48% of 18-to-24-year-olds were net likely to join a community energy group, as compared to only 33% of over 65s. Fifty-one percent of over 65s were net unlikely, but only 39% of 18-to-24-year-olds were of the same view.

Moreover, those from ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to join a community energy group. Sixty-four percent of those who identified themselves as Black or Asian considered themselves net likely to join a community energy group, as compared with only 42% of those identifying as white. Those identifying as white are more unlikely to join a community energy group than otherwise, as 43% of them said they would be net unlikely to join one.

Those engaged with the planning system were particularly likely to join a community energy group. A majority of those engaged in planning (62%) were net likely to join, suggesting that community energy projects stand a good chance at a smoother planning consenting process; the same was true for only 35% of the unengaged.

Politically, 2019 Conservative voters were the least enthusiastic about community energy groups. Thirty-eight percent of Conservatives were net likely to join a community energy group and 48% were net unlikely. By comparison, 55% of Labour voters were net likely to join but only 31% were net unlikely.

Planning permissibility for solar

Given the competing demands for land use and the potential to generate a lot of power through small-scale solar development mounted on the roofs of existing buildings, we also wanted to ask the public on how supportive they would be of mandating that a greater proportion of new and existing buildings have solar panels fitted to them.

As can be seen in Chart 29 below, a strong majority of the UK public (65%) would be net supportive – either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ – of mandating that a greater proportion of buildings have solar panels fitted to them, with only a small minority (9%) net unsupportive.

Chart 29. Views of the public on mandating that a greater proportion of buildings have solar panels fitted to them.

Base: 2,243 UK adults. 

Young people were generally less supportive of the policy. A plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds (45%) were net supportive of mandating that a greater proportion of buildings have solar panels fitted to them, as compared to 71% of over 65s.

Worth noting is also that those on lower incomes were slightly less likely to support the policy than those in other income groups. A small majority of those with a household income of under £20,000 (51%) were net supportive of the policy, as compared to 68% of those with household incomes of between £20,000 and £40,000 and 70% of those with household incomes of over £40,000.

There was only small variation in responses between those engaged and unengaged in the planning system. A majority of both groups was net supportive, with 67% of the engaged and 64% of the unengaged being so.

The policy commanded bipartisan support, with over 71% of both Conservative and Labour voters net supporting it. The policy was most popular among Liberal Democrats, with 74% being net supportive.

Conclusion

This analysis revealed 15 main findings on UK public attitudes about the importance of and potential policies for greater and greener housing and infrastructure development levels in the UK:

Climate risks

• A plurality of the UK public was not too concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies. Younger people were generally more concerned about their home’s ability to withstand future climate-related emergencies, as were those who have engaged in the planning system in the past. Conversely, those who have voted Conservative in the 2019 general election were relatively less likely to be concerned with the climate resilience of their home.
• Half of the UK public said the climate risk they are most concerned about is extreme weather events, such as storms, for their own home and neighbourhood. Younger people were notably less concerned about extreme weather events and water scarcity, as compared to older respondents. A majority of over 65s mentioned extreme weather events as one of their top concerns, as contrasted to only a minority of 18-to-24-year-olds. Different 2019 voters, however, were all concerned most about extreme weather events such as storms.
• A large plurality of the UK public had no flood resilience measures introduced to their home or local area, as far as they were aware. Younger people showed a far greater awareness of the existence of flood resilience measures; only a small minority of 18-to-24-year-olds claimed to be aware of no flood resilience measures in their home or local area. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of over 65s were not aware of any flood resilience measures in their home or local area. Those engaged in the planning system also showed a much greater awareness of the existence of flood resilience measures protecting their home or their local area.

Housing and infrastructure development

• A plurality of the UK public thought that between 70 and 85% of UK land should remain undeveloped in the long term. Moreover, a majority of the UK public (52%) thought that the proportion of land that is undeveloped in the UK should be less than what it is. There was very little variation between different socio-demographic groups on the answers to this question.
• An overwhelming majority of the UK public supported more green housing – such as housing with exceptionally low carbon emissions and high energy and water efficiency – being developed in their local area. A majority of respondents among all 2019 voters wanted new green housing in their local area, but 2019 Conservative voters were more likely to want no or less of such housing. Younger people, and those living in urban areas, however, were the keenest on it.
• A majority of the UK public say they support new housing development in their local area if it meets high environmental standards. Conservative voters were generally less enthusiastic about ‘green’ housing, as were respondents from rural areas and those with a lower educational level. Notably, those who have engaged with the planning system were very likely to find housing meeting a high environmental standard a cause for supporting it.
• A majority of the UK public claim that they are more likely to support a new development in their local area if it is particularly climate resilient. This was especially true of those with a higher education level. A plurality of respondents educated to basic GCSE level or below said that they are more likely to support a new housing development on account of it particularly climate resilient, while a majority of university graduates said the same. Again, those who have engaged with the planning system were exceptionally likely to find housing climate resilience a cause for support for a development.
• A plurality of the UK public thought that the development not releasing new pollutants into the water or air is one of the top two pro-environmental adjustments that would make them more supportive of new development in their local area. The most significant variation in responses to this question came with age, with younger respondents generally more concerned with development having a small carbon footprint and slightly more concerned with local biodiversity.
• A large majority of the UK public support new onshore wind power development, either unconditionally of its location or only in certain areas. However, interestingly, young people were less likely to do so. While a large majority of over 65s support new onshore wind power developments, either unconditionally or only in certain areas, the same is true of only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds. And although 2019 Conservative voters were also less likely to support it than the 2019 voters of other parties, they were still far more likely to support it than not.
• A majority of the UK public who only support onshore wind development in certain areas think that green belt land should be excluded from onshore wind development. Almost half believed that farmland should be excluded, and a minority believed that both farmland and green belt land should be excluded.
• A plurality of the UK public think it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build onshore wind farms. This was especially true for older respondents. Almost half of over 65s thought that the planning permission process for onshore wind farms should be easier. A plurality of the voters of all major political parties in 2019 agreed it should be easier.
• A majority of the UK public support the development of new solar farms, either unconditionally of its location or only in certain areas. Younger respondents were generally less supportive of new solar power development. While a very large majority of over 65s support new onshore wind power developments, unconditionally or only in certain areas, the same is true of only a smaller majority of 18-to-24-year-olds. A majority of 2019 voters of all parties also agreed with the development of solar farm, either unconditionally or only in certain areas.
• Of those who support solar power development only in certain areas, a majority thought that green belt land should be excluded from solar farm development. Almost half believed that farmland should be excluded, and a quarter believed that both farmland and green belt land should be excluded.
• A plurality of the UK public believe that it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build solar farms. However, younger people were generally less in favour of an easier planning process for solar farms. While not as divided as on onshore wind, older people were again more likely to support an easier planning process for solar power, with a large plurality of over 65s saying that it should be easier to acquire planning permission to build solar farms; this is as contrasted with a smaller plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds.
• When given a choice between different development priorities for English offshore waters, a majority of UK public believe that offshore wind farms should be a priority. Most notably, older respondents were more enthusiastic about offshore wind, with a majority of over 65s choosing it as a development type that should be prioritised for English offshore waters. By contrast, only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds were of the same view. Floating solar farms were also a popular option. Oil and gas platforms, on the other hand, were preferred by only a small minority of the UK public.
• A plurality of the UK public had no concerns regarding developers building housing in a way such that it emits less carbon. Men and younger people were less likely to have no concerns regarding it, with a plurality of younger people concerned that it would make housing more expensive to buy. Those engaged with the planning system were more likely to have concerns in general.
• A plurality of the public would have neither a positive nor a negative response to their neighbour installing a heat pump outside their home. Those in better-earning households were more likely to have a more positive view of it, as were middle-aged respondents.
• A majority of the UK public would have a positive reaction to their neighbour installing solar panels on the roof of their home. Again, those in better-earning households were more likely to have a more positive view of it, as were middle-aged respondents.

Policies for greater and greener development

• A plurality of the UK public was supportive of densifying their local street. Renters were generally more supportive of densification than homeowners; conversely, those who voted for the Conservative Party in 2019 were generally less supportive of it. Those historically engaged in the planning system had generally stronger opinions in their answers, but were not any more or less supportive of densification than their counterparts. A plurality of both renters (38%) and homeowners (33%) were net supportive of densification (28%), however, renters were less likely to be net unsupportive (22%) of densification than homeowners, 32% of whom were net unsupportive.
• A majority of the UK public was supportive of developing new settlements in undeveloped nearby areas. Younger respondents were generally less supportive of new settlements. Conversely, respondents identifying as Black or Asian were much more likely to be supportive of the development of new settlements. There was broad consensus among the different political groups on this question.
• A majority of the UK public believe that local planning authorities should be rewarded by central government in exchange for proactive planning for more renewable energy infrastructure developments, such as onshore wind and solar power. Although the policy was supported by a net majority across the 2019 voters of all political parties, it was relatively less popular among 2019 Conservative voters. It commanded overwhelming support in London and, unsurprisingly, among those engaged with the planning system.
• A majority of the UK public think that it is important for community benefits to be offered to the local community when a new onshore wind turbine is proposed nearby. Older respondents were more enthusiastic about the importance of community benefits; while a relatively small majority of 18-to-24-year-olds found community benefits to be important, over 65s were overwhelmingly of that opinion. It was also a topic of broad agreement among different 2019 voters; a large majority of the 2019 voters of all parties found community benefits important.
• A majority of the UK public think that it is important for community benefits to be offered to the local community when a new solar power farm is proposed nearby. Younger people again generally found community benefits to be less important. While a very large majority of over 65s found them to be important, only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds agreed. Again, also, the 2019 voters of different parties overwhelmingly agreed on their importance.
• The overwhelming preference among the UK public for community benefits is for money off energy bills. A majority of over 65s chose this option, but the same was true of only a plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds. Interestingly, this option was roughly equally popular among all levels of household income. Roughly half of the 2019 voters of all parties also had this preference.
• A majority of the UK public have said that the support of the local community should be needed to develop a new wind turbine. 18-to-24-year-olds are the only one where the view ‘the support of the local community should be needed to develop new wind turbines’ was chosen by a plurality, instead of a majority, of respondents – this is despite young people’s relative opposition to onshore wind development. Among the 2019 voters of all parties, a majority agreed that community benefits should be needed, although 2019 Conservative voters felt more strongly about this.
• A plurality of the UK public was unlikely to participate in creating a community-led development proposal for their local area. Young people were generally less likely to want to participate in the plans, but, most notably, 2019 Liberal Democrat voters were far more likely to participate in them than any single other socio-demographic grouping.
• A plurality of the UK public would be likely to join a community energy group. Younger people, those historically engaged with the planning system and those from ethnic minority backgrounds were most likely to join a community energy group. However, 2019 Conservative voters were generally less enthusiastic about community energy groups.
• A majority of the UK public support mandating that a greater proportion of new and existing buildings have solar panels fitted to them. Young people were generally less supportive of the policy. A plurality of 18-to-24-year-olds were supportive of mandating that a greater proportion of buildings have solar panels fitted to them, as compared to a large majority of over 65s. The policy was equally overwhelmingly popular among the 2019 voters of all parties.

Our polling shows that socio-demographic and voting characteristics are associated with differences in views on greater and greener housing and infrastructure development. Some characteristics emerge particularly frequently as markers of differing public attitudes.

First, age. Being younger is associated with: greater levels of concern regarding the climate resilience of one’s home; greater awareness of flood resilience measures in one’s local area; greater desire for more environmentally-friendly housing in one’s local area; greater desire for developments to have a small carbon footprint; and a greater desire to participate in a community energy group. However, it is also associated with: lower levels of concern regarding extreme weather events; lower approval of their neighbours installing a heat pump or solar panels in their home; lower approval of new onshore wind and solar energy developments; lower desire for an easier planning permission process for the development of new onshore wind and solar energy infrastructure; lower desire for the development of new settlements in undeveloped areas nearby; lower desire to participate in creating community-led local development plans; lower desire for money off their bills when community benefits are being offered to one’s community; lower importance attached to the need to offer community benefits when a new onshore wind or solar power development is being developed nearby; and, finally, a lower level of concern for local community approval when a new onshore wind farm is being developed. Conversely, being older is associated with the inverse of all those attitudes, with the exception of lower approval of their neighbours installing a heat pump or solar panels in their home, for which approval is highest amongst the middle aged. Given the high number of attitudes that differ by age, age is the most prominent marker of attitudes on greater and greener housing and infrastructure development.

Second, prior level of engagement with the planning system. Having previously engaged with the planning system is associated with: greater levels of concern regarding the climate resilience of one’s home; greater desire for more environmentally-friendly housing in one’s local area; stronger approval for local development when it is particularly environmentally friendly or climate resilient; greater levels of concern regarding building homes in a way such that it reduces carbon emissions; greater levels of support for the subsidising of local planning authorities in exchange for proactive planning for new renewable energy infrastructure; and a greater importance attached to the need to offer community benefits when a new onshore wind or solar power development is being developed nearby. However, it is also associated with: a lower desire for money off their bills when community benefits are being offered to their community; lower approval of new onshore wind and solar energy developments; and a lower desire for an easier planning permission process for the development of new onshore wind and solar energy infrastructure. Conversely, having not previously engaged with the planning system is associated with the inverse of all those attitudes.

Third, 2019 General Election vote. Having voted Conservative in the 2019 General Election is associated with a higher level of concern for local community approval when a new onshore wind farm is being developed. However, it is also associated with: lower levels of concern regarding the climate resilience of one’s home; lower desire for more environmentally-friendly housing in one’s local area; lower approval for local development when it is particularly environmentally friendly or climate resilient; lower approval of new onshore wind and solar energy developments; lower desire for an easier planning permission process for the development of new onshore wind and solar energy infrastructure; lower approval of one’s neighbours installing a heat pump in their home; and lower approval for the densification of one’s local street. Conversely, having voted for either Labour or the Liberal Democrats in 2019 is associated with the inverse of all those attitudes. Moreover, having voted for the Liberal Democrats in the 2019 General Election is associated particularly high levels of approval for an easier planning permission process for the development of new onshore wind infrastructure and a higher desire to participate in creating community-led local development plans.

Fourth, both level of education and household income. Residing in a household with a higher income and being educated to a higher level are both associated with: stronger approval for local development when it is particularly environmentally friendly or climate resilient; higher approval of new onshore wind and solar energy developments; higher desire for an easier planning permission process for the development of new onshore wind and solar energy infrastructure; and higher approval of one’s neighbours installing a heat pump in their home. Conversely, being of a lower educational level or residing in a household with a lower income are both associated with the inverse of all those attitudes.

A couple other characteristics have also emerged as less prominent markers of differing public attitudes on greater and greener development.

Identifying as either Black or Asian is associated with higher desire for the development of new settlements in undeveloped areas nearby and a higher greater desire to participate in a community energy group. Conversely, identifying as white is associated with the inverse of those attitudes.

Residing in an urban area is associated with a higher desire for more environmentally-friendly housing in one’s local area and greater levels of concern regarding the climate resilience of one’s home. Conversely, residing in a rural area is associated with the inverse of those attitudes.

Many of these characteristics will be correlated, so we cannot attribute a causal relationship between being a member of a specific demographic group or having a particular voting history and holding a certain attitude.

New policy aims

Based on our findings, Bright Blue proposes four policy aims that the UK Government should adopt.

Aim one: Build more.

The UK public consistently agrees with greater levels of greener development – both when it comes to housing and infrastructure – including in their own local communities and on previously undeveloped land.

Currently, less than 9% of English land is developed. The public preference is for this to be much greater. Not only this, a majority of the public also want to see more green housing and climate resilient development built near them. They also want to see more onshore wind and solar power, and they are generally supportive of building new settlements – something that has not happened in the UK since the 1970s.

New development, in all of its ‘green’ forms, is uncontroversially popular, including in people’s local areas. There is no excuse to shirk from it, except for the voices of small, but perhaps loud, minorities.

In order to achieve this, as we suggested in our recent report, Greater and greener homes: more homes, ready for net zero, the Government could create and fund a Neighbourhood Development Order (NDO) Pathfinder Programme to bring forward development in urban neighbourhoods. NDOs give parishes and neighbourhood groups a chance to bring forward the development they want to see in their areas for approval, rather than waiting for developers to come forward with their own proposals. NDOs are able to set clear rules on the type, design and density of homes, and are approved by residents in a referendum.

However, the current funding to deliver NDOs is limited, so achieving good design at a meaningful scale, such as a whole neighbourhood or area in a town, is challenging. In addition, the process for permitting infill and brownfield redevelopment through an NDO remains ambiguous. Perhaps above all, they are simply little known.

To make NDOs an established solution to community-led intensification, the Government needs to kickstart a programme of NDO creation in towns and suburbs which already have a local design code in place. These codes specify the local design preferences and other requirements which residents want new homes to meet. This will allow the neighbourhood planning group to move swiftly to public consultation.

Aim two: Facilitate the transition of buildings towards net zero.

Building greener will brings the UK public onboard when consenting to new development.

Very few people have a problem with heat pumps or solar panels being installed by their neighbours. Conversely, a majority of the UK public are more likely to support a development if it is ‘greener’ – such as if it has exceptionally low carbon emissions, high energy and water efficiency or is particularly climate resilient – and especially so among those who engage with the planning system.

One way to help achieve this would be to include a hierarchy of options to set higher environmental standards for more ambitious local authorities in the National Development Management Policies (NDMP), as we explore in our recent report, Greater and greener homes: more homes, ready for net zero. Local authorities could then continue to set more ambitious planning requirements than the required national minimum on issues such as reducing carbon emissions and providing green infrastructure in developments. Having a centrally-determined hierarchy would prevent a plethora of different requirements from springing up across the country while respecting the wishes of communities to insist on more sustainable development in their area.

Aim three: Consider the interests of the community when bringing forward development.

The interests of the community – whether it be regarding the provision of community benefits or the need for the support of the local community when a new development is built nearby – have consistently been judged as important by the UK public.

One way they can be reinforced is by mandating a minimum level of community benefits when bringing forward new energy infrastructure development. As we write in our recent report, Resilient neighbourhoods, powered by low-carbon energy, the provision of community benefits should be tied to the creation of Contract for Difference agreements (CfDs) for major new renewable energy projects. Instituting a minimum level of community benefits through CfD rounds would avoid downward competition between developers on the level of community benefits while ensuring community interests are recognised. Such a measure should prevent communities from losing out from any wider downward pressure on prices.

Aim four: Facilitate the development of more renewable energy infrastructure, both on sea and land.  

Solar, offshore and onshore wind all are highly popular among the UK public. A large majority support the development of both solar and onshore power, while offshore power remains the most popular choice for development on English offshore waters – though floating solar farms are popular also.

As opposed to the sometimes prevailing narrative about older people being opposed to new development, our findings suggest that it is older people who are the greatest champions of renewable energy infrastructure. Although the development of renewable energy is favoured across all age groups, older people are the most likely to want more solar and onshore wind developments.

The Government could facilitate their development by rewarding local planning authorities in exchange for proactive planning for more renewable energy infrastructure developments – a policy that the UK public supports. As we write in our recent report, Resilient neighbourhoods, powered by low-carbon energy, this should not be excessively costly – according to the Royal Town Planning Institute, in 2020-21, net expenditure by local planning authorities was just £480 million, which is only around 0.4% of the total expenditure by English local authorities. Those resources could be an extension of the existing Planning Skills Delivery Fund – a £24 million grant from the DLUHC to help local authorities with the implementation of the reforms in the 2023 Levelling Up and Regeneration Act.

Such resourcing could prioritise those local planning authorities with significant potential for renewable energy generation and which have considerable need and desire to coordinate the exploitation of this capacity.

Another option, also explored in Resilient neighbourhoods, powered by low-carbon energy, is to draw up marine spatial plans for English offshore waters that prioritise renewable energy. The use of proactive spatial planning to help steer offshore wind and other marine energy development away from the most environmentally-sensitive areas would also support the swift handling of development application consents, insofar as the riskiest areas will have been avoided. Such plans might also identify areas and options for investment in strategic compensation schemes, designed to help offset the biodiversity impacts of offshore energy development.

Such a step should not be problematic. It has been widely called for by government-commissioned inquiries. Scotland already has spatial plans that allocate land for marine renewables. The task could be given to the Marine Management Organisation NDPB, since its powers already enable it to engage in marine planning.

Author

Bartek Staniszewski is a Senior Researcher at Bright Blue.

Acknowledgements

This report has been made possible by the generous support of the European Climate Foundation. The ideas expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of our sponsors. I would like to thank Ryan Shorthouse for his editing and feedback, as well as Emily Taylor for her communications work on it. I would also like to thank Charlie Buckley and the Survation team for their hard work and attention to detail advising on and carrying out the survey.

The full data tables for the polling can be found here.

Executive Summary

Decarbonising the UK power sector is central to the country achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions. To do this, there needs to be a substantial increase in investment in and development of three main renewable energy technologies: solar, onshore wind and offshore wind.

This report examines the role of the planning system in hampering as well as facilitating these renewable energy technologies. In recent years, planning policy concerning renewable energy infrastructure in England has been beset by a stop-and-go dynamic, where development booms get followed by periods of bust because of sudden shifts in public policy, undermining investor confidence.

There has not only been significant inconsistency in planning policy for each of the main three renewable technologies, but also across them. With two key technologies, namely solar power and offshore wind, planning is often framed as a barrier to new infrastructure, which requires streamlining to accelerate project consenting, without considerations of whether this facilitates the best possible route to net zero. But in the context of onshore wind, planning has been deliberately used to construct a ’triple veto’ test for projects that is all but unassailable. This inconsistent reasoning can obscure the need to learn and develop policies that achieve an effective and durable balance between delivery, public engagement and environmental sustainability regardless of the technology involved.

This report identifies the following four principles to put planning policy on a durable footing and, by doing so, contribute to the sustained growth on renewable energy generation capacity that net zero requires.

1. The UK needs to pursue the best net zero energy transition, not simply the quickest.
2. Planning processes need to strike an effective compromise between development delivery, community engagement and protecting the environment.
3. The role of planning in energy decarbonisation varies depending on the decarbonisation pathways pursued, including the technologies prioritised and the balance between technical and behavioural solutions.
4. The role of planning should not be viewed in isolation, but as interconnected with other public policy instruments.

The recommendations of this report are grouped into four categories: increasing the development of onshore wind, increasing the development of solar power, increasing the development of offshore wind, and cross-cutting recommendations for increasing the development of all three of those key renewable energy technologies.

Increasing onshore wind

Recommendation one: Abolish the ‘triple veto’ planning policy for onshore wind from the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF).

Recommendation two: Adjust the NPPF to positively encourage Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to plan for onshore wind.

Recommendation three: Amend the NPPF to adopt a presumption in favour of onshore wind development within all industrial and commercial sites, as well as promote the development onshore wind at all sites with sufficient grid capacity for large-scale low-carbon energy development.

Recommendation four: Create an Onshore Wind Acceleration Taskforce.

Increasing solar power

Recommendation five: Use the Solar Taskforce to collate evidence on planning outcomes from Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) that already issue non-statutory guidance on acceptable greenfield locations for solar PV.

Increasing offshore wind

Recommendation six: Use the Marine Management Organisation to draw up marine spatial plans for English offshore waters that demarcate more closely those areas likely to be the most acceptable for offshore wind, gas and oil development and those which are more sensitive and should be avoided.

Cross-cutting recommendations

Recommendation seven: Enable LPAs that seek to encourage more renewable energy development through proactive spatial zoning to access a pot of central government resources.

Recommendation eight: Deliver a precise Land Use Framework for England to provide a useful knowledge base for LPAs.

Recommendation nine: Institute a minimum level of community benefits at £5,000 per MW per year by making it a requirement of Contract for Difference (CfD) applications for renewable energy developments.

Chapter One: Introduction

Decarbonising the power sector is pivotal to addressing the climate crisis. The power sector – by which we mean the sector responsible for the generation and provision of electricity[2] – is a major source of UK greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in its own right, responsible for 20% of all UK emissions as of 2021.[3] However, achieving net zero emissions for the heating and transport sectors will also mean replacing the fossil fuels on which those sectors currently depend with electricity instead, significantly increasing power demand. As a consequence, decarbonising the power sector must proceed in tandem with expansion in generation capacity, and so, in the size of the power sector itself.

Our future energy systems must not only be decarbonised, but also secure and affordable. The decarbonisation scenarios envisaged by the Climate Change Committee (CCC) all make considerable use of renewable energy technologies, especially solar and wind power, both onshore and offshore.[4] These energy sources are intermittent; they produce a varying supply of power due to external, uncontrollable factors, such as wind speed and sunlight intensity. The expansion of these intermittent renewable energy sources thus needs to be coordinated with investment in energy storage, demand flexibility and interconnectors to power supply systems in other nations, which enable troughs in supply from renewables to be met and surpluses to be fully exploited.

That said, the UK’s power sector has already decarbonised significantly: carbon emissions from UK power stations in 2021 were 73.4% below 1990 levels.[5] Nonetheless, there is scope for the power sector to decarbonise further and faster. Consequently, in 2021, the UK Government made a commitment to fully decarbonise the power system by 2035, and to get 95% of the way there by 2030.[6]

It is almost universally acknowledged that decarbonising the power sector requires very significant and rapid investment in new energy infrastructure. The last 30 years in the UK have seen more than 50GW of renewable energy generation capacity installed across Britain, but scenarios through to 2050 envisage the need for generation capacity to still increase fivefold or more.[7]

Energy and planning

With the clock ticking, and major investment required before the 2030s, policymakers are thinking about the problems facing the delivery of new renewable infrastructure. Such thinking frequently alights on planning. Indeed, the UK’s energy decarbonisation journey has been peppered with concerns that planning is a “key barrier for investments in renewable energy and energy networks”[8] and a source of “delays”[9] that risk “undermining net zero”.[10]

While creating a net zero energy system certainly creates challenges for the planning system, it is important not to reduce complex issues to planning policy failure. Policy frameworks for renewable energy in the UK, and particularly in England, have been beset by a stop-and-go dynamic, where development booms get followed by periods of bust as a result of sudden and drastic shifts in public policy, undermining investor confidence. Shifts in planning policy have often become causal factors in boom and bust, when, in fact, planning ought to be central to smoothing out boom-and-bust cycles in the power sector, creating a consistent, predictable framework for renewable energy investment.

This report examines the role of the planning system in hampering as well as facilitating a low-carbon energy system and outlines how, with the use of planning policy, we can make greater progress on realising a net zero energy system.

By ‘the planning system,’ we mean the town and country planning regime, as framed by the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, plus the planning policy and consenting regimes for major infrastructure that build on the 2008 Planning Act. The marine planning regime falls within the scope of this report, too.[11] The report focuses on the planning powers available to the Westminster government, which apply principally to England.[12] Nevertheless, because devolution in the UK has given very significant power over the planning system to the devolved nations, this has enabled different approaches to emerge. Lessons from Scotland and Wales will be drawn upon where relevant.

The report will focus principally on the relationship between planning and the three main renewable energy technologies: solar power, onshore wind and offshore wind. It takes this focus because these low-carbon technologies are forecast to provide the majority of power in a future net zero energy system.[13]

By solar power, we principally mean the conversion of sunlight into electricity through solar photovoltaic panels (solar PV). This technology can be used in small-scale schemes, where single panels or small clusters are deployed, typically attached to buildings, often referred to as ‘rooftop’ schemes, with capacities measured in kilowatts (kW). Solar power can also be organised into much larger schemes, using ground-mounted panels, often referred to as ‘field-scale’ or ‘commercial’ schemes, with capacities that can, in the largest cases, deliver hundreds of megawatts (MW) of capacity. In total, solar power delivered 4.1% of the UK’s electricity in 2022,[14] with major new schemes providing electricity at £47.00 per Megawatt hour (MWh).[15]

Onshore wind harnesses the power of the wind by using wind turbines located on land, with the collection of multiple turbines into a single development referred to as a ‘wind farm.’ In total, onshore wind provided 10.8% of the UK’s electricity in 2022, with recently approved projects offering to supply electricity at £52.29/MWh.[16]

Offshore wind power is the provision of energy from turbines located in the UK’s coastal and marine waters. The turbines deployed in offshore wind farms have increased greatly in scale, from 2MW average installed capacity per turbine in the early projects, to 9MW as of 2023, with further scale increases anticipated. The dominant technology to date involves mounting turbines in foundations built on the sea floor, but investment is increasing in ‘floating offshore wind,’ where turbines are mounted on platforms that are moored to the sea floor, allowing projects to be built in deeper water. In 2022, offshore wind provided 13.8% of the UK’s electricity, with new schemes offering to supply electricity at £37.35/MWh. [17]

Most scenarios for a net zero power system produced by key bodies – the National Grid Company (NGC ESO), central government and the CCC – assume that electricity generation capacity needs to increase: to meet growing power demand, to enable the electrification of transport and heating, and to accommodate the intermittency of renewable energy supplies. In addition to this, renewable energy technologies also tend to have lower load factors – deficiencies in solar radiation or wind speeds that mean they deliver less power per year than their theoretical maximum – than fossil or nuclear power. This means that more generation capacity from the three main renewable energy technologies must be installed to deliver a given energy output.

For these reasons, scenarios from the NGC ESO suggest total power generation capacity requirements by 2050 – when we have a legal obligation to meet net zero emissions across the UK economy – of between 281 and 298GW. As for the potential contribution of the three main renewable energy technologies to this capacity, this is discussed in Box 1.1. below.

The scenarios outlined above bear multiple implications for planning policy. First, different renewable energy technologies are in different positions when we consider the growth of new generation capacity required against present development rates. Most scenarios suggest that solar power may and offshore wind need to increase capacity more than sevenfold from their present position, but current annual development rates are increasing and, for offshore wind, our 2050 requirements are not far above present development pipelines, granted that one should expect attrition as projects fall by the wayside. With onshore wind, conversely, the requirements for capacity increases look more modest, but current development rates in England are negligible, and so need significant improvement. Thus, the requirements for planning policy change differ between technologies.

Second, scenarios should not be treated as inevitable outcomes or concrete requirements. They vary, and the assumptions behind them reveal trade-offs and different choices. The biggest of those is regarding demand reduction and flexibility. Behavioural change by the public and businesses can affect the scale of future energy demand and thus the scale and costs of the infrastructure required to supply it. For example, the extent to which the public pursue walking, cycling and public transport is a major differentiator between BEIS’ ‘high-demand’ and ‘low-demand’ scenarios. There are also trade-offs between renewable energy technologies. For example, onshore wind has a higher load factor than solar power, requiring less capacity to be installed to achieve a given output, but has a higher landscape impact.[20]

We also face choices in how the future power system should be organised; notably, the balance to be struck between maximising large-scale power projects such as offshore wind, or prioritising smaller-scale, decentralised generation, woven into our urban fabric. The planning system is deeply implicated in these trade-offs and choices.

Third, one of the most important trade-offs is between energy generation and other land use; a trade-off in which the planning system plays a significant role. Most future scenarios tend to deal only in cursory terms with land use and planning challenges,[21] making the tacit assumption that enough space for projected generation requirements can be found. One problem of this spatial myopia in future scenarios is that, where difficulties arise in securing the desired generation capacity, the problem is either blamed on uncooperative citizens acting as ‘NIMBYs’ or on the planning system. Instead, focus should be given to the intense challenges entailed in finding sufficient, socially-acceptable sites and the spatial insensitivity of current forecasts and policy. This challenge is only likely to increase as the sites that are easiest to access for development are used up.

This land dimension also informs this report’s decision to focus on the three main renewable energy technologies – solar, onshore wind and offshore wind – because they make extensive use of space and land and can put pressure on the physical environment. Indeed, prices for electricity from these three renewable technologies have fallen rapidly: by 59% between 2010 and 2022 for offshore wind, by 69% over the same time interval for onshore wind and by 89% for solar power.[22] This means that cost is diminishing as a barrier to development, whilst land use and siting – and therefore planning policy – are becoming the more pressing problems. As such, it is the expansion of these three renewable technologies that will put the greatest pressure on the planning system.

The focus of this report

This report examines the impact of, changes to and ideas for planning policy for the three main renewable energy technologies.

The key research questions are:

1. What are the most economically and environmentally beneficial forms of low-carbon energy infrastructure for the UK?
2. What are the main barriers to decarbonising our energy production?
3. How effective is existing planning policy in enabling new low-carbon energy infrastructure?
4. How can we overcome the barriers related to the expansion of low-carbon energy infrastructure?

The report is structured as follows:

• Chapter Two summarises existing planning policies for the three main renewable energy technologies and their effects on development delivery;
• Chapter Three examines and evaluates ongoing and prospective revisions to planning policy for the three main renewable energy technologies;
• Chapter Four offers new policy recommendations to reform the planning system to support an increase in suitable development of the three main renewable energy technologies.

Chapter Two: The nature and effects of planning policy on the development of the main renewable energy technologies

This chapter begins by outlining the main planning policy measures that UK Governments have applied to facilitate renewable energy infrastructure and then summarises post-2010 changes to planning policy for three main renewable energy technologies: solar power, onshore wind and offshore wind. The chapter concludes by assessing the extent to which planning policy has affected the deployment of these three renewable energy technologies.

There is a range of planning policy measures that can be applied to facilitate energy infrastructure development, including renewable energy infrastructure. The three broad measures include:

1. Central determination of consent, for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs).

Since the post-war period, central government has held powers to determine consents for major power generation stations, usually over 50MW installed capacity, as well as for major grid lines. In the past, this has been the consenting route for coal, oil and gas-fired power stations, and it is now the main consenting route for larger renewable energy facilities, such as offshore wind farms. The Planning Act 2008 designated such projects Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) and instigated a set of measures by which central government has been able to accelerate consenting processes, notably by instituting statutory timeframes for key parts of the process. The NSIP approach also mandates early, front-loaded consultation with statutory bodies and the public.

2. Determination of consent by Local Planning Authorities (LPAs)

For power generation facilities below the 50MW size threshold, applications for planning consent are decided by Local Planning Authorities (LPAs), as per the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, in much the same way as developments such as housing. This has been the main route by which onshore renewable energy capacity in England, both solar and wind, has been developed to date. Applications are judged primarily against Local Development Plans (LDPs), which set down policies for guiding development across an area.

3. Permitted Development Rights (PDRs).

Central government has long held the power to grant PDRs to certain categories of development, thus removing the requirement to go through the usual planning approval process. PDRs have been granted to certain small-scale renewable energy facilities. For example, adjustments to PDRs in 2012, enacted through an amendment to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, increased the scope to attach solar PV panels to buildings without requiring planning consent.

The UK government can also set the policy framework against which applications are determined, affecting the criteria to be considered and the weight to be attached to them. For energy infrastructure projects that go through the NSIP consenting route, outlined above, the Government produces National Policy Statements (NPSs), which set down national objectives for the technology in question and the factors that should be considered in project consent decisions.

For those applications requiring local consent, however, LPAs have been steered through national planning policy guidance – since 2012, the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) – which sets out how applications are to be determined and the policies that LPAs should incorporate in their LDPs.

Because of their scale and potential for environmental impact, some energy generation projects are required to undergo Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and thus are affected by the regulations governing that process. EIA is mandatory for all thermal power stations of 300MW capacity or more and for the largest electricity transmission lines. EIA is also likely to be required for any other energy production facilities occupying more than 0.5 hectares and for wind farms consisting of more than two turbines, or more than 15m in height.[28] Compliance with biodiversity conservation legislation – notably the requirements of the Endangered Habitats Directive – also imposes a series of tests for planning applications that affect species or habitats listed under the Habitats Directive.

Besides the statutory legislation and policy mentioned above, there is a raft of non-statutory government advice and guidance on planning for renewable energy development, often produced with the close input from the energy industry.  This includes advice on community engagement and more detailed facets of project design, discussed later in this chapter.

Non-statutory guidance is an important vehicle for advice on the provision of community benefits – the provision of funds or assets to communities that host or are affected by new energy infrastructure development. The provision of community benefits has become routine for onshore wind and is being increasingly applied to grid network development, too.[29]

In sum, government has great scope to adjust planning policy to be applied to energy project development. Over the last two decades, many such adjustments have been made, as successive governments have sought to recast the balance that planning strikes between infrastructure delivery, community engagement and environmental sustainability. In fact, different adjustments have been made regarding different renewable energy technologies, creating a shifting picture of development risks and opportunities, as successive planning changes facilitate or thwart expansion.

We now turn to summarise post-2010 changes to statutory planning policy and non-statutory guidance regarding the main renewable energy technologies.

Recent developments in planning policy on renewable energy

Solar Power

There are currently more than 1.3 million UK homes with solar panel installations.[30] However, because of their smaller scale, the total installed solar capacity of solar PV on residential and commercial roofs has amounted to less than a quarter of the UK total solar capacity (3.3GW out of 14.8GW, as of 2023).[31]

Since 2010, successive governments have sought to encourage solar energy. One key mechanism for this has been to simplify or remove non-statutory guidance. To achieve this, Permitted Development Rights (PDRs) – introduced earlier in this chapter – have been extended to enable small-scale solar PV projects to be constructed without the need for planning consent, with important additions introduced in 2012 through an amendment to the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act. This conferred the right to install solar panels attached to dwellings or non-domestic buildings, or within their curtilage, subject to size and locational constraints; for example, limiting these rights to schemes that do not raise the height of buildings.

For larger, field-scale solar projects there has been less specific policy encouragement. Solar power projects that exceed the rights conferred by PDRs, but fall below the 50MW threshold that would render them NSIPs – as detailed in Box 2.1 – require planning permission from the LPA. Indeed, the broadly positive message on renewable energy development given in the NPPF applies to solar PV, but it offers no specific advice on this technology. Advice on determining solar PV applications is instead given only in the planning practice guidance on renewable and low-carbon energy.[32] Meanwhile, only a small number of solar power developments, such as the East Yorkshire Solar Farm, have been determined centrally through NSIP procedures.

A key issue facing field-scale solar projects, which governments have needed to navigate, is whether such facilities should be allowed to be sited on higher-quality agricultural land. This is usually interpreted as grades 1-3a in the Agricultural Land Classification system, because it is the land that is classed as ‘Best and Most Versatile’ for growing crops. Although this has frequently been the subject of high-profile ministerial comment,[33] policy has been more stable. Both non-statutory guidance for smaller solar schemes and the National Policy Statements for schemes over 50MW have maintained the long-term convention that solar developments should be steered away from land of grades 3a and above, and that poorer quality agricultural land should be prioritised instead.[34]

Onshore wind

As of 2022, there were over 1,500 operational onshore wind farms in the UK,[35] with a combined capacity of 14.8GW.[36]

Of all the low-carbon energy technologies in the UK, onshore wind has been subjected to the greatest shifts in planning policy, with most of the changes prioritising responding to public disquiet above development delivery.

In the period prior to 2010, statements of national planning policy guidance encouraged LPAs to be supportive of onshore wind development.[37] The guidance documentation set down the criteria that were relevant to determining consents, while warning LPAs against seeking to spatially steer wind energy development through preferred development or exclusion zones in their LDPs.[38] Instead, Regional Planning Bodies, then operating for England, were encouraged to identify broad areas for renewable energy development. However, this resulted in spatial planning guidance only for onshore wind in the North East, with no areas being identified by Regional Planning Bodies in any of the rest of England.

This limited government interest pre-2010 in using the planning system to spatially steer onshore wind energy development in England is in marked contrast to Wales and Scotland. There, local government used national planning policy guidance and LDPs to steer onshore wind projects towards preferred development areas.[39]

From 2010, significant changes to planning policy for onshore wind in England were introduced. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government introduced reforms to the planning system, all designed to institute a new, ‘localist’ approach. Regional Planning Bodies were abolished and the NPPF was created in 2012 – which replaced previous planning guidance consisting of hundreds of pages of Planning Policy Guidance Notes (PPGs), Planning Policy Statements (PPSs) and Planning Circulars. The NPPF also removed any wind-specific planning policy.

New detailed planning practice guidance to the NPPF was introduced by the government in 2013, requiring wind farm developers to engage in pre-application consultation with the local community and giving more weight to grounds for refusal by LPAs.[40]  Then, after the 2015 general election, the Government took forward its manifesto commitment to “halt the spread of subsidised onshore wind farms” and “change the law so that local people have the final say on wind farm applications”.[41] Consequently, new non-statutory guidance for onshore wind was added to the NPPF, as follows: “Except for applications for the repowering of existing wind turbines, a proposed wind energy development involving one or more turbines should not be considered acceptable unless it is in an area identified as suitable for wind energy development in the development plan; and, following consultation, it can be demonstrated that the planning impacts identified by the affected local community have been fully addressed and the proposal has their backing”.[42]

In effect, this change to the NPPF set up three additional tests for the development of onshore wind projects:

• Spatial zones. New wind energy developments need to be in an area identified as suitable within the LDP.
• Impacts. Any planning impacts identified by the affected local community must be “fully addressed.”
• Community backing. It must be demonstrated that proposals have the backing of the affected local community.[43]

This ‘triple veto’ created significant barriers for the development of new onshore wind schemes in England. There has been no obligation on LPAs to identify areas suitable for onshore wind to support the first test, without which wind energy development is precluded. In addition, onshore wind farms over 50MW were taken out of the fast-tracked, central, NSIP consenting processes, and instead passed to local authorities to determine, subjecting them to the same triple veto.

This change was the result of a highly-organised grassroots and parliamentary campaign, which put the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government under significant pressure, including from members of the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and the UK Independence Party.[44]

Alongside these major changes to planning policy, government has worked with the industry to create non-statutory guidance on community engagement and benefits.[45] The ‘Community Benefits Protocol’ encouraged wind farm developers to commit to providing a package of at least £5,000 per megawatt per year to host communities. This advice was updated most recently in 2021,[46] though such changes are of limited practical effect, given that the triple veto policy largely extinguished new onshore wind projects in England.

Offshore wind

As of 2022, there were over 2,600 offshore wind turbines off UK shores,[47] with a combined capacity of 13.9GW.[48]

Successive UK Governments have encouraged the expansion of offshore wind, and this technology has been an important beneficiary of efforts to institute fast-track consenting planning processes. Because most offshore wind schemes are large in scale – over 100MW – they fall within the ambit of the centralised NSIP processes, explained earlier in this chapter.[49]

In contrast to onshore wind, planning policy for determining offshore wind consent has been stable and consistently supportive since 2010. However, as the sector has expanded, so concerns have mounted about the potential risks that the projects pose to marine biodiversity; especially the UK’s internationally important seabird populations. This has led to increased questioning of the way that planning policy balances encouraging project delivery against ensuring environmental sustainability where it comes to offshore wind development.[51]

The input of planning policy on renewable energy development

Having charted the evolution of planning policy for solar power, onshore wind and offshore wind developments since 2010, we now examine the impact that planning policy has had on the development of those technologies.

Chart 2.1 below shows the significant expansion of renewable energy capacity that has unfolded across the UK in the last twenty years, from about 3.5GW installed capacity in 2003 to almost 50GW by 2021, with 80% of that capacity coming from wind power, onshore and offshore, and solar power – and the remainder from hydropower and bioenergy.[52]

While the overall upward trajectory is clear, Charts 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below show the rather more turbulent patterns of development per year for the main three renewable energy technologies in England. This raises the question of to what extent the planning system is responsible for said patterns.

Solar power

For solar power, the significant fluctuations in annual deployment levels, illustrated in Chart 2.2 below, are best explained by economics.[53]

The higher unit cost of power from solar power at the start of the twenty-first century meant that deployment was minimal until market support was provided, in the form of Feed-in-Tariffs (FITs), in 2010, which guaranteed payments at a tariff determined by the government for the energy that solar projects produced.

However, governments have struggled to set FITs at levels that were sufficient to stimulate consistent and sustainable levels of investment. This has precipitated boom-bust investment patterns, with investment nose-diving in 2016, as illustrated in Chart 2.2 above; the year that most FITs for solar power were cut to minimal levels.

Since 2019, however, the continually falling costs of solar development and rising power prices have made more projects investable. Some segments of the market – most notably rooftop solar schemes – have even become subsidy free. Larger, field-scale solar projects have also been assisted by inclusion within the government’s Contracts for Difference (CfD) support programme: CfDs offer stable prices for projects for a set time period, and developers bid for CfDs for their projects in auction ‘Rounds.’ In the CfD Round completed in 2023 (Round 5), solar power generation projects were awarded CfDs at power prices of £47.00/MWh,[54] which is below the long-term average price for gas generation of £50/MWh,[55] even disregarding price shocks arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Almost 4GW of new solar capacity was granted planning consent in the UK in 2022. Moreover, reports suggests that the pipeline of prospective solar projects has dramatically increased in scale, estimated at 37GW of capacity in early 2022,[56] and reaching 85GW by July 2023;[57] a 130% increase over only a year and a half.

Any effects exerted by the planning system on solar power development rates looks thereby secondary to the influence of economics. PDRs mean that small-scale solar schemes, as explained earlier, are currently not very restricted by planning regulation. For schemes requiring local planning consent, the proportion of schemes being granted planning consent has exceeded 80% for the period since 2017.[58] One should be careful, however, in interpreting consent rates in relation to the efficacy of planning: consent rates may depend on the number of planning applications, quality of schemes and the availability of acceptable, low-impact sites. Moreover, they do not always factor in subsequent consent at appeal. Nevertheless, one could reasonably judge that, to date, planning policy has been predominantly supportive of solar power development.

Prior to 2022, relatively few solar power developments have been of sufficient scale to require consent via the NSIP route, though this is set to change in the future, as larger, ‘utility-scale’ solar farm schemes exceeding 50MW come forward in increasing number. This interest in larger schemes has been stimulated by helpful policy and a positive economic context, as explicated further in Chapter Three. 

Offshore wind

As Chart 2.3 below shows, offshore wind has seen a strong upward trajectory of growth.[59]

This growth has been, again, propelled by economics. Offshore wind has been the major beneficiary of the Government’s CfD market support programme, which has helped to stabilise revenue and incentivise major commercial investment. Support for research and development and the adoption of larger, more efficient turbines, assembled in bigger projects, has helped push down the price of power from offshore wind to as low as £37.35/MWh (CfD Round 4).

Initially, the latest CfD Round (Round 5) did not take into account the rapid increases in the production cost of wind turbines due to recent interest rate increases. Instead, it retained the same price as the previous allocation round, making bidding for any new offshore windfarm contracts less commercially viable. Following pressure from Bright Blue, the Government announced an increase in the maximum Contract for Difference (CfD) maximum strike price for offshore wind projects by 66%.[60]

As of June 2023, the total pipeline for offshore wind energy projects for UK waters – which includes projects at every stage of development: operational, under construction, consented and planned – had reached 100GW.[61] Of this, 6.8GW is under construction and 7.3GW is preparing for construction. With those construction projects complete, installed capacity for offshore wind is set to double from 2023 levels to about 28GW, as visible in Chart 2.3, by the end of the decade.

For much of the post-2010 period, planning policy for offshore wind has been supportive. Very few offshore wind farms have been ultimately refused consent; of the ones that have, in many cases the decision was later overturned. Projects that failed tended to be close to shore and highly visible from protected and valued coastal landscapes, where public objections have been a major factor. It is difficult to determine the exact proportion of projects that have been refused consent, but, overall, they have been a minority. As schemes increasingly focus on marine areas further offshore, so the level of public opposition tends to fall. Given the scale of the prospective development pipeline, and looking at planning outcomes, it is hard to claim that the planning framework has deterred investment interest in offshore wind development.

If planning outcomes are ultimately mostly positive, there has nevertheless been growing industry disquiet at the gradually lengthening time taken to make decisions on offshore wind applications.[62] Various factors are at work here. According to Chris Skidmore MP’s Net Zero Review, planning authorities and environmental regulators – such as Natural England – are under-staffed, especially relative to the massive increase in applications and therefore in workload.[63] Sector growth has also increased the requirements for more and larger onshore grid connections, each raising their own environmental concerns and, in some instances, public resistance. This prompted reforms to the hitherto prevailing infrastructural model whereby each offshore wind scheme develops its own individual connection to the nearest point of the grid network. This is set to be superseded by a more strategic approach to offshore wind, which relies on coordinating onshore connections to the grid between different electricity generation schemes.

Another factor delaying consenting for offshore wind developments has been the need to address the impacts on biodiversity. Problems have arisen because the UK has significant, internationally-important nature conservation interests, such as birds, cetaceans and basking sharks, in its marine environment. Those species can be placed at risk by offshore wind development, both at the construction stage and when fully operational. At the same time, how species utilise the marine environment is often poorly understood – especially as we move further offshore. This has meant that a growing number of offshore wind applications have reached an advanced stage of the consenting process, only to find that further survey and analytical work is required to fully assess the likely biodiversity impacts and the efficacy of any mitigation measures.[64]

Onshore wind

 Finally, for onshore wind, the effects of planning policy seem to be more pronounced. Policy changes from 2012 onwards, such as the removal of supportive, wind-specific planning policy and the reinforcement of grounds for application refusal, saw fewer UK onshore wind farm application consents in 2013 and 2014 compared to the 2012 peak, as shown in Chart 2.4 below.[65]

The 2015 policy changes to the NPPF – the requirements for projects to be in a spatial zone, to fully address impacts and to attain community backing, the so-called triple veto – all prioritised local control over delivery and the effect was the evaporation of new onshore wind energy development in England. From 2016 to 2022, only 14 applications for onshore wind projects were submitted. Only 12 of those were subsequently approved, totalling a mere 21 turbines, with a combined installed capacity of 48MW – a figure just 2.85% of the level of capacity granted consent in the period between 2009 and 2014, which was 1624MW.[66]

Moreover, only about 10% of English LPAs have instituted preferred development areas for onshore wind in their LDPs: a pre-requisite for onshore wind development of any scale to be approved.[67]

Onshore wind development was also affected by the ending of ROC (Renewable Obligation Certificate) support in 2016. Under this scheme, electricity suppliers were under an obligation to meet a growing percentage of their supply from renewable sources, enabling renewable energy generators to sell certificates to these suppliers, creating additional income to the revenue they received from selling electricity.  Onshore wind was also then also almost entirely excluded from the first three rounds of CfD support.

However, falling costs for onshore wind, and its admission to the CfD system in December 2021, have shown the diminishing significance of financial constraints in shaping the prospects of future onshore wind development, while throwing the effects of planning into sharper relief. In the fourth CfD round, onshore wind projects were secured with a strike price of £42.47/MWh but, while 0.9GW of capacity was awarded in Scotland with a further 0.6GW on the Scottish islands, no projects were awarded in England.

Conclusion

This chapter has established the key ways that the planning system affects the main renewable energy technologies in England and examined the impact of planning policy and guidance relative to the other factors influencing development rates. Looking back, it is clear that economic circumstances have often been the most significant barrier to greater levels of renewable energy development – especially for solar and offshore wind development. Furthermore, constraints in grid connection and capacity have now emerged as a yet further leading barrier.[68]

However, planning constraints remain relevant, and the effects of planning also vary between technologies. Post-2015 planning policies for onshore wind have clearly all but curtailed development, but by political design rather than by accident. For solar power and offshore wind, planning processes have been facilitative, but the picture is continually evolving. Especially as economic circumstances make renewable energy increasingly affordable, economics will diminish as a factor in hindering the development of renewable energy infrastructure, and planning policies may become a more significant barrier.

The next chapter outlines and examines the current Conservative Government’s proposals for future legislative and policy change for planning in respect of the three key renewable energy technologies we are focused on.

Chapter Three: Ongoing or proposed changes to planning policies for renewable energy

Having established the nature and effects of planning policy on renewable energy technologies in England since 2010, we now turn to examine the leading ongoing proposed policy changes to planning policy and guidance for the three key renewable energy technologies, which have been adopted by the current Conservative Government. The chapter first describes the ongoing or proposed changes to planning policy and guidance for each of the three key renewable energy technologies and concludes by evaluating them.

Solar power

The current UK Government is preparing a raft of measures designed to encourage the expansion of solar power. At the strategic level, the Government recently affirmed a target of deploying 70GW of installed capacity across the UK by 2035, is establishing a taskforce to achieve this goal and will publish a roadmap to drive forward the necessary actions in 2024.[69]

Changes to planning policy are one component of these measures to boost solar power capacity. The Government has again clarified the acceptability of solar power developments on low- and medium-grade agricultural land, as described in Chapter Two, and offered a positive view on the potential complementarities between solar power and farming as “[supportive of] each other financially, environmentally and through shared use of land”.[70] For projects over 50MW, a positive stance has also been adopted in the March 2023 revision to the National Policy Statement for Renewable Energy (EN-3) by underlining the need for solar power.[71]

The major substantive changes to planning policy have been to PDRs to facilitate the development of solar power, including larger solar projects, in a wider range of contexts. The Government has recently consulted on proposed extensions to PDRs for solar PV to include: buildings with flat roofs; increased scope for standalone solar PV within the curtilage of homes;[72] removing capacity limits for solar PV on non-domestic buildings to replace the current PDRs which only apply up to 1MW;[73] and creating new PDRs to enable the construction of solar canopies on non-domestic car parks, for example at supermarkets and retail parks.[74] 

Offshore Wind

Offshore wind has been placed centre stage in the current UK Government’s vision of a decarbonised energy system. The 2022 British Energy Security Strategy raised ambitions for installed offshore wind capacity from 40GW to 50GW by 2030, including up to 5GW of floating offshore wind.[75] This exacting time frame and mounting concerns from the energy industry about slowing project delivery,[76] as discussed in the previous chapter, have prompted a raft of government proposals on planning policy concerning offshore wind.

The Levelling Up and Regeneration Act 2023 includes powers to amend the Planning Act 2008 to empower the relevant Secretary of State to set a shorter timeframe for one of the main decision-making stages for NSIP projects – the public examination – than the normal six months.  As noted in Chapter Two, almost all offshore wind projects are consented as NSIPs under the Planning Act 2008 procedures. The Bill will also allow any government agencies with vital technical expertise[77] to charge developers for their services in the aforementioned NSIP process, which may be used to fund extra staff capacity, thus reducing staffing constraints in the handling of offshore wind projects.[78]

Revisions to the NPS for Renewable Energy (EN-3), published in March 2023, instituted a new ‘Critical National Priority’ presumption for offshore wind, meaning that “subject to any legal requirements, the urgent need for offshore wind to achieving our energy objectives, together with any national security, economic, commercial and net zero benefits, will in general outweigh any other residual impacts not capable of being addressed by application of the mitigation hierarchy”.[79] The definition of ’Critical National Priority infrastructure‘ includes supporting onshore and offshore network infrastructure and related network reinforcements. The intention there is to tip the planning balance in favour of development delivery.

The current Government has also sought to re-engineer the way that marine biodiversity impacts are addressed in offshore wind consenting processes, for which a key component is the Offshore Wind Environmental Improvement Package (OWEIP). This is designed to “help to reduce offshore wind consenting time from up to four years to one year, whilst ensuring we continue to meet our environmental commitments”.[80] The OWEIP is being taken forward in the Energy Act 2023. The Act received royal assent in October 2023 and makes provision to, among other things, allow developers to collaborate in developing biodiversity impact compensation schemes rather than being required to develop their own measures, reducing the time burden on the developer and, potentially, delivering greater ecological benefits. Moreover, the Bill sets up a marine recovery fund that developers can pay into to help deliver these schemes.

Other reforms in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act, such as supplanting the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) detailed in the previous chapter with Environmental Outcome Reports, are also aimed at streamlining the planning application process. Environmental Outcome Reports are designed to make assessment simpler, by focusing assessment solely on the government’s environmental priorities.

It is clear that considerable policy effort is going into the development and systematisation of compensatory measures for renewable energy infrastructure, justified by the Government in large part in relation to smoothing the path for development. Much less attention has been given, however, to measures that might help the most sensitive biodiversity areas be avoided. Major conservation organisations have expressed concerns that England’s marine spatial plans – non-statutory guidance concerning the management of the UK’s marine environment – have lacked the required level of spatial specificity to identify the least environmentally-sensitive areas for marine renewables development. Data on marine biodiversity is inadequate and has struggled to keep up with the effects of climate change or avian influenza or growing knowledge of the impact of offshore wind on bird populations.[81] These inadequacies result in decisions about how best to avoid and mitigate impacts being delegated to individual projects, at which point development sites have already been chosen and fewer options for ameliorating harms are available.[82]

Offshore wind has also been one of the major beneficiaries of wider, non-planning policy changes. The Government has moved to increase the frequency of CfD auction rounds from every two years to holding them annually.[83] It also recently increased the maximum Contract for Difference (CfD) strike price for offshore wind projects by 66% from the previously-set level, a policy that Bright Blue has called for.[84] Such steps are designed to accelerate the deployment of low-carbon electricity generation, and the former also means that, where planning application processes take more time than expected, such that the developer misses a CfD window, the waiting time to the next opportunity is reduced.[85]

Onshore wind

Recent Government planning policy proposals for onshore wind have been tepid in comparison to the outlined proposals for solar power and offshore wind. There have been some positive developments in the last couple of years, such as allowing onshore wind back onto the government’s CfD support programme in 2021, but those have been of limited effect, and more support for onshore wind is still required. As can be seen in Chart 2.4 earlier, additions to installed onshore wind capacity in England have remained at a very low level even in the most recent years.

Late last year,[86] the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) consulted on revisions to the NPPF, including adjustments to planning policies for renewable energy technologies. The consultation proposed more supportive policies for the repowering of existing onshore windfarms, advising LPAs to “approve an application for the repowering and life-extension of existing renewables sites, where its impacts are or can be made acceptable. The impacts of repowered and life-extended sites should be considered for the purposes of this policy from the baseline existing on the site”.[87]

This proposed adjustment to the NPPF was welcomed by the renewable energy sector.[88] Repowering enables older wind farms to be re-equipped with newer, higher-capacity turbines.

Nonetheless, the effect of this policy adjustment to the NPPF on total installed capacity of onshore wind is likely to be modest. Some estimates suggest repowering could deliver more than 1GW of additional capacity in England,[89] which would be a 30% increase on the 3GW currently installed, as visible in Chart 2.4 above, but this is probably optimistic.[90] While there is good reason to believe that the repowering of existing onshore wind power sites would be subject to less local resistance than the development of new ones, that may not be the case in all locations.[91] On some sites, using fewer, larger turbines may be considered a visual improvement, while in others it may, conversely, be considered more visually intrusive.

Beyond repowering, planning policy for new onshore wind proposals remains largely unchanged by the current Government in most important respects, despite some recent announcements from this Government that relax planning restrictions on onshore wind.[92] This is despite widespread criticism, including from Bright Blue.[93] Applications for onshore wind development are still required to be for an area identified in LPPs or a supplementary planning document as suitable for wind energy development, without mandating that LPAs identify such areas, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. The requirement for addressing impacts has only changed to requiring impacts identified by the local community to be “appropriately addressed,” rather than “fully addressed,” which still opens anything short of a full address open to a legal challenge, insofar as one can consider a full address the only appropriate address. Finally, the previous requirement for local community “backing” has now shifted to a requirement to demonstrate community “support.”

Placing these three tests together, the ‘triple veto’ planning policy – the requirements for zoning, appropriately addressed impacts and community support, as described in the last chapter – maintains a de facto ban on onshore wind energy development in England. Until recently, it was near impossible to define the community support requirement in a consensual and coherent way that enables it to be met.[94] A ministerial statement claims that, since Autumn of 2023, non-statutory planning guidance seeks to “provide clarity on how policy [including regarding community support] should be applied in practice,” but it remains unclear how effectively said guidance will address this issue.[95] Unsurprisingly, therefore, onshore wind remains the only major renewable energy technology to still lack an official UK government target. The result of this is the effective curtailment of a proven and low-cost source of low-carbon renewable energy, adding to energy prices.

Any attempt to restart the expansion of onshore wind in England with smaller or medium-sized turbines that might better fit the English landscape also faces the problem that eight years of restrictive planning policy has largely dissipated the supply chain of smaller turbines. It would require secure prospects of growth to return, as well as a stable, supportive planning policy framework.

That said, in May 2023, the new Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) initiated a consultation on measures to improve community engagement and community benefits for onshore wind development.[96] The intervention could be depicted as ‘back to the future,’ insofar as the proposals were all in policy circulation a decade before. The proposed measures include: promoting early engagement between developers and local communities; using feedback to improve projects, including through the use of digital and online approaches to involve communities; and tailoring the system of community benefits – such as reducing the electricity bills of households in communities host to onshore wind developments – to particular community needs.

Extensive research suggests that these actions to facilitate community engagement and benefits would be likely to have a positive effect on the local acceptability of wind farm proposals and reduce opposition.[97] However, this effect has its limits. High-quality community engagement cannot insulate all onshore wind farm proposals from the possibility of significant resistance.[98] Not everyone will regard the negative landscape impacts of onshore wind as something that can be adequately substituted by any benefits offered to them or their community.

Whatever the merits of these recent proposals from the current Conservative Government, they remain moot for as long as onshore wind energy remains subject to the trio of planning tests that, together, deter almost all project developers.

Analysis of planning policies concerning renewable energy technologies

The last two years have seen an unprecedented level of new statutory planning policy and non-statutory guidance to support the development of renewable energy provision. Whether these policies are sufficient, and how helpful they are likely to be, depends on the type of renewable energy technology involved.

In truth, what the analysis shows is an inconsistent and asymmetric approach to the deployment of planning in relation to different renewable energy technologies.

First, on inconsistency. For onshore wind, the overwhelming emphasis from government is on the so-called ‘localist’ approach, which maintains significant veto powers for local communities. Meanwhile, for solar power and especially offshore wind, the emphasis from government is more firmly on delivery, with much attention being given to accelerating project consenting process. Such inconsistent treatment pays too little heed to the requirement for significant increases in investment across all three technologies.

Indeed, both approaches have risks. With onshore wind, the localist approach imposes such heavy risks on developers that it stymies most new projects. With solar power and offshore wind, on the other hand, the concern is that most measures seek to de-risk and accelerate development by rolling back planning controls or smoothing environmental assessment and impact mitigation requirements. This results in a degree of moral hazard. One reason why projects may be delayed is that they, due to their siting, design or scale, risk creating significant impacts that require careful consideration.[106] By reforming planning policy in ways that squeeze out delay, disincentives to making risky choices are removed. Moreover, the need to learn and develop better solutions to avoid future risks and delays is also diminished.

One area where this is evident is social acceptability. Polling may show strong levels of public support for energy decarbonisation and renewable energy technologies,[107] but it cannot be inferred from such evidence that the public will necessarily always accept specific projects, or that public resistance to specific renewable energy projects will not foment more significant dissent affecting wider decarbonisation policies; especially where public perceive that their influence over decision-making processes is diminished.

However, the present, inconsistent planning arrangements around renewable energy technologies leave community engagement either marginalised by the relentless pursuit of swift project consenting – as in some offshore wind and solar power developments – or exercising effective veto powers over major developments – as in onshore wind developments.

There is little sign that this undesirable binary pattern of policy development is disappearing. The Sunak Government has stated that, “[g]iven the scale and speed of low-carbon infrastructure development needed, we expect that more planning reform will be required”,[108] indicating a doubling-down on measures to accelerate consenting process.

In Chapter Four we propose ways to reform planning statutory policy and non-statutory guidance to help keep the UK on track for net zero by 2050.

Chapter 4: Policy Recommendations

So far, this report has concluded that the role of planning policy in renewable energy development in England often lies on a binary spectrum. With two key technologies, namely solar power and offshore wind, planning is often framed only as a problem to be got rid off, without considerations of whether this facilitates the best possible route to net zero. But in the context of onshore wind, planning has been deliberately used to construct a ’triple veto’ test for projects that is all but unassailable. This inconsistent reasoning can obscure the need to learn and develop policies that achieve an effective and durable balance between delivery, public engagement and environmental sustainability regardless of the technology involved.

The planning policy recommendations offered in this report seek to go beyond this binary, place the role of planning on a durable footing and, by doing so, contribute to the sustained growth on renewable energy generation capacity that net zero requires.

The policy recommendations in this chapter flow from the following principles:

1. The UK needs to pursue the best net zero energy transition, not simply the quickest. Decision speed alone is an inadequate way of judging the performance of the planning system, and this is equally true in the energy sector. There is a legitimate role for planning in ensuring that our future energy systems are comprised of high-quality projects and that potentially harmful schemes are rigorously assessed. Many facets of creating new, decarbonised energy systems create profound challenges for places and people, such as in the case of expanding large-scale wind or solar in rural landscapes. Given this, there needs to be caution in pursuing ever-faster planning permission consenting times.
2. Planning processes need to strike an effective compromise between development delivery, community engagement and protecting the environment. We require all these qualities of our future energy systems, and planning is a key mechanism for delivering all three of them. Recognising this is not inimical to effective delivery. History provides numerous instances of where the excessively gung-ho promotion of development at the expense of community engagement or environmental protection generates a backlash that leads to policy retrenchment and delays to development in the long run.[113]
3. The role of planning in energy decarbonisation varies depending on the decarbonisation pathways pursued, including the technologies prioritised and the balance between technical and behavioural solutions. Pathways that major on very large, centralised facilities, such as offshore wind or major field-scale solar, create a very different planning challenge to pathways that give greater scope to energy efficiency and demand management or smaller-scale decentralised energy production. The latter pathways, for instance, entail important roles for planning in shifting patterns of household energy consumption, integrating local energy systems and supporting behavioural change in areas like travel.
4. The role of planning should not be viewed in isolation, but as interconnected with other public policy instruments. Some problems that become visible in the course of project planning processes more accurately have their cause in other parts of the policy landscape. Market support arrangements, financing, grid network investment, supply chains and a host of other factors impact on the trajectories of energy development and may be more important foci for remedial policy action. Similarly, the types of energy projects encouraged by other policies – their scale, form, patterns of ownership, the distribution of costs and benefits and their social acceptability – can exacerbate problems that planning processes need to address, but where planning is not their cause. Blaming planning and seeking planning reform may be a poor substitute for policy action better directed elsewhere.

Our recommendations begin with onshore wind, as this presents the thorniest challenges for planning policy, but the recommendations also have relevance to other renewable energy technologies. The recommendations then address measures for solar power and offshore wind, before ending with a set of cross-cutting suggestions.

Increasing onshore wind

Recommendation one: Abolish the ‘triple veto’ planning policy for onshore wind from the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF).

With onshore wind, there is an urgent need to convert the ongoing ‘bust’ in development rates to sustained patterns of growth. As noted in Chapter Three, there is considerable support for abolishing the current triple veto planning policy requirements in the NPPF;[114] that is, the requirement that proposals be located in a pre-identified zone, that impacts are appropriately addressed, and that proposals demonstrate community support. The analysis supports the abolition of the triple veto.

That said, it is important to learn about the factors behind the social disquiet that precipitated the triple veto policy. Removing the triple lock is often justified by combining appeals to the urgency of delivering a net zero energy system with data from polling showing that onshore wind enjoys a high level of public support.[115] However, polling rarely captures those concerns about location, impacts on place, and sense of fairness that shape public responses to individual applications.[116] Moreover, the wind industry has changed since 2015. Larger turbines are now the industry standard, lowering costs but risking greater visual intrusion.

Rather than simply abolishing the triple veto and doing nothing else, planning policy for onshore wind should also be refined in line with the recommendations below.

Recommendation two: Adjust the NPPF to positively encourage Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to plan for onshore wind.

The NPPF should be adjusted to firmly encourage LPAs to plan proactively for onshore wind, particularly by the identification of preferable areas for locating wind farms.

The wording of this policy needs to strike a careful balance. It should not, as per the present NPPF, mandate that onshore wind can only be developed in areas identified as suitable in Local Development Plans (LDPs) and supplementary planning policies, as – at present, and likely also into the medium term – only a small proportion of LPAs have the time or resources to undertake the requisite analytical work and consultation to construct fully effective policies.

Instead, policy should be worded to institute a presumption in favour of developing onshore wind in areas identified as potentially suitable in LDPs and supplementary planning policies, without making it an inviolable requirement. This would give effect to local appetite to exercise spatial steering over this development, without creating a new impenetrable hurdle for applications outside identified areas. Broadly speaking, this is the style of planning approach that has prevailed in Scotland since the late 1990s, where it has proven no bar to suitable onshore wind expansion.[117]

For a proportion of LPAs, the simple removal of the triple lock veto policy from the NPPF would give them sufficient incentive to engage in thinking about spatial zoning, as the prospect of new onshore wind developments would become real. Although only 10% of English LPAs to date have engaged in the mapping and identification of suitable areas for onshore wind, despite little incentive to do this, 39% of all were planning to do so.[118] Early adopters include LPAs with a large land area and significant wind resource, such as Cornwall.[119]

Recommendation three: Amend the NPPF to adopt a presumption in favour of onshore wind development within all industrial and commercial sites, as well as promote the development of onshore wind at all sites with sufficient grid capacity for large-scale low-carbon energy development.

Chapter One discussed the significant uplift in onshore wind capacity required to support the delivery of net zero. This will place continued pressure on the identification of sufficient, suitable sites for offshore wind development.

However, currently, the NPPF is scant in its coverage of onshore wind. It receives none of the copious guidance attached to major projects for other energy infrastructures in the National Policy Statements. There is unexploited potential here for planning policy to assist in guiding the process of identifying acceptable sites, without stifling creativity and flexibility by developers or local authorities.

To this end, as well as pushing positive planning action by LPAs, the NPPF needs also to facilitate the development of onshore wind in key economically and environmentally advantageous locations.

Two sets of locations warrant supportive planning policy.

First, policy should adopt a positive stance towards onshore wind development within industrial and commercial sites, a measure that would reduce the barriers for business seeking to adopt on-site wind generation.[122] This would go a long way to improving the competitiveness of the businesses there, giving them access to cheap energy and so reducing their operating costs. The NPPF should adopt a presumption in favour of all onshore wind developments at such sites.

Second, England has a relatively limited number of locations where there is sufficient grid capacity for large-scale low-carbon energy development. These locations should be identified as strategic energy development sites in LDPs, with policies that ensure that such sites are protected from other land uses that might compromise their use for energy development.

Recommendation four: Create an Onshore Wind Acceleration Taskforce.

Taskforces have widely deployed in the UK to drive forward the development of key energy technologies and inform ministers of prospective policy development by harnessing the expertise of key stakeholders from the private sector, regulators and government. This is already the case with the Offshore Wind and Floating Wind Acceleration Taskforces. It should also be the case for onshore wind.

It is important that such a taskforce has a remit that goes beyond the acceleration of consenting times and generation capacity increases. The goal needs to be the delivery of onshore wind expansion over the long term, striking an acceptable balance with community engagement and environmental sustainability, rather than just short-term decision-making speed. To that end, and onshore wind taskforce should embrace also: close monitoring of public responses to the projects coming forward, within and beyond the planning process; the delivery of community ownership of onshore wind and community benefits coming from onshore wind development; and close monitoring of areas of environmental impact.

Increasing solar power

Recommendation five: Use the Solar Taskforce to collate evidence on planning outcomes from Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) that already issue non-statutory guidance on acceptable greenfield locations for solar PV.

To date, the UK has achieved a very significant development pipeline of solar PV, with less social disquiet or environmental concern than has afflicted onshore wind. However, most pathways for a net zero energy system entail further, very significant expansion of solar power, as outlined in Chapter One. Evidence to date suggests that it is unlikely that sufficient capacity could be realised through incorporating solar power into the built environment, meaning an ongoing requirement for considerable greenfield investment.

To address this, the Solar Taskforce was established earlier this year. The taskforce will run up to February 2024, and its key objectives are: to assist in the development of a roadmap for solar power setting out a clear step-by-step deployment trajectory up to 2034; to identify and drive forward processes and measures to unlock deployment; and to put in place structures to facilitate cost reduction and sustainable investment.[123]

National Grid future scenarios suggest 41GW of solar capacity could be required on existing buildings by 2050. CPRE, the Countryside Charity, make a similar estimate, suggesting that the space available on new buildings, existing large warehouse rooftops, car parks and other existing buildings could provide at least 40GW of installed capacity by 2035.[124] As such, it is likely that greenfield development will need to be a major component of the around 90GW of solar capacity that key scenarios suggest is needed, as aforementioned in Chapter One. Given this, it is vital that – rather than waiting for social and environmental concerns to mount – we get ahead of the curve by collating evidence for effective planning policies to guide the development of ground-mounted, field-scale solar PV projects in a proven, politically viable manner. This task could be given to the Solar Taskforce, and the Taskforce could run for longer to achieve this.

Such efforts should be directed towards the LPAs that are already using their development plans to issue non-statutory guidance on acceptable locations for solar PV and can provide insights on installation rates, environmental impact and societal engagement and community benefit. Evidence-gathering efforts should also monitor applications concerning the application of guidance on the avoidance of the best and most versatile agricultural land, as discussed earlier in this report.

Increasing offshore wind

Recommendation six: Use the Marine Management Organisation to draw up marine spatial plans for English offshore waters that demarcate more closely those areas likely to be the most acceptable for offshore wind, gas and oil development and those which are more sensitive and should be avoided.

Government has given considerable attention to accelerating the development of offshore wind, including measures to mitigate the potential impacts on marine biodiversity, as demonstrated in Chapter Three. But there is one element that is seriously underdeveloped: the use of proactive spatial planning to help steer offshore wind and other marine energy development away from the most environmentally sensitive areas. Taking this step would also support the swift handling of development application consents, insofar as the riskiest areas will have been avoided. Indeed, this step could also provide a spatial framework for identifying strategic grid connection options. Such plans might also identify areas and options for investment in strategic compensation schemes, designed to help offset the biodiversity impacts of offshore energy development, as described earlier in this report.

Such a step should not be problematic. It has been widely called for by government inquiries.[125] Scotland already has spatial plans that allocate land for marine renewables.[126] The task should be given to the Marine Management Organisation NDPB, since its powers already enable it to engage in marine planning.

Cross-cutting recommendations

Recommendation seven: Enable LPAs that seek to encourage more renewable energy development through proactive spatial zoning to access a pot of central government resources.

There is a need to adequately resource planners and other environmental regulators in order to ensure that the operation of planning processes for renewable energy investment is not needlessly delayed.[127] Important measures to address this are being undertaken. For example, measures are coming forward through the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act 2023 to enable statutory environmental regulators to charge for their services in handling NSIPs. However, ways also need to be found to channel more resources to LPAs, many of which may be looking to handle large numbers of lower-scale applications.

This should not be excessively costly – according to the Royal Town Planning Institute, in 2020/21, net expenditure by planning authorities was just £480 million,[128] which is only around 0.4% of the total expenditure by English local authorities.[129]

One mechanism to achieve better resourcing of LPAs should be to enable those LPAs that seek to encourage more renewable energy development through proactive spatial zoning to access a pot of public resources. In order to avoid a time-costly bidding process, resources from said pot could be accessed by LPAs automatically if they fulfil certain criteria surrounding the promotion of renewable energy. Those resources could be an extension of the existing Planning Skills Delivery Fund – a £24 million grant from the DLUHC to help local authorities with the implementation of the reforms in the 2023 Levelling Up and Regeneration Act.[130] Such resourcing could prioritise those LPAs with significant potential for renewable energy generation and which have considerable need and desire to coordinate the exploitation of this capacity.

In the 2023 Autumn Statement, the Government already committed a modest £5 million of extra funding for the Planning Skills Delivery Fund to target planning application backlogs,[131] therefore there already exists a precedent for more targeted extensions to the Fund, but, ideally, central government subsidy of LPAs should be more extensive.

Recommendation eight: Deliver a precise Land Use Framework for England to provide a useful knowledge base for LPAs.

The DLUHC should commission or deliver and administer a precise Land Use Framework for England. Such a Framework should highlight the land use demands of different activities, such as food production, carbon absorption and energy, how they might be affected by climate change and enable future conflicts between land demands to be resolved.[132] Such a framework should include the spatial demands of renewable energy development scenarios, especially for onshore wind and field-scale solar PV as compared to for agriculture, in order to provide a useful knowledge base for planning authorities.

A Land Use Framework is already set to be published by the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) before the end of this year, however, its scope is set to be limited. What is important is that such a new Land Use Framework provides sufficient geographical information to underpin effective, informed policy-making around some of the key trade-offs, such as between building- and ground-mounted solar PV, or between solar power and agriculture – something that the upcoming Land Use Framework is not set to do. In so doing, the Land Use Framework should provide an arena for the identification of planning policies that provide an effective, durable balance between these land use goals and reduce the risk of potentially disruptive policy disputes. A Land Use Framework for England would also provide a broader context for LPAs engaged in proactive spatial planning for solar power and onshore wind, as the LPAs would be able to prioritise the developments that they are best-suited to deliver within a national context. For example, a local authority in an area that is relatively sunnier in comparison to the rest of England may be particularly well suited to solar power developments.

 Recommendation nine: Institute a minimum level of community benefits at £5,000 per MW per year by making it a requirement of Contract for Difference (CfD) applications for renewable energy developments.

One of the challenges in promoting the use of community benefits in conjunction with renewable energy developments is how one can move beyond voluntary community provisions by developers and towards institutionalising community benefits as a firmer requirement of development consent.[133] The current use of community benefits in facilitating the release of planning consent is problematic, as explored in Chapter Three. An alternative mechanism would be to attach the requirement for community benefits to contracts between prospective developers and public bodies, where those bodies control key aspects of the development process, such as land or market support.

The provision of community benefits should be tied to the creation of CfDs for major new renewable energy projects. [134] Government is already exploring the scope for including non-price factors into the CfD scheme, such as around skills development.[135] Instituting a minimum level of community benefits through CfD rounds would avoid downward competition between developers on the level of community benefits without stifling creativity on how such benefits are structured or deployed. Such a measure should prevent communities from losing out from any wider downward pressure on prices. The minimum level of community benefits could be set at £5000/MWh for onshore wind, and more for more profitable technologies, such as large-scale solar PV or offshore wind.

Conclusion

We need to ensure planning policy is consistent, strategic and popular to facilitate an increase in the generation capacity of the three main renewable energy technologies in England: solar, onshore wind and offshore wind. This is crucial to delivering a net zero energy system.

The policy recommendations given here are not exhaustive. However, they are built on careful analysis of what works, drawn from several decades of practical experience in planning for renewables across the UK, and reflect the importance of the four key principles outlined at the start of this chapter.

The scale of the challenges involved in creating low-carbon energy systems to power our neighbourhoods puts a premium on our capacity to develop effective planning policies that still manage to command widespread political support. The recommendations presented here seek to do just that.

Author

Richard Cowell is the Professor of Environmental Policy and Planning as well as the Director of Research and Innovation at the University of Cardiff. His work has been published widely in international journals across the planning, energy and environmental policy fields. He has also produced a number of books, most recently The Routledge Companion to Environmental Planning.

Greater and greener development

This report is part of Bright Blue’s project to create and argue for a programme of reforms to the English planning system, which reconciles two key sometimes conflicting objectives in housing and infrastructure policy: the socioeconomic (such as more and affordable homes for young people, and more secure and affordable energy) and the environmental (such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving biodiversity). Ultimately, we want to present sensible solutions to the politically contentious planning system to enable both greater and greener development.

Bright Blue has commissioned independent experts to provide original analysis and policy recommendations in three key areas.

The first paper, published earlier this year, examined how to secure more homes, ready for net zero.[1] This paper considered how the English planning system can encourage more housing development which helps to achieve net zero by 2050, including both improvements to the construction process and ensuring that all homes are energy efficient and utilise latest technologies to integrate them with the aims of the Government’s Net Zero Strategy.

Second, this paper on building resilient neighbourhoods, powered by low-carbon energy. This paper considers how the English planning system can incentivise the construction, maintenance and expansion of low-carbon energy infrastructure, especially onshore wind, going beyond the recommendations outlined in the Net Zero Strategy.

Third, a paper on building resilient neighbourhoods, prepared for climate risks. This paper will consider how the English planning system can support development which accounts for the increasing amount of adverse weather events, reducing the risk of and impacts from coastal and fluvial flooding in particular, going beyond the measures in the National Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy.

Acknowledgments

This report is part of Bright Blue’s project on greater and greener development, which is kindly supported by the European Climate Foundation. The ideas expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor.

Thanks are due to Sam Hall for his helpful feedback.

I am especially grateful to Bartek Staniszewski and Ryan Shorthouse for their edits and thoughtful comments during the progress of this report.

All remaining errors and all judgements are the author’s responsibility. The views in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Bright Blue.

Endnotes

[1] James Cullimore, “Greater and greener homes: more homes, ready for net zero”, https://www.brightblue.org.uk/portfolio/greater-and-greener-homes-more-home-ready-for-net-zero/ (2023).

[2] This is as opposed to a more broad understanding of power systems as all systems concerned with the transfer of energy, insofar as, strictly speaking, energy is the capacity for some force to be exerted, and power is the rate at which energy is transferred.

[3] Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, “2021 UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63e131dde90e07626846bdf9/greenhouse-gas-emissions-statistical-release-2021.pdf (2023).

[4] Climate Change Committee, “Sixth Carbon Budget”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/sixth-carbon-budget/ (2021).

[5] Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, “2021 UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, provisional figures”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62447a158fa8f527729bfab2/2021-provisional-emissions-statistics-report.pdf (2022), 9.

[6] HM Government, “British energy security strategy”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/british-energy-security-strategy/british-energy-security-strategy (2022), 6.

[7] See, for example, NGC ESO, “Future Energy Scenarios”, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/document/283101/download (2023).

[8] Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023), 76.

[9] Ibid., 8.

[10] Ibid., 12; 39.

[11] Centre for Sustainable Energy and TCPA, “Spatial planning for climate resilience and Net Zero”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/spatial-planning-for-climate-resilience-and-net-zero-cse-tcpa/ (2023), 18-22.

[12] Some consenting powers held by Westminster also apply in Wales, especially for larger projects in the marine environment.

[13] See, for example, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Powering Up Britain: Energy Security Plan”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/powering-up-britain/powering-up-britain-energy-security-plan (2023), 34; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “AR6 Synthesis Report”, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/ (2023).

[14] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES): electricity”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electricity-chapter-5-digest-of-united-kingdom-energy-statistics-dukes (2023), 5.6.

[15] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Contracts for Difference (CfD) Allocation Round 5: results”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contracts-for-difference-cfd-allocation-round-5-results (2023).

[16] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES): electricity”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electricity-chapter-5-digest-of-united-kingdom-energy-statistics-dukes (2023), 5.6; Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Contracts for Difference (CfD) Allocation Round 5: results”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contracts-for-difference-cfd-allocation-round-5-results (2023).

[17] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES): electricity”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electricity-chapter-5-digest-of-united-kingdom-energy-statistics-dukes (2023), 5.6; Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Contracts for Difference (CfD) Allocation Round 4: results”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contracts-for-difference-cfd-allocation-round-4-results (2022).

[18] NGC ESO, “Future Energy Scenarios”, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/document/283101/download (2023); Climate Change Committee, “Sixth Carbon Budget”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/sixth-carbon-budget/ (2021); Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Net Zero and the power sector scenarios”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1157220/annex-o-net-zero-power-sector-scenarios.pdf (2023).

[19] Philipp Diesing et al., “100% Renewable Energy for the United Kingdom”, https://100percentrenewableuk.org/wp-content/uploads/100-RE-23-Dec-.pdf (2023).

[20] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “List of tables in Standard load factors by region 2009 – 2022”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1187285/Regional_spreadsheets__2009-2022__-_Std_LFs.xls (2023); Philipp Diesing et al., “100% Renewable Energy for the United Kingdom”, https://100percentrenewableuk.org/wp-content/uploads/100-RE-23-Dec-.pdf (2023), 97.

[21] NGC ESO, “Future Energy Scenarios”, https://www.nationalgrideso.com/document/283101/download (2023), 163.

[22] International Renewable Energy Agency, “Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2022”, https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Aug/Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-2022 (2023).

[23] Tim Marshall and Richard Cowell, “Infrastructure, planning and the command of time”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2016), 1843-1866.

[24] Richard Cowell, “The role of place in energy transitions: Siting gas-fired power stations and the reproduction of high-carbon energy systems”, Geoforum (2020), 73-84.

[25] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “National Planning Policy Framework”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-planning-policy-framework–2 (2023).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Environmental Impact Assessment”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/environmental-impact-assessment (2020).

[29] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Community benefits for electricity transmission network infrastructure”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/community-benefits-for-electricity-transmission-network-infrastructure (2023).

[30] Tom Gill, “How Many People Have Solar Panels in the UK?”, https://www.theecoexperts.co.uk/solar-panels/popularity-of-solar-power (2023).

[31] Gareth Simkins, “Rooftop solar power installations double in a year”, https://solarenergyuk.org/news/rooftop-solar-power-installations-double-in-a-year/ (2023); see also Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “UK Solar Photovoltaics Deployment”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/solar-photovoltaics-deployment (2023).

[32] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Guidance: Renewable and low carbon energy”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/renewable-and-low-carbon-energy (2023).

[33] For example, BBC News, “Solar farms are a blight on the landscape, says minister”, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29679312 (2014); Shosha Adie, “Plans could see solar farms banned on over half of England’s farmland, according to reports”, https://www.endsreport.com/article/1801601/plans-solar-farms-banned-half-englands-farmland-according-reports (2022).

[34] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Guidance: Renewable and low carbon energy”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/renewable-and-low-carbon-energy (2023).

[35] National Grid, “Onshore vs offshore wind energy: what’s the difference?”, https://www.nationalgrid.com/stories/energy-explained/onshore-vs-offshore-wind-energy (2022).

[36] Statista, “Cumulative installed capacity of onshore wind in the United Kingdom (UK) from 2009 to 2022”, https://www.statista.com/statistics/792363/cumulative-onshore-wind-capacity-united-kingdom/ (2022).

[37] Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, “Planning Policy Statement 22: Renewable Energy”, https://www.inbalance-energy.co.uk/further_reading_books/planning_permission/planning_policy_statement_22_renewable_energy.pdf (2004).

[38] Ibid., para 1(ii).

[39] Richard Cowell and Carla Delaurentis, “Understanding the effects of spatial planning on the deployment of onshore wind power: insights from Italy and the UK”, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management (2021), 241-264.

[40] Department for Communities and Local Government, “Planning Practice Guidance for Renewable and Low Carbon Energy”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/planning-practice-guidance-for-renewable-energy  (2013); Eric Pickles “Written statement to Parliament: Local Planning and Onshore Wind”, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/local-planning-and-onshore-wind (2013).

[41] Conservative Party, “Strong Leadership. A Clear Economic Plan. A Brighter, More Secure Future”, https://www.theresavilliers.co.uk/sites/www.theresavilliers.co.uk/files/conservativemanifesto2015.pdf (2015), 57.

[42] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “National Planning Policy Framework”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-planning-policy-framework–2 (2023), 46.

[43] Ibid.

[44] See, for example, Graham Henry, “Welsh campaigners welcome ‘small step’ in wind farm battle”, https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/welsh-campaigners-welcome-small-step-2023334 (2012); Godfrey Bloom, “Fighting wind farms: A guide for campaigners”, https://windfarmaction.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/windfarmbookletfinal_ammended.pdf (2012).

[45] Renewable UK, “Community Benefits Protocol” https://www.renewableuk.com/page/CBP (2013).

[46] Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Community engagement and benefits from onshore wind development: Good practice guidance for England”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61b87e3b8fa8f50384489ccb/community-engagement-and-benefits-from-onshore-wind.pdf (2021).

[47] BBC, “How many more wind turbines will the UK build?”, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-60945298 (2022).

[48] Statista, “Cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind in the United Kingdom (UK) from 2009 to 2022”, https://www.statista.com/statistics/792374/cumulative-offshore-wind-capacity-united-kingdom/ (2022).

[49] Between 1MW and 100MW, consents are issued by the Marine Management Organization under Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989.

[50] Crown Estate, “Offshore Wind Leasing Round 4: Delivering a low carbon future”, https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/3921/guide-to-offshore-wind-leasing-round-4.pdf (2021).

[51] Craig Richards, “Delay to massive Ørsted offshore wind farm prompts call for UK planning reform”, https://www.endsreport.com/article/1813033/delay-massive-orsted-offshore-wind-farm-prompts-call-uk-planning-reform (2023).

[52] Note: in the graph above, onshore and offshore wind installed capacity are only measured separately from 2008 onwards.

[53] Note: in the graph above, onshore and offshore wind installed capacity are only measured separately from 2008 onwards.

[54] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Contracts for Difference (CfD) Allocation Round 5: results”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contracts-for-difference-cfd-allocation-round-5-results (2023).

[55] Climate Change Committee, “Sixth Carbon Budget”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/sixth-carbon-budget/ (2021), 13.

[56] Finlay Colville, “Meteoric growth in new solar farm planning in UK sees pipeline reach a staggering 37GW”, https://www.solarpowerportal.co.uk/meteoric_growth_in_new_solar_farm_planning_in_uk_sees_pipeline_reach_a_stag/ (2022).

[57] Solar Media Market Research, “UK Large-Scale Solar Farms: The Post-Subsidy Prospect List”, https://marketresearch.solarmedia.co.uk/reports/uk-large-scale-solar-farms-the-post-subsidy-prospect-list/ (2023).

[58] Ibid.

[59] Note: in the graph, onshore and offshore wind installed capacity are only measured separately from 2008 onwards.

[60] Sarah Kuszynski, “Offshore wind power – blown off course?”, https://conservativehome.com/2023/11/14/sarah-kuszynski-offshore-wind-power-blown-off-course/ (2023).

[61] David Stewart, “UK Offshore Wind pipeline nears 100GW as Global pipeline tops 1.23TW”, https://www.renewableuk.com/news/643056/UK-Offshore-Wind-pipeline-nears-100GW-as-Global-pipeline-tops-1.23TW.htm (2023).

[62] Rob Norris, “Delay to massive offshore wind project shows planning system needs urgent reform”, https://www.renewableuk.com/news/631530/Delay-to-massive-offshore-wind-project-shows-planning-system-needs-urgent-reform.htm (2023).

[63] Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023), 87; Centre for Sustainable Energy and TCPA, “Spatial planning for climate resilience and Net Zero”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/spatial-planning-for-climate-resilience-and-net-zero-cse-tcpa/ (2023), 74-76.

[64] See Rob Norris, “Delay to massive offshore wind project shows planning system needs urgent reform”, https://www.renewableuk.com/news/631530/Delay-to-massive-offshore-wind-project-shows-planning-system-needs-urgent-reform.htm (2023) and Craig Richards, “Delay to massive Ørsted offshore wind farm prompts call for UK planning reform”, https://www.endsreport.com/article/1813033/delay-massive-orsted-offshore-wind-farm-prompts-call-uk-planning-reform (2023).

[65] Richard Howard and Katherine Drayson, “Powering Up: The future of onshore wind in the UK”, https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/powering-up-the-future-of-onshore-wind-in-the-uk/ (2015), 49; note that in the graph, onshore and offshore wind installed capacity are only measured separately from 2008 onwards.

[66] Rebecca Windemer, “The impact of the 2015 onshore wind policy change for local planning authorities in England: Preliminary survey results”, https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/9206381 (2022).

[67] Not applicable to the wind power applications that are subject to PDRs, but these only apply to the smallest schemes (single turbines; within the curtilage of a property; with the tallest element no more than 11.1m high).

[68] See Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Accelerating electricity transmission network deployment: Electricity Networks Commissioner’s recommendations”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accelerating-electricity-transmission-network-deployment-electricity-network-commissioners-recommendations (2023).

[69] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Powering Up Britain: Energy Security Plan”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/powering-up-britain/powering-up-britain-energy-security-plan (2023), 38.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “National Policy Statement for Renewable Energy Infrastructure (EN-3)”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1147382/NPS_EN-3.pdf (2023).

[72] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Permitted development rights: supporting temporary recreational campsites, renewable energy and film-making consultation”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/permitted-development-rights-supporting-temporary-recreational-campsites-renewable-energy-and-film-making-consultation/permitted-development-rights-supporting-temporary-recreational-campsites-renewable-energy-and-film-making-consultation (2023).

[73] Subject to prior approval by the LPA.

[74] Also subject to prior approval by the LPA, in regard to siting, design, external appearance and glare on occupiers of neighbouring land.

[75] HM Government, “British energy security strategy”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/british-energy-security-strategy/british-energy-security-strategy (2022), 16.

[76] Rob Norris, “Delay to massive offshore wind project shows planning system needs urgent reform”, https://www.renewableuk.com/news/631530/Delay-to-massive-offshore-wind-project-shows-planning-system-needs-urgent-reform.htm (2023).

[77] For example, Natural England or the Environment Agency.

[78] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Levelling-Up and Regeneration Bill: Explanatory Notes”, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0006/en/220006en.pdf (2022), 115-117.

[79] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Planning for new energy infrastructure: revisions to National Policy Statements”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/planning-for-new-energy-infrastructure-revisions-to-national-policy-statements (2023).

[80] HM Government, “Energy Security Bill factsheet: Offshore wind environmental improvement package”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/energy-security-bill-factsheets/energy-security-bill-factsheet-offshore-wind-environmental-improvement-package (2023).

[81] Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, “RPSB Report: Powering Healthy Seas – Accelerating Nature Positive Offshore Wind”, https://offshore-coalition.eu/publications/rpsb-report-powering-healthy-seas-accelerating-nature-positive-offshore-wind (2022).

[82] Ibid.

[83] Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, “Revised (Draft) National Policy Statement for Energy”, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/9002/documents/152669/default/ (2022).

[84] Sarah Kuszynski, “Offshore wind power – blown off course?”, https://conservativehome.com/2023/11/14/sarah-kuszynski-offshore-wind-power-blown-off-course/ (2023).

[85] It also enables Government to correct its own mistakes more quickly, as with the fifth CfD round in 2023, where no new offshore wind energy was contracted and firms argued that this was because the Government set the expected price for electricity too low; see Michael Race, “No bids for offshore wind in government auction”, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-66749344 (2023).

[86] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill: reforms to national planning policy”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/levelling-up-and-regeneration-bill-reforms-to-national-planning-policy (2023).

[87] Ibid.

[88] Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, “Revised (Draft) National Policy Statement for Energy”, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/9002/documents/152669/default/ (2022).

[89] Renewable UK, Onshore Wind: The UK’s Next Generation (London: Renewable UK, 2019).

[90] Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, “Revised (Draft) National Policy Statement for Energy”, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/9002/documents/152669/default/ (2022).

[91] Rebecca Windemer, “Considering time in land use planning: An assessment of end-of-life decision making for commercially managed onshore wind schemes”, Land Use Policy (2022).

[92] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill: reforms to national planning policy”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/levelling-up-and-regeneration-bill-reforms-to-national-planning-policy (2023).

[93] Rebecca Foster, “Onshore wind farms and a new case for green energy if Ministers overhaul planning laws to avert fuel crisis sparked by Ukrainian War”, Yorkshire Post, 17 March 2022; criticism also came from numerous LPAs, the power sector, key bodies involved in promoting a net zero energy system – the Climate Change Committee and the National Infrastructure Commission – and the Government’s own net zero review (Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023)). See also Rebecca Windemer, “The impact of the 2015 onshore wind policy change for local planning authorities in England: Preliminary survey results”, https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/9206381 (2022).

[94] Luke Clark, “RenewableUK comments on new Bills announced in Queen’s Speech”, https://www.renewableuk.com/news/604850/RenewableUK-comments-on-new-Bills-announced-in-Queens-Speech.htm (2022).

[95] Michael Gove, Planning update, 5 September 2023, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2023-09-05/hcws1005.

[96] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Developing local partnerships for onshore wind in England”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/developing-local-partnerships-for-onshore-wind-in-england (2023).

[97] See, for example, Geraint Ellis and Gianluca Ferraro, “The social acceptance of wind energy: Where we stand and the path ahead”, Publications office of the European Union (2016); Patrick Devine-Wrigh, “Public engagement with large-scale renewable energy technologies: breaking the cycle of NIMBYism”, WIREs Climate Change (2011), 19-26.

[98] Neil Simcock, “Procedural justice and the implementation of community wind energy projects: A case study from South Yorkshire, UK”, Land Use Policy (2016), 467-477; Gordon Walker et al., “Trust and community: Exploring the meanings, contexts and dynamics of community renewable energy”, Energy Policy (2010), 2655-2663.

[99] Camilla Palladino, “Grid bottlenecks delay transition to clean energy”, Financial Times, 30 May 2023.

[100] Rishi Sunak, PM’s speech on Net Zero, 20 September 2023.

[101] Sarah George, “Report: ‘Phantom’ power projects holding up grid connections in UK”, https://www.edie.net/report-phantom-power-projects-holding-up-grid-connections-in-uk/ (2023).

[102] HM Treasury, “Autumn Statement 2023”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumn-statement-2023 (2023).

[103] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “National Policy Statement for Electricity Networks Infrastructure (EN-5)”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1147384/NPS_EN-5.pdf (2023), 31-32.

[104] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Accelerating electricity transmission network deployment: Electricity Networks Commissioner’s recommendations”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accelerating-electricity-transmission-network-deployment-electricity-network-commissioners-recommendations (2023), 7; 50.

[105] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Community benefits for electricity transmission network infrastructure”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/community-benefits-for-electricity-transmission-network-infrastructure (2023).

[106] Tim Marshall and Richard Cowell, “Infrastructure, planning and the command of time”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2016), 1843-1866.

[107] Sam Hall, “Green conservatives? Understanding what conservatives think about the environment”, https://brightblue.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Green-conservatives-polling-report-Final.pdf (2017); Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “BEIS Public Attitudes Tracker: Autumn 2021”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/beis-public-attitudes-tracker-autumn-2021 (2021).

[108] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Powering Up Britain: Energy Security Plan”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/powering-up-britain/powering-up-britain-energy-security-plan (2023), 30.

[109] Amory Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Towards a Durable Peace (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977).

[110] Bartek Staniszewski and Thomas Nurcombe, Mind your own business: centre-right arguments for increased levels of democratic business ownership (London: Bright Blue, upcoming); Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023), 209.

[111] Marko Aunedi, Enrique Ortega and Tim Green, “Benefits of flexibility of Smart Local Energy Systems in supporting national decarbonisation”, https://www.energyrev.org.uk/media/1965/energyrev_flexiblesystemimpacts_202205_final.pdf (2022).

[112] Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023), 12.

[113] See Richard Cowell and Simon Power, “Wind Power and Spatial Planning in the UK” in Richard Cowell et al. (eds.), Learning from Wind Power: Governance, Societal and Policy Perspectives on Sustainable Energy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 61-84.

[114] Rebecca Windemer, “The impact of the 2015 onshore wind policy change for local planning authorities in England: Preliminary survey results”, https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/9206381 (2022).

[115] Richard Howard and Katherine Drayson, “Powering Up: The future of onshore wind in the UK”, https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/powering-up-the-future-of-onshore-wind-in-the-uk/ (2015).

[116] Geraint Ellis and Gianluca Ferraro, “The social acceptance of wind energy: Where we stand and the path ahead”, Publications office of the European Union (2016), 24.

[117] See also Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “National Planning Policy Framework”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/national-planning-policy-framework (2012), 98.

[118] Rebecca Windemer, “The impact of the 2015 onshore wind policy change for local planning authorities in England: Preliminary survey results”, https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/9206381 (2022).

[119] Cornwall Council, “Climate Emergency Development Plan Document”, https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/uxgjk4jn/climate-emergency-dpd.pdf (2023), 34.

[120] Stroud District Council, “Stroud District Local Plan Review”, https://www.stroud.gov.uk/info/Draft_Plan_2019.pdf (2019), 206-207.

[121] North Ayrshire Council, “Council reveal latest green drive”, https://www.thisisnorthayrshire.co.uk/council-reveal-latest-green-drive/ (2022).

[122] Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023), 155.

[123] gov.uk, “Solar Taskforce”, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/solar-taskforce (2023).

[124] CPRE, the Countryside Charity, “Shout from the rooftops: delivering a common sense solar revolution”, https://www.cpre.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Rooftop-Revolution-Report.pdf (2023), 4.

[125] Climate Change Committee, “Sixth Carbon Budget”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/sixth-carbon-budget/ (2021); RSPB (2022) Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, “RPSB Report: Powering Healthy Seas – Accelerating Nature Positive Offshore Wind”, https://offshore-coalition.eu/publications/rpsb-report-powering-healthy-seas-accelerating-nature-positive-offshore-wind (2022).

[126] Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, “RPSB Report: Powering Healthy Seas – Accelerating Nature Positive Offshore Wind”, https://offshore-coalition.eu/publications/rpsb-report-powering-healthy-seas-accelerating-nature-positive-offshore-wind (2022).

[127] Centre for Sustainable Energy and TCPA, “Spatial planning for climate resilience and Net Zero”, https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/spatial-planning-for-climate-resilience-and-net-zero-cse-tcpa/ (2023), 74-76.

[128] Ben Kochan, “ How council planning department finances could be protected from further cuts”, https://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1806992/council-planning-department-finances-protected-further-cuts (2022).

[129] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “Local authority revenue expenditure and financing: 2023-24 budget, England”, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-revenue-expenditure-and-financing-2023-24-budget-england/local-authority-revenue-expenditure-and-financing-2023-24-budget-england (2023).

[130] Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, “​​Planning Skills Delivery Fund (year 1): Guidance for applicants”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/planning-skills-delivery-fund-year-1-guidance-for-applicants (2023).

[131] HM Government, “Autumn statement https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/655e107697196d000d985d6b/E02982473_Autumn_Statement_Nov_23_Accessible_v3.pdf (2023), 107.

[132] Chris Skidmore, “Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf (2023), 114.

[133] Richard Cowell et al., “Wind energy and justice for disadvantaged communities”, https://www.climatejust.org.uk/resources/wind-energy-and-justice-disadvantaged-communities (2012).

[134] Richard Howard and Katherine Drayson, “Powering Up: The future of onshore wind in the UK”, https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/powering-up-the-future-of-onshore-wind-in-the-uk/ (2015), 11; 60.

[135] Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, “Introducing non-price factors into the Contracts for Difference scheme: call for evidence”, https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/introducing-non-price-factors-into-the-contracts-for-difference-scheme-call-for-evidence (2023).